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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three chapters. After a brief introduction, the first
chapter discusses the definition of on-the-job training, reviews the literature, and
reports empirical analyses for the specific case of UK. I decompose training par-
ticipation and study its evolution in the last 20 years for specific sub-groups of
workers, providing new compelling evidence.
The second chapter finds empirical evidence in favour of a relation between train-
ing and wage inequality between workers with different education level. On this
basis, a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model with on-the-job training is
developed and calibrated to match UK data. I use the framework to study the
redistributional effects of training subsidies. The model is intentionally simple,
to allow for a better understanding of the dynamics of macroeconomic variables
after policy changes.
The third chapter proposes a more articulated general equilibrium model which
features training externalities and distortionary income taxes. I present evidence
that motivates the use of this framework, and its underlying assumptions. Thus,
I calibrate the model to replicate the salient characteristics of the UK economy
and I employ it to evaluate the welfare effects of policy reforms on training. The
main contributions of my work are summarised in the conclusions.
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Introduction
The thesis studies the role and the effects of firm-provided training activities in
the UK and it produces policy recommendations about the desirability of training
subsidies. In the first part, I collect and summarise empirical results dispersed
throughout the literature and I provide novel evidence on training activities of UK
companies. Then, I develop a theoretical model for firms’ training decision and
use it to study the effect of fiscal subsidies to training on workers’ wages. Finally,
I build a more realistic framework and produce policy recommendations for the
optimal level of training subsidies.
Training activities are an important element of modern developed economies.
Training is associated with higher wages for workers, and higher productivity for
companies. The latter capture most of the benefits of training spells and finance
most of their costs. Also, these activities, that in the UK amount to approximately
4% of firms’ gross value added, have important aggregate effects on economic
growth. According to the literature, training contributes to increasing total factor
1
productivity together with other activities, such as research and development
(R&D), and the diffusion of formal education.
Integrating this evidence, I show that, after a surge in the 1990s, training provi-
sion has fallen since 2002. Despite severe data limitations, it appears that training
has declined both in terms of duration and number of workers who receive training.
To investigate the drivers of these changes, I study how training opportunities are
distributed across workers, bringing new insights on age-dependent trends in the
UK data.
In the literature, there is evidence that training provision is unequally dis-
tributed among workers with different educational attainments. I contribute to
this literature by reporting and analysing the inequality in training participation
between University educated and non-University educated employees. Also, I di-
rectly link training inequality to wage inequality with an empirical analysis of the
UK labour force data. The small but economically relevant relationship between
training and wage inequality suggests that there is scope for policy-makers to
intervene in this market.
Chapter 2 develops this issue, studying the effect of fiscal policies with a stylised
general equilibrium (GE) model. I calibrate the model to data from the UK
and ensure that it generates training and wage inequality that are consistent
2
with the data. Then, I evaluate policies that target training for the unskilled
workers by subsidising the firms and reducing the relevant financial costs. The
model’s predictions regarding the magnitude of the effect of training subsidies
to training participation and the effect of the reduction in training inequality on
wage inequality are consistent with the empirical evidence collect. With respect
to both relationships, the model predicts effects just below the lower bound of my
estimates.
Despite the conservative calibration, there is a significant impact on wages
and earnings for workers. In particular, training subsidies significantly increase
wages and labour income of the target group, and there are sizeable positive
spillover effects from subsidising the training of each group of workers to the
other group. For instance, a policy to subsidise a quarter of the costs to train
unskilled workers can increase their wages (earnings) by 0.23% (0.75%), 10-years
following the implementation of the policy, and by 0.58% (1.06% for earnings) in
the long-run. Moreover, there are sizeable effects on skilled workers, who benefit
from the increased productivity of unskilled workers. Continuing with the same
example, skilled workers would experience an increase in their wages (earnings) by
0.06% (0.16%), 10-years following the implementation of the policy, and by 0.42%
(0.51% for earnings) in the long-run.
3
These positive spillover effects are important in generating wider social gains
from a more targeted policy. In addition, they are helpful in reconciling the small
effect that training inequality has on wage inequality in the data (and model)
with the strong impact that training has on wages in both the empirical literature
and the model. Thus, the proposed framework helps explain the new empirical
evidence and it builds a solid basis for the evaluation of policies related to firm-
provided training.
Chapter 3 brings forth the analysis of wages and inequality that I started ad-
dressing in Chapter 2. The main contributions are three: (i) I build a new stylised
model which features a range of endogenous channels affecting training provision
and wage and productivity outcomes, and I extend it by introducing a more com-
plex fiscal menu at disposition of the policy-maker; (ii) I find novel and compelling
evidence that training provision is negatively affected by the separation rate of
workers, i.e. poaching externality; and (iii) I provide a first quantitative evalua-
tion of the effects of fiscal policies with respect to training subsidies that the UK
government could implement.
The revised framework allows to measure changes of welfare for skilled and
unskilled workers. On the empirical side, the analysis suggests that an increase
in the job-to-job separation rate leads to a decrease in the training participation
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rate. This is consistent with the idea that firms curtails training investments if
trained workers are likely to be hired by their competitors. Thus, it appears that
training provision is sub-optimal.
Under these considerations, training subsidies can be Pareto improving. Yet,
for high level of subsidies, the distortions caused by their financing outweigh the
benefits. Measuring welfare for ex-ante different households, it can be observed
that households have very different preferences on training subsidies.
Recent data suggests that UK institutions subsidise about 2.4% of the training
monetary costs paid by firms. The analysis concludes that the subsidy rate is
too low. Both households would benefit by a moderate increase of the subsidies
to skilled training activities, however, such a policy would increase the inequal-
ity of outcomes. Conversely, unskilled training subsidies are more controversial.
These subsidies increase the welfare of the average worker, but are likely to reduce
skilled workers’ welfare and to reduce labour productivity. Thus, the choice of the
training fiscal policy requires the balancing between equity, efficiency and social
preferences.
5
”Job training empowers people to realize their
dreams and improve their lives.”
Sylvia M. Burwell, US Secretary of
Health and Human Services
1
On the job training: theory and empirical
evidence
1.1 Introduction
The chapter provides a comprehensive overview on training activities that firms
offer to their workers. To this purpose, I collect and summarise empirical results
6
dispersed throughout a large literature and I provide novel evidence on training
activities of companies located in the UK.
After presenting a working definition of training and a theoretical framework
that justifies its provision, I discuss why training activities are an important ele-
ment of modern developed economies. In particular, training is associated with
higher wages, for workers, and higher productivity, for companies. The latter
capture most of the benefits of training spells and finance most of their costs.
Also, these activities, that in the UK amount to approximately 4% of firms’ gross
value added, have important aggregate effects on economic growth. According to
the related literature, training contributes to increasing total factor productivity,
together with other activities such as research and development (R&D) and the
diffusion of formal education across the workforce.
Next, I quantify training activities in the UK and I provide evidence that, after a
surge in the 1990s, training provision has been falling since 2002. Data limitations
prevent estimating the intensive margin, but, given the available information, it
appears that training has declined both in terms of duration of spells and number
of workers who receive training. In relation to this issue, I investigate how training
opportunities are distributed.
In the literature, there is evidence that training provision is unequally dis-
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tributed among workers. I contribute to the literature by reporting and analysing
the inequality in training participation between University educated and non-
University educated employees. Also, I directly link training inequality to wage
inequality with an empirical analysis on the UK labour force data. The small but
economically relevant relationship between training and wage inequality suggests
that there is scope for policy-makers to intervene in this market.1
Then, I investigate the business cycle characteristics of UK training participa-
tion rate. Contrary to earlier results in the literature, I show that there is no clear
relationship between economic activity and the provision of training, at least for
the UK. The results can be reconciled by the fact that other researchers employed
different definitions of training, referred to other countries, or employed different
proxies for the business cycle.
I also report that the great recession had limited effect on the training provision
in the UK. This evidence further strengthens the idea that training activities are
unresponsive to their indirect costs, i.e. the opportunity cost of working time,
while direct costs may have a stronger influence.2
Finally, I employ decomposition techniques to further investigate the long-run
1I further develop this issue in Chapter 2, where I study the effect of fiscal policies using a
general equilibrium model.
2This conclusion is drawn by the evidence that, ceteris paribus, companies facing high direct
costs are less likely to provide training to their workers.
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trend in training participation for the UK. What emerges from this analysis is that
(i) workers moved towards training-intensive sectors and occupations; (ii) training
inequality has reduced mostly because of a reduction in training of University edu-
cated workers, which is not related to their observable characteristics but appears
to be residual to these factors; (iii) the probability of training for older workers,
who are close to retirement age, has drastically increased and compensates the
decline in training observed for all the other age groups.
The changes in training provision that I find have not been observed by the
literature and provide a interesting puzzle. While I postulate several explanations
to reconcile theory and empirical data, I do not present an ultimate solution the
puzzle since more comprehensive data is needed to identify the factors that drove
the observed changes in the distribution of training across the UK workforce.
1.1.1 Human capital theory and observed wage profiles
Since the seminal work of Mincer (1958), economists have investigated the relation
between the human capital of a worker, i.e. her education, and her productivity.
The latter, in absence of better proxies, is generally associated to her wage. It is
widely agreed that the human capital accumulated through schooling and Univer-
sity education can explain much of the earning differential among workers with
9
different education levels (see e.g. the Handbook of Education and Economics
(2011)).
At the same time, it has been noted that average wages display specific pat-
terns during the work-life of an employee. They generally rise at the start of her
career, stabilise later on, and decrease slightly before retirement. Also, workers
with different education levels have different wage profiles. In particular, more
educated workers have steeper increases in their wage at the beginning of their
career. To explain these three stylised facts, researchers have presented a number
of competing theories: e.g. on-the-job learning (i.e. sheer experience), on-the-job
training (OJT), and contract theory.3
In the context of the OJT literature, the main hypothesis is that training is
complementary to education as a source of additional human capital for workers,
increasing their productivity and, thus, their wage.4
As shown below, training is one of the main factors contributing to wage and
productivity dispersion across the workforce. Despite its importance, little is
known about job-related training for three main reasons: (i) training activities
are different in terms of skills they develop and they have different impacts, e.g.
3See Rubistein and Weiss (2006) in the Handbook of Economics of Education, volume 2,
chapter 1 for a comprehensive review of the literature.
4Section 1.2.4.3 presents alternative mechanisms that economists have proposed to justify
the link between training spells and productivity.
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safety vs technical training; (ii) these activities are poorly observed and surveyed;
and (iii) training spells interfere with other job-related events, e.g. promotions
and job changes within the same firm, that are often not (or not timely) recorded
in survey data. Not controlling for training activity heterogeneity is likely to
dilute the effect of training, as some of the training spells are mandatory or less
relevant for the company. Conversely, promotions and career advancements that
are concurrent to training may bias upward the estimates of training returns.
These issues have received a great attention by the literature and are the subject
of the next section.
1.2 Empirical evidence on training costs and returns
The section reports the most relevant evidence on job-related training that is
available to date with respect to training costs and its returns. Even though
this work focuses on the UK case, I expand the discussion to other countries to
compensate the lack of UK-based evidence.5 Although it should not be taken
for granted, the strong similarities in training patterns between European (and
generally OECD) countries suggest that empirical results from other countries
5Detailed information on training is costly to collect, thus countries have very different
datasets. Some of those datasets span for long periods, other provides exceptionally detailed
information about training activities over a shorter time. Hence, even though a large number
of empirical works use UK and US data, important information can be gathered only from the
evidence collected in other countries.
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may hold true also for the UK.
1.2.1 Definition of training
Training activities are many and diverse, and most surveys fail to capture such
heterogeneity. I focus on formal training courses, run either on the employer’s
premises or off-site. As shown below, these represent a large share of adult learn-
ing activities. Thus, I do not consider apprenticeships and formative courses for
unemployed workers since, although those may be as important as on-the-job
training, they are intrinsically different from it. In fact, apprenticeships are an
instrument to facilitate the transition of new hires from education to the work-
place, while remedial training should serve to mitigate the effect of industrial
restructuring and to support the relocation of dismissed workers.6
The best way to discriminate between on-the-job training and other forms of
adult education is to consider who pays for it. Indeed, apprenticeships are often
state-subsidised and co-financed by employees (through lower salaries), and, gen-
erally, the state pays for virtually all training provided to unemployed workers.
Conversely, on-the-job training is paid chiefly by employers. For this main reason,
the latter is studied and analysed separately from other forms of adult learning.
6I use the word ’should’ because several researchers, e.g. Rosholm and Skipper (2009) and
Heckman and Carneiro (2003), argue that remedial training has weak positive effects in terms
of job-market outcomes for its participants. For a more extensive review of this literature, see
Heckman et al. (1999) and, more recently, McCall et al. (2016).
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Further, the literature that studies employer-provided training proposes a dis-
tinction between formal and informal activities.7 Several authors (e.g. Frazis and
Loewenstein (2005) and Albert et al. (2010)) suggest that, even though there is
no official data, a large amount of working time is invested into these informal
activities. Yet, whenever data about informal training is available, these activ-
ities appear to have a very little effect: they don’t increase firms’ productivity,
nor workers’ wage. For example, Dostie (2013), employing a dataset of Canadian
companies, shows that only formal training has a measurable effect on these vari-
ables. Black and Lynch (1996) obtain similar results for the US. For these reasons,
I focus my attention on formal activities, which are more consistently reported in
the surveys. This is also the prevailing approach in the literature.
1.2.2 Training costs and who pays them
The identification of who bears the cost of training is the first essential step to
comprehend the role and nature of on-the-job training in developed economies.
This is also the first step before I can evaluate the effects of a possible intervention
of the state in the training sector.
7Informal training is an activity that takes place on the workplace. It is generally defined as
the process of learning by others, e.g. a line manager or more tenured co-worker, or learning by
oneself, which could by either learning by doing or learning by watching (see e.g. Black et al.
(1999) and Destré et al. (2008)).
13
A few stylised facts with respect to the costs of on-the-job training can be
identified. In particular, I find that (i) in European countries, the cost of job-
related training activities is covered chiefly by employers who, on average, pay
80% of the costs (the share varies among datasets and countries but is never
below 50%); (ii) in the UK, taking as an example the year 2004, companies paid
77% of the direct costs related to the training of their employees; and (iii) UK
public funds and grants cover for less than 1% of the total training expenditures,
after controlling for firms’ own contribution to such funds.8
From a theoretical standpoint, workers should be paying for their training if
and only if they are the beneficiaries of this investment. According to Becker
(1962), training is general as long as it is equally valuable to any company. In this
case, the firm needs to increase the salary it pays up to the level of the worker’s
marginal productivity if it wants to retain the trained worker. Thus, the latter is
the only beneficiary of training. If training is specific, the productivity increase is
entirely captured by the firm as the accrued human capital does not increase the
worker’s outside option.
Nonetheless, as Leuven (2004) suggests, market imperfections may render gen-
eral training equivalent to firm-specific training, e.g. when the prevailing market
8Different data sources report a different size of government intervention, however they all
suggest that training funds financed by general taxation are few percentage points of the direct
training costs. On this matter, see the UK training datasets mentioned below.
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wage is below the worker’s marginal productivity. The literature names this sit-
uation wage compression, e.g. see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999). More formally,
wage compression occurs whenever the elasticity of wage to productivity is lower
than one. In this case, firms have incentives to provide training, although their
offer could be sub-optimal. As a consequence, the theory can’t predict a priori
who pays for on-the-job training.
To address this question, Bassanini et al. (2007) have collected data from the
Continuing Vocational Training Survey, run every five years among a large number
of European countries. They report that employer-provided training represents
the main component of all training activities, and that workers do not pay for
OJT through lower initial salaries or flatter wage-tenure profiles. More precisely,
their data reveal that training spells paid by employers represent about 70-80%
of the total training expenditures and about 50-60% of the total time spent on
training. The difference between cost and time shares can be justified by the
fact that remedial training, often financed by the family or the government, lasts
longer than employer-provided courses.9
To confirm these findings for the UK case, I collect specific evidence from the UK
9There are several justifications that can explain why remedial training may cost less than
on-the-job training despite lasting longer. For example, this would be the case if fixed costs
represented a large share of total training expenditure and if they were larger for firm-provided
training.
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Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). In this survey, training is divided into: (i)
workplace training, if run within one of the establishments of a company; (ii) away
training, if the activity is held in a separate place; and (iii) mixed training, if only
part of the training is run within the company. In the period 2005-2015, employees
reported that 40% of activities were workplace training, 42% were away training,
and 18% were mixed. Workplace training is by definition an activity organised
and fully paid by employers. Hence, to understand to what extent companies pay
for training their employees, I have to consider who pays for the two other training
types.
As reported in Table 1.1, around 60% of the remaining training activities are
paid mostly by employers.10,11 Combining these statistics, I conclude that, taking
as reference the year 2014, UK employers have financed about 77% of the total
expenditures in job-related training.
Several academics, e.g. Parent (1999) and Acemoglu and Pischke (2007), have
advanced the hypothesis that workers may accept lower salaries to receive train-
ing, i.e. they finance these activities indirectly. Against this hypothesis, Booth
10Unfortunately, the survey does not ask the exact contribution of employer, family or gov-
ernment, but only the order by which they contributed. Thus, a worker reports who paid the
largest part of the training costs but she does not specify if e.g. the company paid fully or partly
the training costs.
11Since the question has not been asked for several years, Table 1.1 reports the older and
newer period for which data are available. The excluded years provide similar figures as workers’
response to the question is relatively stable.
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Table 1.1: Who pays for training, %
1992-1996 2010-2014
employer or potential employer 63.6 59.9
self, family or relative 15.9 19.2
other government or labour organization 11.1 8.0
no fees 5.3 9.7
employment action or similar program 2.0 0.3
other 1.7 2.2
don’t know 0.4 1.7
total 100 100
and Brian (2002) show a positive but insignificant effect of next year’s training
on current wages for UK households. On the opposite, Connoly and Gottshalk
(2008) show that, ceteris paribus, initial wages are lower for trainees. Yet, they
adopt a broader definition of training which includes apprenticeships. As discussed
earlier, apprenticeships have employee-employer dynamics different from that of
job-related training activities. Thus, I do not consider their finding relevant to
the current analysis. In the context of on-the-job training the main evidence is
that training costs are not rebated onto trainees.
Finally, I verify that UK public funds don’t cover a large share of these expenses
in place of the employers. To do so, I look at the National Employer Skills Survey
(NESS) carried out by the UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES)
in the years 2011, 2013, and 2015. They decompose training expenditures into
multiple items. Their results are summarised in Table 1.2. In most cases, com-
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panies contribute to funds managed by the government, local authorities or trade
associations, and they receive back credits to support their training needs. As
reported in Table 1.2, the net transfer from public funds to employers represents
less than 1% of the total expenses, even after considering tax deductions. In other
words, the UK government contributes to the training expenses of employers,
while UK firms bear most of the training costs for job-related training activities.
Table 1.2: Decomposition of UK job-related training expenditures
2011 2013 2015
£bn % £bn % £bn %
all Training, total £43.8 100 £43.0 100 £45.4 100
off-the-job training, total 21.1 48 21.3 50 22.9 50
on-the-job training, total 22.7 52 21.7 50 22.6 50
levies minus grants -0.3 -0.7 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4
1.2.3 Implications of the empirical evidence
Since empirical evidence indicates that companies pay for most of the training,
I advance two hypotheses: either training activities are firm-specific or there are
important frictions in the labour market causing wage compression.12 Since dis-
criminating between the two cases may have important policy implications, many
economists have collected evidence on this issue.
12As briefly discussed above, wage compression can occur because of e.g. asymmetric informa-
tion, wage rigidities, search costs, and social norms (see e.g. Akerlof and Yellen (1990)). Frazis
and Loewenstein (2006) find strong evidence of wage compression for the US labour market.
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Most empirical investigations conclude that training has both a specific com-
ponent and a general one. Parent (1999) analyses data from the US National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NFLS), reporting that employers provide train-
ing to their workforce, even if, at the same time, their competitors are willingly
to offer higher wages to trained employees. Parent maintains that firms benefit
from training workers even after taking into account the risk of poaching. Labour
poaching occurs when a competitor firm hires the trained worker. The new firm
can capitalise on her higher productivity without bearing any training cost, hence,
it can offer a higher wage. This is more likely to occur when training is general
rather than firm-specific.13,14
If training were chiefly general, no firm would train its workers. For this reason,
researchers exclude the possibility that training is purely general. On the other
side, the presence of spillovers in favour of trained workers excludes that training
is purely firm-specific. Hence, Garloff and Kuckulenz (2006), who find evidence
in favour of firm-specific training for Germany, recognise that employer-provided
training must have a general component too.
13See Brunello and Gambarotto (2004) for a study on local firm density and training provision
in UK. They find these two variables to be negatively correlated, and one of the accredited
explanations is the fact that firms in denser areas face higher poaching risk. Thus, they are less
likely to train employees.
14Industry, or sector, specific training is comparable to general training, as competing compa-
nies desire the skills acquired and are willing to pay to poach them. Therefore, the externality
will be stronger, the stronger is the competition for these skills in the local labour market.
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To summarise, firm-provided training has general and firm-specific components
in varying degrees; and, to complicate the picture, institutional factors, such as
labour unions and legislation, also affect how rents from training are shared be-
tween employers and workers.15 Provided this empirical evidence, as long as
training spells increase productivity, companies should be the main beneficiaries
of such investments. I verify this conjecture in the next section.
1.2.4 Returns to training
A large strand of the literature has investigated the returns to training. Those
are measured in various ways, but in most cases training costs are not taken into
account as such information is poorly measured, if available at all, in current
datasets. Thus, researchers have focused on the difference in wage or productivity
between a trained and an untrained worker, or the difference in productivity of
companies with different training levels.16 Below, I first review the evidence with
respect to training returns from the point of view of companies, and then from
that of their workers.
15As an example, take Acemoglu and Pischke (2003), who discuss extensively the consequences
of the introduction of the ’minimum wage’ legislation on unemployment and training invest-
ments.
16Productivity is generally defined as the gross value added, per worker, of a company.
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1.2.4.1 Firms’ returns to training
With respect to the benefits of training that are captured by the firms, I maintain
that the estimation of the returns to training is challenging due to endogeneity and
unobserved heterogeneity. Nonetheless, recent estimates for UK firms suggest that
a 1 percentage point increase in training participation increases value added per
worker by 0.6 percentage points (Dearden et al. (2006)). Also, returns to training
seem to be heterogeneous. Some firms thus do not train their workers because
the return rate on these investment is negative. Primarily, these companies face
higher training costs, but it is not excluded that they have less to gain from a
trained workforce.
As Table 1.2 shows, UK companies spend around 45 billion pounds per year in
training their employees. Given the amount of resources invested, I expect these
firms to receive sufficiently large benefits from training, unless they use these
activities as a fringe benefit that integrates the salary of their employees.
Empirical works report almost unanimously positive effects of training on firms’
productivity (see the evidence reported in Table 1.3). The effect of higher training
participation is observed both at the firm level and among sectors. However, the
effect of training is not easily measurable.
21
Ta
bl
e
1.
3:
Fi
rm
ret
ur
ns
to
tra
ini
ng
pa
pe
r
da
ta
se
t
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
co
nt
ro
ls
eff
ec
ts
D
ea
rd
en
et
al
.
(2
00
6)
UK
;1
98
3-
19
96
Va
lu
e
ad
de
d
pe
rw
or
ke
r
ca
pi
ta
lp
er
wo
rk
er
,
R&
D
in
te
ns
ity
,
ho
ur
pe
rw
or
ke
r,
wo
rk
er
s’
qu
al
ifi
ca
tio
n
0.
6%
fo
r1
%
in
cr
ea
se
in
tr
ai
ni
ng
(G
M
M
)
St
an
ca
,
Co
lo
m
bo
(2
00
8)
IT
;2
00
2-
20
05
Va
lu
e
ad
de
d
ov
er
em
pl
oy
m
en
ta
tfi
rm
lev
el
ca
pi
ta
lp
er
wo
rk
er
,
R&
D
in
te
ns
ity
,s
ize
,
tr
ai
ni
ng
du
ra
tio
n,
ag
e,
ex
ec
ut
iv
es
’s
ha
re
,
wo
rk
er
s’
sh
ar
e,
se
ct
or
0.
07
4%
(G
M
M
)
0.
02
8-
0.
04
5%
(F
E-
O
LS
)
fo
r1
%
in
cr
ea
se
in
tr
ai
ni
ng
Al
m
eid
a,
Ca
rn
eir
o
(2
00
9)
PG
;1
99
5-
19
99
M
ar
gi
na
lr
et
ur
n
of
on
e
m
or
e
tr
ai
ni
ng
ho
ur
fo
ra
ll
em
pl
oy
ee
s
em
pl
oy
ee
s,
wo
rk
er
s’
qu
al
ifi
ca
tio
n,
ca
pi
ta
ls
to
ck
,
ex
ec
ut
iv
es
sh
ar
e
-0
.3
0%
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
(δ
=
17
%
)
8.
60
%
fo
rfi
rm
sw
ho
ar
e
tr
ai
ni
ng
Zw
ick
(2
00
6)
D
E;
19
97
-2
00
1
Va
lu
e
ad
de
d
at
th
e
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
tl
ev
el
co
lle
ct
iv
e
wa
ge
s,
IT
,
hi
rin
g
ru
les
,s
ec
to
r,
siz
e,
wo
rk
er
s’
qu
al
ifi
ca
tio
n
0.
76
%
fo
r1
%
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
tr
ai
ne
es
(F
E
wi
th
th
re
e
IV
s)
D
os
tie
(2
01
3)
CA
;1
99
9-
20
06
Va
lu
e
ad
de
d
pe
rw
or
ke
r
at
th
e
fir
m
lev
el
wo
rk
er
flo
ws
(t
ur
no
ve
r)
,
in
du
st
ry
,y
ea
r,
ty
pe
of
tr
ai
ni
ng
11
%
m
or
e
pr
od
uc
tiv
e
th
an
un
tr
ai
ne
d
wo
rk
er
s(
G
M
M
)
Va
no
rm
eli
ng
en
m
,
Ko
ni
ng
s(
20
15
)
BE
;1
99
7-
20
06
Va
lu
e
ad
de
d
an
d
wa
ge
s
ca
pi
ta
l,
fir
m
’s
se
ct
or
,
N
◦
em
pl
oy
ee
s,
ye
ar
,
av
er
ag
e
ed
uc
at
io
n,
ge
nd
er
.7
6%
(.4
4%
)v
al
ue
ad
de
d
(w
ag
e)
in
cr
ea
se
fo
ro
ne
ho
ur
of
tr
ai
ni
ng
22
The literature has identified two main issues that affect estimation of train-
ing spells on productivity: endogeneity of training investments and unobserved
heterogeneity that correlates with training. According to Stanca and Colombo
(2008), failing to account for the potential endogeneity of training leads to under-
estimates of the effect of training on productivity. As Bartel (1994) and Black and
Lynch (2001) have suggested, it is likely that, when a firm faces adverse market
conditions and labour productivity is low, it invests more resources on training.
On the other side, failing to account for unobserved firm heterogeneity leads to
overestimation of the returns. In fact, when Stanca and Colombo use a fixed
effects estimation procedure instead of OLS, returns to training are halved. This
difference is not accidental, but consistently observed in many other works cited
above.
Some of these empirical works estimate also the effect of training on average
wages at firm level. In general, the effect of training on wages is estimated to be
about half its effect on firm’s productivity. Thus, it seems that either training has
a relevant firm-specific component, or that firms’ bargaining power is large enough
to capture the rents from general human capital. In both cases, underinvestment
seems not so severe as the earlier literature envisaged. In last instance, such
evidence leaves less scope for policy intervention over concern about efficiency.17
17These are the conclusions, in a nutshell, that both Leuven (2004) and Pischke (2005) draw
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Table 1.3 reports a summary of the most recent works that estimate the marginal
effect of training on productivity. For the UK, Dearden et al. (2006) show that a
1 percentage point increase in training participation increases by 0.6 percentage
points the per worker value added of a sector. Unfortunately, most researchers
cannot estimate the rate of return due to lack of information about training costs.
They can only estimate gross returns to training.
Almeida and Carneiro (2009), using a unique Portuguese dataset containing
information about both training costs and returns, estimate that the average firm
has a return on investment of about 8% (which may vary by few percentage points
depending on the assumption on human capital depreciation). Yet, if those firms
that do not provide training were to provide it, the marginal return of one hour
of training would be negative. This evidence, although limited to firms with more
than 100 workers, suggests that training is heterogeneous both in its provision and
in the returns associated to it.
1.2.4.2 Employees’ returns to training
With respect to the effect of training on trainees’ wages, a few important empirical
results emerge. The early literature claims that employees realise high returns
from training. The high range estimates are up to seven times higher than the
from reviewing the past literature.
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returns to schooling. However, several authors are sceptical about these estimates,
e.g. Leuven (2004) and Pischke (2005). More recent works have found weak
evidence of a causal effect of training on wages.
The literature has attempted to identify a non-spurious causal link between
training and wage earnings as a first step to derive policy implications. Estimating
the effects of training is a challenging task, as it is empirically correlated with many
other events in the work-life, such as promotions. Thus, it is difficult to establish
a causal relationship in one direction or the other, as well as to control for each
factor. Nonetheless, several authors have found evidence in favour of a strong
positive effect of training on wages, e.g. Frazis and Loewenstein (2005).18
To give a broad idea of the empirical evidences collected so far, in Table 1.4, I
report a far from exhaustive list of the estimated effect of training on log-wages for
a handful of countries. As emphasised by Pischke (2005), these works, in particular
the ones published during the 90s, estimate ”huge returns” from training.19 If
converted to annual returns, they are about five to six time greater than the
returns from schooling.
18Yet, one of their concerns is that they may be not properly controlling for promotions,
causing a bias in the estimation of log-wages changes due to training spells. They are also
worried about other issues, in particular about: (i) measurement errors, (ii) heterogeneity in
wage growth, and (iii) heterogeneity of returns to training with respect to job characteristics.
19In Table 1.4, I do not report them to focus on the results of more recent literature. However,
summary tables are available in Leuven (2004).
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Pischke is sceptical about these values, and he suggests two possible explana-
tions. First, he argues that a single training spell could be extremely useful, for
example to someone promoted to a managerial position, but any additional invest-
ment would be unproductive. In this case, marginal returns decrease fast to zero
for any additional training. An alternate hypothesis is that standard methods fail
to control for the endogenous selection of workers into training.
Indeed, recent works that employ different empirical techniques to study the re-
lation between training and wages have revised downwards these estimates. Most
of the recent studies use instrumental variables (IV ) to control for endogeneity
between wages, training and skills. They find little or no relationship between
training and wages. Yet, their results are criticised over two main concerns. First,
compared to the traditional approach, they rely on small samples with low statis-
tical power. Second, as they generally select small groups of similar workers, one
as treatment and the other as control, their estimation may not be representative
of the whole population.
An example is Leuven and Oosterbeek (2002). They employ a survey based on
3074 interviews with workers from randomly selected Dutch companies to perform
the following test. They compare the average wage of trained workers to that of
workers who couldn’t train due to some random event, such as an illness or family
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circumstances. The authors fail to reject the null hypothesis of no wage difference
between participants and control group.20
A serious concern coming from this literature is that some workers may have
unobserved characteristics that lead both to steeper wage-experience profiles and
to higher training participation. Thus, the relation between wages and training
remains somewhat disputed.21
1.2.4.3 How training can affect productivity and wages
The hypothesis of positive effects of training on wage and productivity relies
on the underlying assumption that, through training, workers gain productivity-
enhancing skills. However, there could be other reasons for a causal relationship
between training and productivity. The literature has advanced a number of al-
ternative hypotheses with respect to the role of training in advanced economies.
I take into consideration four potential effects of firm-sponsored training: (i) em-
ployees happiness, (ii) the probability of promotion, (iii) turnover reduction, and
20In another work, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) report previous estimates that are consistent
with their findings: ”Examples of studies with low or zero returns are Booth (1993) for the United
Kingdom and Pischke (2001) for Germany. Lynch (1992) and Veum (1995) report returns to
company training incidence not statistically different from zero for US NLSY data”.
21Recent works report statistically, and economically, significant wage returns from training
for developing countries, for example the work by Almeida and Faria (2014). Yet, in these
economies, training could be a substitute for education, especially if the quality of education is
particularly low. For that reason, these results cannot be extended to different contexts, e.g. to
OECD countries.
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(iv) human capital externalities. These theories support the importance of training
for companies, sectors, and the economy of developed countries.
Happiness Happiness, or job satisfaction, has been related to a series of positive
labour market outcomes, such as reduction in absenteeism, and higher growth of
wages and productivity.22 Consequently, researchers from economics and psychol-
ogy have studied the main determinants of job satisfaction. Among them, Budria
(2012) estimates the effect of training spells on self-reported job satisfaction based
on the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHPS). He argues that
the effect of training on happiness can be equated to a 17.7% increase in earnings.
Notwithstanding his results, the link remains disputed as all such analyses rely on
employees’ self-reported mental status, rather than objective measures.
Probability of Promotion Other works have tried to test whether training
can predict promotions. Melero (2010), using the BHPS, estimates a positive
affect of training on the probability of promotion for women. The coefficient is
smaller and non-significant for men. The author suggests that firms reward women
according to the market value of the skills they possess, while for men promotion
is mainly a tool to induce effort. Thus, training has much less importance for
22See respectively the works of Judge et al. (2001) and Wegge et al. (2007).
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the latter group. Since this differential could be attributed to other uncontrolled
factors, such as composition effects (women achieve on average lower education
levels), the author considers other plausible explanations (rejecting them). If
confirmed, the link between training spells and promotions is additional evidence
that job-related training is an important activity for both firms and workers. In
particular, for a firm, training could be an efficient alternative to hiring new
employees to fill specific vacancies (see e.g. Blatter et al. (2012)).
Reducing turnover Several authors argue that providing training to low pro-
ductivity workers can lead to a significant reduction in the turnover rate.23,24 This
literature assumes that idiosyncratic shocks hit workers productivity and, if large
enough, they break the match. More precisely, an employer separates from the
worker whenever the rent from the match becomes negative. A firm that provides
training to low-productivity workers faces lower firing costs since idiosyncratic
shocks are less likely to induce separations.
However, since training is strongly correlated with educational attainment and
wages, Budria and Pereira (2007) argue that training is ”far from remedial”. In
other words, firms invest mainly on top employees. If training could reduce the
23Labour turnover is defined as the proportion of a firm’s workforce that leaves during a given
period of time.
24Theoretically, such result can be obtained by introducing endogenous separation in a model
with employer-employee matching, see for example Lechthaler (2005) and (2009).
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turnover rate of low skilled workers, the data should display a high training partic-
ipation rate for these workers on the marginal productivity threshold; arguably, it
doesn’t. On the contrary, Dostie (2013) provides the empirical evidence that work-
places with high turnover provide more training, due to the incidence of induction
training for new hires. It is possible that researchers overlook informal training
activities, since the latter are virtually unreported in available datasets. How-
ever, according to Dostie, this type of training does not seem to be productivity-
enhancing, as it only provides some basic knowledge to the new hires. Thus,
this theoretical framework, based on idiosyncratic shocks, finds little support in
empirical data.
Nonetheless turnover could be affected by training through a different mecha-
nism. The investigation of Koster et al. (2011), on a small sample of 2833 Dutch
pharmacy assistants, suggests that investing in general training contributes to job
satisfaction and to the ”perceived support in employment development” (PSED),
which can reduce sensibly turnover rates. The underlying theory is borrowed
from the social exchange theory, as developed by Blau (1964) or Eisenberger et
al. (1986) among the others. According to the authors, workers’ reciprocity and
gratitude allow firms to profit from investments in general human capital. Unlike
the matching theory reviewed above, reciprocity affects any worker, therefore it
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is compatible with the fact that more educated and productive workers receive
more training.
In a more recent paper, Leuven et al. (2005) argue that worker reciprocity
has a positive and significant effect on the probability that a firm will provide
training. They estimate a 15% increase in the probability of receiving training
due to observable differences in the reciprocity index, which they engineered from
a Dutch survey. They speculate that, since training is mainly general, a firm
knows that training workers who are more likely to feel indebted yields higher
expected returns. The reciprocity theory, unfortunately, cannot be tested on the
QLFS dataset due to data limitations. Nonetheless, this channel could have a high
economic impact for companies. For example, Mattox and Jinkerson (2005), using
a private dataset of a large US company, show that training programs meant to
retain key managers or experienced employers had a return on investment ranging
from $12 to $21 per dollar spent.25
From a macroeconomic perspective, economists have found evidence of uncon-
ditional negative correlation between training and the separation rate of workers,
25It must be noted that the rate of return estimated by Mattox and Jinkerson (2005) is
incredibly high compared to other works’, e.g. Almeida and Carneiro (2009). Yet, their result
is not directly comparable with all the others since: (i) it is based on a very specific sub-sample
of employees, i.e. key managers; (ii) data comes for a single large US multinational company;
and (iii) the training programmed under scrutiny is precisely monitored, whereas, in general,
researchers observe more noisy information.
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which can explained in two ways.26 From one side, trained workers are less likely
to change job, at least in the short term (consistently with what reported above).
On the other side, firms may train workers when the probability of separation is
low, as expected returns are higher. In this respect, Brunello and De Paola (2009)
fail to find a statistically significant relationship between past training and the
probability of changing job the year after the training spell. Hence, they question
the rationale for government intervention on the training sector out of efficiency
concerns. They use data from 7 waves of the European Community Household
Panel, but they employ a linear probability model and, while they control for in-
dividual fixed effects, they are unable to control for endogeneity issues, or reverse
causality. For these reasons, their results do not appear robust and leave scope
for further research. In chapter 3, I show that, at least in the UK, firms reduce
training when the rate of job-to-job transitions is higher in the local labour market.
This represents evidence of the poaching externality and it calls for government
intervention.
Workplace externalities A strand of the literature, among the others
Galindo-Rueda and Haskel (2005) and Metcalfe and Sloane (2007), has shown
that within-sector and within-firm education spillovers can be strong, especially
26I confirm this result for the UK in Chapter 3.
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from high educated to less educated workers.27 Further, O’Mahony and Riley
(2012) show that training can boost the relationship between an employee’s wages
and the education of his peers. Similarly, several authors have argued that hu-
man capital can be informally passed on from some workers to others as they work
together. For example, De Grip and Sauermann (2011) have carried out a field
experiment in a call centre from a Dutch telephone company to estimate return to
training for workers and their peers. What emerges is a consistent transmission of
know-how from trained to untrained workers. More precisely, they estimate that
the performance of an untrained worker is in average 0.51% higher if the share of
trained peers is increased by 10 percentage points.
If these spillovers are strong enough, they can bias downward the estimates
of wage returns to training. Also, another possible consequence is that these
spillovers may induce firms to train only part of their workforce, as the know-how
will diffuse among the workers through informal learning.28
27The cited works refer to spillovers within sectors and within company’s workforce, respec-
tively. Also, they are both based on UK datasets.
28It must be noted that the experiment is carried out in a very specific context. Thus, it is
unclear whether their results can be generalised to other workplaces. De Grip and Sauermann
(2011) themselves recognise this limit.
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1.3 Training inequality
Since the 1980s, researchers have pointed out that training opportunities are not
evenly distributed among the workforce (e.g. Lillard and Tan (1986), Barron et
al. (1989), and Brown (1989)). This section shows that there is a large variabil-
ity in the provision of training which can be attributed to many observable and
unobservable characteristics, and that training outcomes are persistent with time.
1.3.1 Determinants of training
A worker’s probability of getting trained appears to be influenced by both indi-
vidual characteristics and characteristics of the firm that employs her. I consider
each group of factors separately in the next subsections.
1.3.1.1 Training differential among firms
Two main factors affect the probability of training at the firm level, i.e. dimension
and innovativeness.29 According to Bassanini et al. (2005), in all EU countries
large and/or innovative firms invest similar resources in training. For that reason,
the difference in training participation rate among those countries can be explained
by the share of small-medium enterprises and their different propensity to train
29As an exception, innovative and non-innovative firms are equally likely to train employees
in countries with high levels of training participation (e.g. Scandinavian countries).
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the workforce. Both lower costs and higher returns to training can justify the
evidence that large companies invest more in training.
Also, they observe that higher R&D investment entails more training. However,
the effect is weaker on college graduates as they require less training to adapt to
new technologies. The schooling system plays an important role as well. On
average, after technological innovations, workers coming from vocational schools
receive more training than those coming from a general track.30
Finally, training differs sensibly among sectors as well. For the UK, the dif-
ference in OJT participation between services and production sector is relatively
small. According to the results of the fourth continuing vocational training sur-
vey (CVTS), training participation is estimated to be 49% in production and 56%
in services, which means that in the year of the survey about half of the work-
force has received at least some sort of training. Yet, the authors of the report
warrant that in many of these cases training is mandatory, enforced by the state
through laws, e.g. to ensure workers’ security on the workplace. This explains
why ”mining and quarrying” leads the production sectors with a 65% share of
trainees over its workforce.31 The cases where firms decide how much to train
30For example, as Beck et al. (2009) and Grund and Martin (2012) discuss, German firms
invest in apprenticeships more than other countries’, thus they tend to provide less training
afterwards as workers have already acquired the skills they need on a given job.
31The authors recognise that lacking information on mandatory training is one of the limits
of their investigation.
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their employees are more interesting, as these companies provide training either
to retain key competencies and/or to enhance workforce productivity. Sadly, the
distinction between different training activities has not been considered in worker,
or household, surveys.
With respect to the UK services sector, ”education”, ”health” and ”public ad-
ministration” have the highest level of training incidence with a share of 71, 77
and 80 percent of trainees over total workers, respectively. The finance and in-
surance sectors follow them with a training participation rate of 59%, and they
represent the private sector with the highest incidence of training.
percent
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Figure 1.1: Training participation by industry and size, average 2009-2016
The analysis of training participation rates based on the QLFS confirms the
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qualitative findings of the CVTS report, in particular with respect to differences
among sectors. However, a smaller proportion of workers report they are training
in the former survey. The difference between the two indexes ranges between
20 and 30 percentage points. So, on average, 30% of workers get trained every
quarter, but only half of the working population reports having received any form
of training in the last year. This evidence supports the intuition that some workers
receive training on a regular basis, whilst a large group of workers have small or
no access to training activities. In Figure 1.1, it is possible to see that firm
size has a big impact on training probability of workers, for all sectors except
”public admin, education, and healthcare.” For this sector only, about 60% of the
employees report that they work for a state-owned, or public, company. Thus,
the evidence can be accommodated by assuming that public companies commit
to higher training targets, and the size of the company does not influence the
training policy that is implemented.
In the bar chart, I report the average training participation for the years 2009-
2016 for a number of reasons. First, there is very little variation between one
year and the other. More importantly, sectors comove closely. Thus, it is not
particularly interesting to look at yearly variations in the training participation
rate across sectors. To verify the absence of relevant idiosyncratic trends, I use
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two digit SIC classification and I rank sectors by their training participation rate.
Then, for each year, I distinguish the top 30 sectors from the rest with a dummy
variable. I observe that only 10 out of 88 sectors move from one group to the
other in at least 30% of the last 20 yearly observations. That is to say that
very few sectors have experienced a significant change in training (increase or
decrease) that deviates from the overall training pattern. I come back to this
issue in Section 1.6.2.1. The next section discusses how individual characteristics
of workers correlate with training participation rates.
1.3.1.2 Training differential among individuals
Heterogeneity in training participation depends largely on worker characteristics.
As Bassanini et al. (2007) show, training probability is positively correlated with
educational attainment, even after controlling for several factors such as firm’s
sector. Thus, all else equal, low skilled workers are less likely to be trained. I also
expect that a relatively larger share of their training is compulsory. This would
be the case, for example, if laws enforced the same requirements on health and
safety trainings for all workers.32
The same source reports that employers are more likely to train men rather
than women, especially at the beginning of their career. At the same time, mar-
32White collar jobs should be in general safer than manual works though.
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ital status and the type of contract appear to have a significant incidence on
training probability.33 Another factor that correlates with training is trade union
membership. Empirical analyses have found that Unions have a positive effect on
the probability of training, and in some cases even on returns to training. Booth
and Francesconi (2003) provide some evidence in this respect for the UK economy.
Most importantly, training participation is a highly persistent outcome. Work-
ers who receive training are more likely to be offered new training the next time
(see e.g. Bassanini et al. (2007) on page 70). This feature of training can favour
workers’ segmentation. Even though educational attainment and other individual
characteristics are similar, some workers receive training regularly, while others
are largely untrained. For the UK, Sousounis and Bladen-Hovell (2010) report
that, for a previously untrained worker who gets trained in one period, the proba-
bility of being trained in the next period is raised by 0.401, on average, due to the
persistence of training outcomes. The corresponding figure for women is 0.362.
Through this mechanism, the wage differential between trained and untrained
workers will increase with time, one training spell after the other. This outcome
may be socially undesirable, especially in the case training outcomes do not to
reflect differences in ability, skills, or effort of workers. Indeed, for the countries of
33Probabilities are estimated for a pooled dataset at European Union level, after controlling for
time and country effects. Data come from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
for the years 1995-2001.
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south-western Europe, parents’ educational attainment has been found to predict
training participation of a worker. According to Bassanini and his colleagues, who
report these results, in such countries family and social relationships play a great
role in finding a good job, thus in receiving company provided training.
A more detailed evaluation of all the determinants of training participation is
offered in the next section.
Novel evidence on training determinants Although the literature has
pointed out that UK training has changed through time both qualitatively and
quantitatively, little has been done to analyse these changes. Thus, to integrate
the evidence coming from the literature, I estimate the probability of training
with a Probit model, splitting the last twenty years of (quarterly) data into two
periods, i.e. before and after the training peak of 2002.34
As shown in Section 1.6.2, the average training participation rate is almost
the same between the two periods, at least at the endpoints. Thus, the analysis
focuses on how the distribution of training has changed from the past to the
present. More precisely, I estimate over different sub-periods the simple Probit
34The choice, although based on the peak observed in the data, may appear arbitrary. Thus,
as robustness check, I take the oldest 8 years and the 8 most recent years of data, and perform
the same exercise. Results are consistent to the one reported here, but the changes in training
patterns are relatively larger. This is to be expected since, in the latter case, I drop the years
2002-2008 to compare past and present training patterns.
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model:
yi ,j,t = 1
[
Xi ,j ,tβ + βj + γt + εi ,t ≥ 0
] (1.1)
where yi ,j ,t , a binary outcome which denotes whether worker i, who is employed in
cell j,35 has participated in work-related training in the period t ; 1[·] is an indicator
function that can assume only the values 0 or 1, depending on the realizations of
the latent variable within the squared brackets; Xi ,t is a set of exogenous individual
and job-specific characteristics, such as age, gender, firm’s size; βj are sector and
occupation specific fixed effects; γt is a set of quarterly time dummies (remember
that I use a pooled cross-sectional dataset); and εi ,t are normally distributed error
terms, ∼ N (0,σ 2ε ), which may be heteroskedastic and correlated within industry-
sectors.
I use the Probit estimates to compute the predicted probability of training
with respect to a number of worker’s characteristics. In particular, I interacted all
observables with the skilled-unskilled worker dummy, and the female-male dummy
since these two characteristics are the most relevant.36
Table 1.5 reports the probability of training conditional on several variables,
under the assumption that all other characteristics are as balanced, which means
35A cell is defined by the interaction between the sector and the occupation of a worker.
36There is a large and growing literature that studies the differences in pay, career opportu-
nities, and training between male and female employees, e.g. Don and Sheryl (2002), Kunze
(2005), Arulampalam et al. (2007), and Blau and Kahn (2017), among the many.
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Table 1.5: Training probability by worker’s characteristics,%
1995-2001 2009-2016 1995-2001 2009-2016
unskilled skilled unskilled skilled male female male female
non married 22.2 27.7 21.7 26.5 23.6 26.2 23.2 24.9
married 18.8 24.9 19.8 23.4 21.3 22.3 21.1 22.0
male 20.4 24.5 20.4 24.0 - - - -
female 20.5 28.2 21.1 25.9 - - - -
temporary 20.1 23.6 20.1 23.0 20.4 23.3 20.7 22.4
permanent 20.8 29.2 21.4 26.9 24.5 25.1 23.6 24.5
part-time 18.7 24.1 18.8 23.3 21.5 21.1 20.8 21.1
full-time 22.4 28.7 22.8 26.6 23.4 27.5 23.5 25.9
small firm 17.9 25.7 18.9 24.2 20.0 23.3 20.3 22.7
large firm 23.2 26.9 22.8 25.6 25.0 25.0 24.1 24.2
no-white 19.9 25.5 20.8 24.5 22.1 23.2 22.3 23.0
white 21.0 27.1 20.7 25.3 22.8 25.2 22.0 23.9
private 18.5 23.4 18.9 22.2 20.3 21.4 20.2 20.8
public 22.5 29.4 22.7 27.8 24.7 27.1 24.2 26.2
that they are all equally likely. In this sense, each predicted probability refers to
a hypothetical individual who is equally likely to be e.g. part-time and full-time
when controlling for e.g. skills and private sector. By doing so, it is possible to
compare these probabilities to each other and discover which worker is more likely
to be trained, all else being constant.37
As a key result, the analysis suggests both a large skill-premium, in favour
of educated, and a large gender-premium, in favour of female employees. Thus,
skilled workers are more likely to be trained, both in the old and in the new period,
and so are women. The result that, ceteris paribus, female workers are more likely
37The Probit model includes as regressors workers’ age, time dummies, and SIC industry. Yet,
those are not shown here as they are not the focus of this section.
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to be trained stands in contrast with earlier evidence, but is in line with the
findings of Dearden et al. (2006). The evidence from Greenhalgh (2002) helps
explaining the divergence of results. According to his findings, women’s training
provision rose faster than men’s in the 1980s and surpassed the latter since 1989.
The highest training participation rate is observed for skilled married female,
skilled workers in full time employment and workers working in the public sec-
tor. In the more recent period, training differentials between male and female,
and between skilled and unskilled workers, shrank but they are still large and
significant.38
Table 1.6: Training probability by occupation,%
1995-2001 2009-2016 1995-2001 2009-2016
unskilled skilled unskilled skilledmale femalemale female
managers, directors, senior officers 25.5 32.1 23.4 27.9 27.7 29.7 24.9 26.3
professional occupations 30.0 37.1 28.0 32.8 32.4 34.6 29.6 31.1
professional and technical associates 28.8 35.7 26.6 31.3 31.1 33.2 28.1 29.6
administrative and secretarial 20.0 25.8 17.3 21.1 21.9 23.7 18.6 19.7
skilled trades 16.9 22.1 19.0 23.0 18.7 20.2 20.3 21.6
caring, leisure and other 21.3 27.2 26.7 31.4 23.3 25.1 28.3 29.7
sales, customer service 22.8 28.9 20.2 24.3 24.8 26.7 21.6 22.9
process, plant, machine operators 13.7 18.3 16.4 20.0 15.2 16.6 17.6 18.7
elementary occupations 10.6 14.5 12.6 15.7 11.9 13.0 13.6 14.5
Table 1.6 focuses on training differences between job occupations. The results
are in line with previous research, and confirm that more specialised jobs require
38According to Bassanini et al. (2007) the higher training participation rate of female em-
ployees is related to their higher willingness to pay for their training, however I cannot test this
hypothesis with the UK QLFS data.
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more training investments. It is worth noting that there is a sizeable increase
in training probability from the old to the new period for those jobs which train
less, e.g. elementary occupations, whereas training participation has decreased
for those jobs where training was more frequent, e.g. professional occupations.
This result suggests that recent technical progress has demanded a skill upgrade
to those at the bottom of the skill distribution.
Table 1.7: Training probability by tenure,%
1995-2001 2009-2016 1995-2001 2009-2016
unskilled skilled unskilled skilled male female male female
less than 3 months 25.7 27.3 26.7 26.3 26.3 26.8 26.2 26.8
3 months but less than 6 24.0 29.4 25.9 28.2 25.3 28.1 26.0 28.1
6 months but less than 12 21.8 28.2 23.0 27.3 23.7 26.1 24.0 26.2
1 year but less than 2 19.6 27.3 20.6 25.6 21.8 24.8 22.0 24.1
2 years but less than 5 18.7 25.0 18.7 23.8 20.8 22.7 20.5 21.9
5 years but less than 10 18.2 23.4 17.5 22.6 19.8 21.7 19.5 20.4
10 years but less than 20 18.0 24.7 17.3 22.5 20.5 21.9 19.4 20.2
20 years or more 18.5 25.4 17.8 23.4 21.7 22.0 20.4 20.6
Finally, Table 1.7 presents the relationship between tenure and probability of
training. In this case, the most striking (but not unexpected) result is that tenure
has a non-monotonic effect on training provision after controlling for skill, sex, and
other covariates. The highest training rates are observed within one year from the
hiring. Thereafter, training spells are progressively reduced. However, as tenure is
sufficiently high, i.e. 10 (20) years for skilled (unskilled) workers, firms invest once
again in their formation. The result is even more remarkable considering that I
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control for age which is highly correlated to workers’ tenure within a company. It
appears that firms are compelled to train senior workers to compensate for the
depreciation of skills as they have completed their education much earlier than
other workers.
So far, I omitted any reference to age. However, the latter has a strong and
important effect on the probability of training. Furthermore, the UK working
population in the last twenty years have been changing significantly in terms of
age structure, and this, I argue, has largely affected the training policies of firms.
For these reasons, the next section describes and discusses this issue.
1.3.2 Does education affect lifetime training?
Scholars, e.g. Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (2009), show that a simple overlapping
generation (OLG) model with on-the-job training can reproduce the worker’s ten-
dency to accumulate high initial skill capital early in the career and reduce her
stock by curtailing on-the-job training later in life. Indeed, as workers have less
residual work time, the present value of further training investments, up to the
point that individuals close to retirement choose not to invest time and/or physical
resources to accumulate new human capital.
Figure 1.2 shows that, for unskilled workers the training participation rate de-
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Figure 1.2: Training participation by age and skill
creases monotonically as they get older, whereas for skilled workers the training
participation rate does not decline significantly until very late in their life.39 For
the latter group, the largest drop in training participation occurs between the age
groups 55-59 and 60-64. Thus, old skilled workers are less likely to train than
young ones, but they receive more training than most unskilled workers.40
Computing the average training level by age cohort based on about 20 years
of data available from the QLFS hides significant changes in the relationship
39Keep in mind that I consider ”skilled” a worker who has at least a bachelor’s degree and
”unskilled” a worker who does not have any University degree or equivalent qualification.
40Only young unskilled workers receive more training than old skilled ones. This proves how
uneven are training opportunities between the two groups.
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between training and a worker’s age. Later, in Section 1.6.2, I come back with
a more robust analysis of this relationship, highlighting the changes observed in
the training-age profile over the last twenty years. The next section focuses on
one of the key issues of my thesis, i.e. the relationship between training and wage
inequality.
1.4 Training and wage inequality
The section contributes to the literature by generating evidence that exposes the
link between training inequality and wage inequality. As Sousounis and Bladen-
Hovell (2010) suggests, the persistence of training outcomes and the unequal dis-
tribution of training opportunities, together with the positive effects of training
on wages, pave the way to a causal link between training and wage inequality.
I test this relationship for the UK with the data collected by the Office of Na-
tional Statistics for the Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Since at the individual
level education is one of the main factors influencing training participation, I di-
vide the workforce into non-University educated and University educated workers,
whom, from now on, I call unskilled and skilled workers.
I compute the training participation rate of each group as the share of workers
who got trained in a given quarter (the unit reference of the survey). Thus, I use
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Figure 1.3: Training inequality, skill supply, and wage inequality
the ratio of training participation of skilled workers over that of unskilled workers
as the index for training inequality. Next, I compute wage inequality as the ratio
of skilled workers’ average wage over unskilled workers’ average wage. Also, I use
the ratio of skilled workers over the total working population to control for skill
supply.41
41Numerous works, e.g. see the literature review by Acemoglu and Autor (2011), have identi-
fied the relative supply of high educated workers as one of the main drivers of the wage inequality
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I build a panel dataset with quarterly observations and (2 digit) SIC industry
averages for the above variables. The panel is composed of 79 industries and, for
each of them, it contains an average of 70 observations. I trim the data, dropping
observations with less than 25 skilled workers and 25 unskilled workers, to have
more robust inference.42,43 To extend the analysis back in time as much as possible,
I employ the conversion code from SIC92 to SIC07 available on Jennifer Smith’s
web page for the sector classification during the years 1994-2008.44
In Figure 1.3, I present two scatter-plots using sector-level averages. On the left
hand side, I plot wage inequality over training inequality, and on the other side
I plot wage inequality over the relative supply of educated workers.45 As can be
seen, the skill supply is correlated with both wage and training inequality. Also,
the data exhibit a clear tendency for sectors that have higher training inequality
to have higher wage inequality. To test more formally the relationship between
in the data.
42Dearden et al. (2006) drop observations based on less than 40 workers, in total I require 50
workers, i.e. 25 per group. For robustness, in Table 1.8, I report estimates based on trimming
observations with less than 70 unskilled and 70 skilled workers along with the baseline estimates.
43For robustness, I also use yearly averages and 2 digit SIC classification, obtaining similar
estimates for the effect of training inequality on wage inequality. Further information, and the
code, is available on request. Notice that with the baseline classification, the panel is unbalanced
as many sectors do not have enough observations for inference in some periods.
44The conversion code is available on http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/
jcsmith/sicmapping/resources/direct/. I have accessed it on October 22, 2016.
45To draw the figure, the data have been collapsed to 1 digit instead of 2 digit SIC sectors.
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training and wage inequality, I estimate the following model:
wsj,t
wuj,t
= α1 + α2
psj,t
puj,t
+ α3
nsj ,t
nuj ,t
+ qt + γj + εj,t , (1.2)
where w
s
j ,t
wuj ,t
is the ratio of wages for skilled, wsj,t , to unskilled,wuj ,t , employees in
period t for sector j; p
s
j ,t
puj ,t
is the ratio of training participation for skilled, psj,t , to
unskilled, puj ,t , employees; and
nsj ,t
nuj ,t
is the ratio of skilled, nsj,t , to unskilled, nuj,t ,
employees in period t and sector j. I always include time dummies, qt , as control,
and, for the random effects estimation, I assume that sector-specific differences,
γj , are equal to zero. Random effects model is reported for completeness, as the
visual inspection of data suggests strong sector-level differences in both training
and wage inequality that are addressed only in the fixed effects regression. As
expected, fixed effects are the more conservative results.
Table 1.8: Effect of training inequality and skill supply on wage inequality
baseline minimum of 70 obs.
α1 α2 α3 α1 α2 α3
FE 1.550 0.0578 -0.2289 1.390 0.0851 -0.0257
p-value 0.000 0.059 0.188 0.000 0.148 0.893
RE 1.475 0.0775 -0.0495 1.353 0.1058 -0.0180
p-value 0.000 0.004 0.633 0.000 0.046 0.873
The results of my investigation are reported in Table 1.8. I find that, ceteris
paribus, a decrease by 1 percentage point in the industry average differential be-
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tween skilled and unskilled training participation is associated with a decrease
of wage inequality by 0.05 percentage points. Arguably, the effect is small but
statistically significant across specifications. In chapter two, I provide a theoret-
ical justification for this finding. In particular, the general equilibrium model I
build in Chapter 2 suggests that the small size of the coefficient may due to the
spillovers of training benefits from one group to the other. I proceed to analyse
the business cycle properties of training activities in the UK.
1.5 The training business cycle
This section investigates the business cycle properties of UK on-the-job training.46
The literature generally assumes training to be countercyclical, see e.g. DeJong
and Ingram (2001), Kim and Lee (2007), and Brunello (2009). Empirical evidence
suggests that companies invest more on training when they are less competitive
than their peers and when the cost of foregone output is relatively smaller. Since
about half of training costs are represented by opportunity costs (i.e. trainees’
time allocated to training rather than producing), when consumer demand is
low, training costs are lower. Thus the theory predicts that firms should be
more inclined to provide training. Yet, the theory also provides reasons why
46The literature identifies the business cycle as the fluctuations in economic series that have
a periodicity of less than 33 quarters (see e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982) King and Rebelo
(1999)).
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training should be cyclical. In a recession, the short-term benefits of training are
expected to decrease as consumer demand weakens. Whether the first positive
effect outweighs the negative one is an open empirical question.
On a practical level, the first issue is to define precisely which training activities
are under investigation. Brunello (2009) argues that apprenticeships, or any ini-
tial workplace training of long duration, are drastically different from on-the-job
training, the latter generally being a short-term activity. He maintains that an
economic slowdown affects apprenticeships less intensely than training of senior
employees.
In his view, apprenticeships is less influenced by the business cycle because new
hires are relatively cheaper and their formation will be completed in about two
years. However, the expected duration of the downturn plays a crucial role to
the validity of this argument. The counter-cyclicality thesis holds as long as the
economy recovers rapidly. If the recession is long-lasting, the returns from both
apprenticeships and training activities will be diminished and businesses may cut
drastically on training investments.
Evidence for the cyclical behaviour of training is available mostly for the US.
Among the many, Einarsson and Marquis (1998) report that their empirical proxy
for skill accumulation is negatively related to aggregate output, with a correlation
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coefficient of -0.187.47
With respect to the European countries, Bassanini et al. (2007) is again an
important source of information. Using a multi-country panel with annual data on
training, output gap, and unemployment, they show that training has an elasticity
with the output gap which lies between -2.8 and -7% depending on the specification
they employ.48 As part of my research, I test whether on-the-job training is
procyclical in the UK economy.
1.5.1 Empirical evidence for the UK
To study the business cycle properties of training for the UK, I employ the infor-
mation on training reported in the QLFS and macroeconomic time-series available
from the ONS website. I seasonally adjust all the series with presumed or evident
seasonality with the X-13 ARIMA-SEATS toolkit.49 For a deeper understanding
of UK business cycle I consider also the behaviour of other relevant economic
indicators, such as consumption, investments and labour market indicators.
Figure 1.4 shows the cyclical and trend component of training participation and
47They also notice that a RBC model, carefully calibrated, produce a much negative cor-
relation between output and human capital investment (very close to -1). The only solution
they find is to introduce a random independent process for human capital depreciation. This
assumption drastically reduces the correlation between output and training investments.
48They obtain similar results when they use the unemployment rate as a proxy for the business
cycle. In this case, the coefficient of interest is positive.
49Training and labour series show a clear seasonal pattern, together with GDP and gross fixed
capital formation.
54
GDP. It can be noted that training is less volatile than GDP, although the great
recession is the main phase when GDP fluctuations are particularly larger than
training ones, and that there is no clear correlation between the two series.
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Figure 1.4: Hodrick-Prescott residuals of training and GDP series
I complement the graphical analysis with Table 1.9 which reports the business
cycle moments of the UK economy. To this purpose, all data have been detrended
with a HP-filter with λ = 1600 as commonly employed in the RBC literature. The
most striking results are that: (i) training is negatively correlated with output, but
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the correlation coefficient is small; (ii) after seasonally adjusting and detrending
data, training has a low standard deviation; and (iii) the skill premium is also
almost uncorrelated with output, yet it has a very high variability.
Table 1.9: UK business cycle moments
std(xi ),% std(xi )/std(y),% corr(y, xi ) ρ(xi ) N◦ obs.
output, (y) 1.16 1.00 1.00 0.89 96
consumption 1.06 0.91 0.77 0.86 96
investments 3.89 3.35 0.83 0.73 76
skill premium 3.66 3.15 -0.02 -0.07 84
wage 0.88 0.76 0.08 0.56 83
skilled training, 4w 0.34 0.29 -0.01 0.25 85
unskilled training, 4w 0.22 0.19 -0.05 0.50 85
skilled training, 3m 0.59 0.51 -0.06 0.59 86
unskilled training, 3m 0.39 0.33 -0.10 0.63 86
weekly hours 0.43 0.37 0.44 0.37 95
employment 0.38 0.32 0.69 0.85 96
Interestingly, the business cycle properties of training look unstable over time.
To highlight this, I split the sample for estimation in five year intervals and com-
puted the correlation of training and GDP for each sub-sample. As can be ob-
served in Table 1.10, the correlation appears to be stronger and negative during
the decade 1995-2005. The correlation is weaker in between 2005 and 2015. This
holds true when I consider the training participation rate computed over the last
quarter and over the last month. Moreover, using growth rates instead of HP-
filtered residuals affects these results only marginally, and not systematically.50
50The standard deviation, almost constant throughout the estimates, reinforces the idea that
the cyclicality of training activities cannot be identified. The formula for the standard deviation
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Table 1.10: Correlation between training participation and GDP
growth rates HP-residuals N° obs.
1995-2005 2005-2015 1995-2005 2005-2015
training last 4 weeks -0.01 0.09 -0.24 0.03 42
std 0.158 0.157 0.153 0.158
training last 3 months -0.18 0.07 -0.15 -0.05 42
std 0.156 0.158 0.156 0.158
When considering the business cycle properties of training, one may ask what
was the effect of the great recession on training. As discussed above, several
authors, e.g. Blatter et al. (2009), claim that the length of a crisis has important
consequences on the cost-benefit analysis of training provision. A long period of
low demand and high financing costs can force firms to reduce training investments.
In the next subsection, I verify if this has happened in the UK economy during
the great recession (2007-2012).
1.5.2 Training participation during the great recession
At the outset of the great recession, several UK institutions feared a dramatic fall
in training participation rates, and several business confidence indexes showed
that managers expected a broad reduction in training activities.51 Yet, the UK
is
√
(1−ρ2)
(n−2) , where n stands for the number of observations and ρ for the correlation coefficient.
51For example, in 2008, the Confederation of British Industry, the Trade Union Congress
and other institutions have cosigned an open letter pleading with UK business managers not to
cut training during the recession. Both the CBI Industrial Trends Survey and the Quarterly
Economic Survey, run by the British Chamber of Commerce, have a section dedicated to training
activity expectations. These surveys foretold a drastic reduction of training investments.
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National Employer Skill Survey (NESS) figures suggested that most of the es-
tablishments intended to maintain pre-crisis training participation levels. Indeed,
QLFS data shows that the great recession did not have a significant effect on train-
ing rates. As reported by the UKCES report (2013) and by Felstead et al. (2013),
the overall training participation rate shows a marked long-run declining trend.
However, the fall in training has begun in 2002, and it has not been influenced by
the great recession.
The literature cited above suggests that the recession has influenced how train-
ing is organised and provided to workers rather than affecting the overall training
provision. Felstead’s interviews of employers and HR managers reveal that they
switched towards on-line, or digital, courses, and they organised on-the-job train-
ing rather than paying for external off-the-job formation. Many respondents have
emphasised the importance of managing more efficiently the resources. According
to Felstead and his colleagues, enterprises have training floors, i.e. must-have
training activities that, for a reason or another, cannot be remitted. In particu-
lar, they argue that six constraints sustained the firms’ demand for training: (i)
compliance with legal requirements, (ii) operational needs, (iii) skills shortages,
(iv) market competition, (v) managerial commitments, and (vi) customer demand
needs. Due to these constraints, the great recession did not affect the training
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participation rate nor the total training expenditure.52
1.6 Long run training trends
The long-run trend of training participation features a clear inverse-U pattern.
Figure 1.5 shows the time series for the whole UK economy derived from QLFS
data. Whilst in the 1990s training participation has been expanding, since the
beginning of the new century employers have cut training provision. This trend
emerges not only from the data reported here, but from any dataset on UK train-
ing. The Centre for Learning and Life Chances in Knowledge Economies and
Societies (LLAKES) in 2013 has presented a report showing that as many as 11
different surveys reveal a decrease in training demand. Some of these indexes refer
to participation rates, others to training duration. As shown below, the length
of training spells has shortened too. Furthermore, the drop is more intense after
controlling for sector relocation.53 This makes the decrease in training even more
remarkable.
Green and his colleagues suggest several competing explanations for this decline,
each of them only partly supported by the data. An optimistic hypothesis is that
52Although the total expenditure hasn’t changed during the great recession, it can be observed
a decrease in the average cost of training spells. This is in line with the evidence of firms adopting
cheaper training types, e.g. growth of on-line training at the expenses of classroom training.
53Indeed, workers’ relocation has mitigated the drop, as workers moved towards sectors with
higher training participation.
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Figure 1.5: Aggregate annual training participation rate
better educated workers require less training as they learn faster. Yet, I have
shown earlier that training is complementary to education, so this explanation is
weak.54 Another hypothesis is that in recent times companies provide training
more efficiently, and, in particular, managers make better use of informal know-
how transfers among workers. In this sense, training is quantitatively less, but is
qualitatively unchanged. I have virtually no means to test this hypothesis.55
54Also, UK PISA scores (a test measuring the ability of 15 yo UK pupils, run every three
years since 2000) have remained relatively constant through time (see e.g. Mo (2016)).
55A possible test would be to verify whether training has now a higher return to investment.
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Figure 1.6: Training participation rate and turnover
More pessimistically, managers may have lower expectations about training
returns than in the past. They may have revised downward their training targets
in reaction to the change in gross returns to training. However, Dearden et al.
(2006) find no evidence of a decrease of training returns during the previous ten
years. Another possibility is that human capital depreciation, due to relocation
of workers from one sector to the other, or from an employer to the other, has
decreased thanks to a reduction of the turnover rate of UK workforce and an
If, presumably, training is qualitatively the same but quantitatively less, returns to training
should have increased in the last decade.
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increase in average tenure (see figure 1.6).56 Against this hypothesis, it must
be noted that the decrease of turnover has anticipated the reduction in training
participation, moreover, the latter has continued to drop while turnover of workers
is relatively constant.57 In conclusion, the reasons for the reduction in training
participation rates are still not fully understood. What is evident is that UK has
moved to a lower training participation equilibrium, and this may have important
implications in terms of long run economic growth.58
1.6.1 The decline in training length
Another relevant indicator of training is the length of training spells. The litera-
ture and, in particular, government reports e.g. Green et al. (2013), have reported
that the reduction in training participation levels has been accompanied by a re-
duction in the duration of training. I utilise the QLFS data to verify this empirical
evidence. The QLFS does not have information about hours, but interviewers ask
about the length of a training spell; this is divided into several intervals: (i) less
than a week; (ii) up to a month; (iii) up to three months; (iv) less than a year;
(v) up to three years; and (vi) ongoing training.
56To draw the figure, I employ the flow from employment to unemployment as reported in
Smith (2011). The author has published the series on her website.
57Cointegration tests between turnover and training have failed to provide evidence in favour
of a long run relationship between the two series.
58See De la Fuente and Ciccone (2003) for a commentary of the importance of human capital,
both from education and life-time training on economic growth.
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Figure 1.7: Training length by skills
In Figure 1.7, I plot the histograms of training rates by spell duration for the
periods 1992-2001 and 2002-2017, and for skilled and unskilled workers. According
to the data, training duration has decreased for both skilled and unskilled workers.
However, the share of ongoing training has not reduced; it is spells of medium
duration that are less frequently observed, while the proportion of workers who
report the shortest training interval (less than a week) has increased. Also, it is
evident that unskilled training has longer duration than skilled training, both in
the past and in more recent times. This may be due to the strong complementarity
of formal education and job-related training which the literature has discussed
thoroughly, see e.g. Cunha and Heckman (2007). In conclusion, the decline in
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training length reinforces the evidence of a reduction in the overall provision of
training by UK companies that has begun in 2002.
1.6.2 Has training participation declined for all workers?
I contribute to this literature providing empirical evidence that can help under-
stand the trends in training participation by considering the evolution of training
for several sub-classes of workers. I classified the QLFS workers by age and ed-
ucation level. With respect to the education, I divide workers into skilled and
unskilled ones, while for the age, I define the four following bands: (i) young,
who are between 25 and 34 years old; (ii) mid-young, who are between 35 and 44
years old; (iii) mid-old workers, who are between 45 and 54 years old; and (iv) old
workers, who are over 55 years old. My intuition is that these statistics should be
able to detect relevant changes in the quality of education. In fact, if education
has improved, I should observe an intense drop of training participation for the
youngest cohort, that anticipates changes for the other groups. The figure shows
that this is not the case, as young, mid-young and mid-old workers’ training rates
comove closely.
Figure 1.8 reports the evolution in time of the training participation rate of
skilled workers (to the right) and unskilled workers (to the left). I plot the training
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participation in the last quarter in the first row and the training participation in
the last month in the second row.59 What emerges from this analysis is that there
has been a convergence of training levels between younger and older workers.
Around the year 1993, young skilled workers were much more likely to train than
older ones, whereas nowadays they are as likely as older workers. With respect to
unskilled workers, young individuals are still more likely to train. However, the
difference in training participation rates has shrunk remarkably. By comparing
unskilled and skilled workers, it can be noted that the training participation rate
of unskilled workers, after a temporary increase between the years 1997-2002, has
maintained the levels of the 1990s. For skilled workers the decrease of training
participation have been more pronounced and it has affected all individuals but
those older than 55 years old.
To fully understand the impact of these changes, it must be noted that the
average age of UK workers has been slowly growing from about 38 to 41 years
old in the last twenty years. Table 1.11 summarises the variation in the age
composition of the workforce. The table reports that the share of old workers,
who receive much less training than young ones, has increased by 6 percentage
59Researches are worried about double-counting training spells when using the information
about the last three months. Conversely, they may under-measure training activities when using
the information about the training activities in the last month before the interview.
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Figure 1.8: Training participation rates by skill and age group
points in the last 20 years. The share of youngest workers has decreased by 16%.60
According to these findings, it is plausible that workers’ age has played a relevant
role on the overall trend in training provision. The demographic trend observed
in Table 1.11 suggests that the UK will face a large increase in the share of older
workers (age 55+) in the next decade, and it will require sizeable investments to
60I exclude workers who are younger than 25 years old to make comparison between unskilled
and skilled workers possible, and to avoid including apprenticeships into the on-the-job training
statistics. This threshold is commonly employed by the literature I refer to in my thesis.
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Table 1.11: Workforce share by age, %
period age 25-35 age 35-45 age 45-55 age 55+
1994-1996 31 28 26 15
1997-2013 27 29 26 17
2014-2016 26 25 28 21
train these workers. In the next section, I use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
method to understand how much of the changes in training participation can be
attributed to age and other factors, such as sector relocation.
1.6.2.1 Decomposition of training participation changes
In this section, I analyse more analytically the observed changes in training partici-
pation rates. In the QLFS dataset, I generate a dummy variable that distinguishes
the observations for the years 1994-2001 from those of the years 2002-2016, i.e be-
fore and after the peak of the training participation rate.61
This allows to estimate, with Stata built-in functions, the Probit model for
each period, and to perform an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the changes into
endowment and coefficients. The endowment component apprises how much of the
difference in training participation can be attributed to changes in the observed
characteristic of workers. The coefficient component provides an estimate of how
much the change of each coefficient explains the change in participation rates
61As a robustness check, I compared and decomposed the years 1994-2000 and 2010-2016,
obtaining similar results to what reported in this chapter.
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between the old and new group of workers. Any residual, or unexplained, variation
is attributed to the interaction term.
More formally, the methodology seeks to decompose the difference between the
2002-2016 and the 1996-2001 average training participation rate:
diff = E (t02,16) − E (t96,01) (1.3)
based on the assumption that the training participation rate is a linear function
of a given set of variables. The latter simply entails that ti = X ′i βi + ϵi , where ti is
training participation, Xi is a vector of firm-specific and worker’s characteristics,
βi is a vector of coefficients (including the intercept), and ϵ a normally distributed
random error; subscript i indicates each one of the time periods analysed.62
Since by assumption E(ϵi) = 0 and E(βi) = βi , if I substitute the linear functions
into equation 1.3, the latter becomes:
diff = (X ′02,16β02,16) − (X ′96,01β96,01) . (1.4)
As shown by e.g. Jones and Kelley (1984), it is possible to rearrange the right
62Although the variables are the same as in equation 1.1, here the model used is linear. In this
context, the linearity assumption holds because I am interested in observing the mean participa-
tion rate and not not the individual outcome. Among others, Wooldridge (2016) validates the
use of a linear model for dependent variables that are aggregates of individual binary outcomes,
such as the employment status.
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hand side of equation in a various way.63 Here, the difference between E(t02,16)
and E(t96,01) is decomposed into three main components:
diff = [E (X02,16) − E (X96,01) ]′ β96,01+
+E
(
X96,01
)′ (
β02,16 − β96,01
)
+[
E
(
X02,16
) − E (X96,01) ]′ (β02,16 − β96,01) .
(1.5)
where the first term relates to differences in observables, i.e. endowments, the
second term refers to differences in the coefficients of the linear model, and the
last term is the interaction between the first two.64
As well known, one of the key assumptions necessary for the decomposition is
the conditional independence assumption, also called ignorability of the treatment.
This requires that the errors have the same conditional expectation across groups.
Clearly, it is very hard to refute or support such assumption when comparing
the training probability of people employed in two different periods. Nonetheless,
the exercise is still informative and helps summarising the main changes in the
provision of training.
In Table 1.12, I report the summary results from the decomposition exercise. In
particular, I observe a small difference between the average training participation
63For example, many works in the discrimination literature, Cotton (1988) among them, em-
ploy a twofold decomposition to distinguish explained from unexplained (or residual) differences
between two groups.
64For a longer treatment of Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition see e.g. Jann (2008).
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Table 1.12: Summary of training participation decomposition
variable percentage points
training rate, 2002-2016 27.9
training rate, 1996-2001 27.2
difference 0.74
endowments 2.12
coefficients -1.04
interaction -0.34
N° of obs. 2,956,909
rate of workers in the period 1994-2001 and that of workers in the period 2002-
2016, the latter being slightly greater than the former. Yet, this is not due to
training being provided the same way as in the past, but it is the consequence of
how endowment, coefficients, and other unobservable factors have changed.
The positive value reported in ’endowments’ suggests that workers have moved
towards jobs that require more training and that they have developed character-
istics associated with higher training participation, e.g. more people are skilled
or more of them work in large companies. Similarly, the positive contribution of
’coefficients’ entails that characteristics leading to higher training in the past have
now a stronger effect on the probability to train, e.g. being skilled, or working for
a large firm, implies higher training probability than in the past.65
To better understand these trends, I report further information in Table 1.13,
65Alternatively, it can be the case that the characteristics leading to lower training now have
a smaller effect than in the past.
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Table 1.13: Decomposition of training participation before and after 2002
(1) (2) (3)
variables endowments coefficients interaction
skilled 1.0 -1.8 -0.5
married 0.0 -1.4 0.0
female 0.0 -0.9 0.0
temporary 0.0 0.1 0.0
part-time 0.0 1.1 0.0
region 0.1 0.4 -0.4
quarter 0.0 0.0 0.0
tenure -0.1 -2.9 0.0
occupation 0.9 -0.9 -0.5
size 0.0 -1.8 0.0
age -0.8 30.8 0.7
industry 1.0 1.3 0.3
constant - -25.0 -
where the detailed results of the decomposition are recorded. From Table 1.13,
first column (endowments), it can be observed that age contributes negatively
to the difference in training participation rates, as average age has increased,
and older workers train less. On the other side, relocation to training intensive
industries and occupations raised training participation among the workforce, as
the increase in University education did. The third column, where the effects of
the interaction terms are reported, is marginally relevant.
The fact that the set of quarterly dummies does not contribute to the differences
in training participation between the two periods (as all entries are close to zero),
does not mean that they do not have an effect on the probability of training. The
correct interpretation is that the effect of seasonality on training has not changed
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from one period to the other.
The most interesting pattern emerges from the second column, and in particular
from the coefficients of the constant term and age. Both coefficients have changed
drastically, and their contribution to difference in training participation rate is
very large. The overall effect is positive; however, this hides the fact that workers
start with a much lower training probability, and the latter does not decrease
with age (or it does so but much more slowly than before). As a consequence,
the distribution of training has changed in favour of senior workers and at the
expenses of the youngest cohort of workers.
Despite being relevant, so far the literature has totally neglected this aspect.
My findings entail that any explanation of the aggregate training participation
rate needs to be consistent with age-dependent changes in training. Education
quality is unlikely to explain these trends. My hypothesis is that (i) recent techno-
logical changes demanded more training investments on older workers, and that
(ii) institutional changes, e.g. the increase in retirement age and the higher share
of old workers in the active population, have driven up the demand for training
activities of this age cohort.
The question that remains unanswered is whether the decline of training for
the workers who are less than 40 years old reflects a genuine decline in training
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needs or it reflects negative developments in the economy. O’Mahony (2012),
using industry data for 15 different European countries, argues that training posi-
tively contributes to yearly GDP growth for about 6 basis points, thus answering
this question can have important economic implications.66 If training is being
under-provided, it is crucial to understand what factors have driven training par-
ticipation down. To this end, it is necessary a clear definition of training activities
which discerns them by type, duration, and quality.
As a complement of the previous analysis, the next section performs the same
decomposition exercise with respect to skilled and unskilled workers to verify the
presence of patterns in the data that may be hidden by aggregation.
1.6.2.2 Decomposition of training participation by skills
In this section, I use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to assess the sources of
differences in training participation between unskilled and skilled workers. I run
the decomposition for each of the two periods considered in the previous section,
i.e. before and after the observed peak in training participation.67 By comparing
66During the period 2001-2007, the average GDP growth was about 1.9% for his sample of
countries. Thus, training activities contributed to 3% of the observed GDP growth. Most of the
observed economic growth can be attributed to the increase in physical capital stock and hours
worked.
67As robustness check, I run the decomposition with the observations from the years 2010-
2017 only. Selecting a shorter and more recent period as a comparison to the decomposition
from the years 1994-2001 provides a more nuanced picture (e.g. training inequality has reduced
in the last 7 years but it has not reduced if I look at the whole period 2002-2017). Nonetheless,
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the output of the two decompositions, it is possible to highlight what factors were
important for training inequality in the past, and what matter most nowadays.
Table 1.14: Summary of training participation decomposition by skills
1994-2001 2002-2017
unskilled training participation 20.93 21.69
skilled training participation 42.74 37.38
difference -21.80 -15.68
endowments -11.04 -9.30
coefficients -8.04 -5.96
interaction -2.73 -0.42
N° of obs. 732,041 2,238,618
The decompositions reported in Table 1.14 suggest that the training participa-
tion rate of unskilled workers was 21.8 percentage points lower than that of skilled
workers during the period 1995-2001. This gap decreased to 15.7 percentage points
in 2002-2017. A finer decomposition, i.e. over smaller sub-periods, would show
a non-monotonic evolution of training inequality. Indeed, looking back at Figure
1.5, the peak of training inequality matches broadly with the period when the
training participation rate was the highest, i.e. around the year 2002.68 Nonethe-
less, some clear trends can be observed in the data through the decomposition
exercise. Table 1.15 attempts to disentangle the main (observable) characteristics
the main conclusions drawn here are not affected by the choice of how to break the dataset into
sub-periods.
68The time series for training inequality can be found in Chapter 2, Figure 1.3.
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of workers, and jobs, that contribute to training inequality.
Table 1.15: Decomposition of training participation by skills
- - - - 1994-2001 - - - - - - - - 2002-2017 - - - -
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
variables endowments coefficients interaction endowments coefficients interaction
married -0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0
female 0.1 -2.4 0.0 -0.1 -1.6 0.0
temporary 0.2 0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
part-time -0.8 0.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.0
white 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.5 0.0
pub -1.6 -2.6 0.2 -1.3 -2.0 0.1
quarter 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
region 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
tenure 0.0 -1.4 0.0 -0.1 -1.6 0.0
occupation -4.7 4.1 -2.2 -4.2 1.0 -0.2
size -0.1 0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 -0.1
age -0.8 6.2 -0.2 -0.3 -6.4 -0.1
industry -3.5 -1.0 -0.1 -3.1 -0.8 0.0
constant - -14.0 - - 3.9 -
Before the year 2002, differences in occupation and industry between skilled
and unskilled workers (column one) explain as much as 8 percentage points of the
training gap. This entails that workers were sorted according to their education to
different occupations and industries. Unskilled employees worked in sectors with
less training needs, while skilled employees worked in sectors with more training
needs. In the period 2002-2017, this sorting has become slightly less effective
(column four).69
69The reduction of inequality due to sorting is more pronounced over the period 2010-2017,
as observed in the robustness checks available on request.
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Comparing column two with column five, it is possible to observe that sectors
training needs of skilled and unskilled workers have become more similar within
the same industry and sector. In fact, the contribution of these coefficients is
closer to zero (in absolute value).70
Other differences in either endowments or coefficients are small, and generally
close to zero, except for the constant and for the age coefficients. In fact, the
difference between the constant term between skilled and unskilled training con-
tributes by 14 percentage points to the training gap in the period 1994-2001. This
is two thirds of the whole training gap reported in Table 1.14. The change in this
component from -14 to 3.9 in the period 2002-2017 (column five) entails that
nowadays unskilled workers are more likely to train than skilled ones. However,
the change is largely compensated by the variation in the age coefficients. As a
consequence, I only observe a modest reduction in training inequality.
For both unskilled and skilled workers training is a monotonic decreasing func-
tion of age Therefore, the fact that the difference in age coefficients contributes
to reducing training inequality during the period 1994-2001 implies that skilled
workers have a steeper age-training profile than unskilled workers. The opposite is
70Thanks to the normalization of categorical variables (region, occupation, and industry), the
choice of the baseline category does not affect the interpretation of the coefficients. Thus, for
example, sector’s coefficients do not represent the difference from the participation rate of the
baseline sector, but from the average training participation rate among sectors.
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Figure 1.9: Training probability over the work life
true for the period 2002-2016, where the training probability of unskilled workers
decreases faster with age than that of skilled workers. The best way to appreci-
ate the drastic change in training provision is to look at the predicted training
probabilities, conditional on the worker’s age.
Figure 1.9 shows the age-training profile for the two skill groups and three
different sub-periods. For unskilled workers, the transition from the first to the
middle period looks like a upward parallel movement, while in the most recent
period training has been redistributed from young generations to older ones. For
skilled workers, the transition looks more gradual and it features a large reduction
of training and a redistribution towards older workers.
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To conclude, this exercise provides further evidence that: (i) assortative match-
ing explain parts of the observed difference in training between skilled and un-
skilled workers; (ii) age-related changes have affected skilled and unskilled workers
unevenly; and, finally, (iii) there are factors affecting training inequality (at least
with respect to educational attainment) that are uncorrelated with observable
characteristics of workers and standard job characteristics such as firm’s size and
sector.
Perhaps other factors, such as technological progress in the supply of train-
ing and shifts in the type of training demanded by firms, are responsible of the
patterns observed with available data. Unfortunately, the lack of detailed infor-
mation about training activities and their costs represents a strong impediment
to identifying the drivers of the evolution of UK training provision.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter combines empirical evidence job-related training and theoretical con-
tributions to provide an accurate representation of on-the-job training activities
in the UK. I demonstrate the importance of training activities in supporting eco-
nomic activity, and, to this end, I review the literature estimating returns to
training for workers and companies and link these results to stylised facts about
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UK labour market.
I provide evidence that training provision is acyclical for the UK. This result
suggests that indirect costs of training spells do not influence firms willingness to
invest on these activities, at least in the short run. It is however more challenging
to understand the long run trend of UK training participation rate. The literature
has not provided a convincing explanation for trend observed in UK data. In this
regard, my contribution is that I provide new evidence about training patterns
within the workforce. By looking at specific subgroups of workers, I exclude
some of the proposed explanations. For example, I rule out that changes in the
education system or changes in the technology may be the main cause for the
observed decline in training.
Another key contribution of Chapter 1 is the findings about the distribution
of training across age groups. In the last ten years, training participation has
declined for all age groups except for workers in the age band 55 to 65 years old.
A puzzle arises from the evidence I collect, since economic theory predicts no
human capital investments for workers who are close to retirement. A potential
research venue for the future is to investigate what led companies to shift training
towards this category of workers.
I find that University educated workers were twice as likely to get trained as non-
79
University educated workers in the 1990s and that training inequality is correlated
to wage inequality. Although both wage and training inequality have reduced in
the last ten years, I maintain that governments should consider fiscal subsidies
to training as a policy that supports and integrates other interventions aimed
at reducing labour income and wage inequality between University educated and
non-University educated workers.
The rest of the thesis focuses on the relationship between training and wage
inequality and the scope for fiscal policy.
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”Labor looks different in the 21st century. And so
should our job training programs.”
Leila Janah, businesswoman
2
A general equilibrium model with
training
The work presented here draws from and enriches the working paper Angelopoulos et al.
(2017).
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2.1 Introduction
As Chapter 1 shows, firm-provided training is an economically significant activity
in the UK. According to data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS),
every quarter, about one-fourth of workers receives some training. Empirical
literature, including both academic and policy-related research, has examined the
importance and the characteristics of employee training. The reviewed research
suggests that job-related training is beneficial to both employers and employees
by positively contributing to productivity and wages, although the gains tend to
be larger for employers (see, e.g. Blundell et al. (1999), Dearden et al. (2006),
Konings and Vanormelingen (2015) and other works cited earlier). Data for the
UK from the QLFS, the Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS), and the
Employer Skills Survey (ESS) also suggest that the costs of job-related training
are to a large extent covered by the employer.1
Given the productivity and wage benefits associated with training, I speculate
that, ceteris paribus, the latter could contribute to increasing earnings for low-skill
workers and to reducing labour income inequality between groups of workers with
different skills. A key observation relating to the UK labour market since the
1Further details relating to QLFS, CVTS, and ESS are reported in the next section and in
the Appendix A.
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1980s is the existence of pronounced earnings and wage inequality accompanied
by a stagnation of wages for the lower income groups since mid-2000s. Among
others, Blundell and Etheridge (2010), Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2016), Belfield et
al. (2017) and Angelopoulos et al. (2017a)) have reported such trends in inequality
measures. An important dimension of inequality in many developed countries has
been the earnings differential between University and non-University educated
workers (see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2008) and Heathcote et al. (2010) for the US
as well as Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and Angelopoulos et al. (2017a,b) for the
UK). In the UK, wage inequality related to University education increased since
1980, and despite reductions between 1995 and 2005, the skill premium remains
high.2 Thus, persistently lower labour market returns for workers with lower skills
characterise the UK economy.
Enhancing the skills and productivity of those with lower education is one of
the possible interventions to boost earnings for the low skilled and to reduce
inequality by closing the gap from the lower end. One way to achieve this result is
by improving the quality of basic education, see e.g. Machin and Vignoles (2005),
Wößmann and Schütz (2006), and Autor (2014). Academics and policy-makers
have considered complementing such efforts by interventions to improve the skills
and productivity of workers already in the labour market. These have been applied
2In the next section, data for the UK are presented and discussed in more detail.
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to individuals with high school degrees through ongoing vocational training and
lifelong learning schemes (see e.g. Stevens (1999), Sofer (2004), Brunello et al.
(2007) and the European 2020 Strategy).3 Thus, more intensive training of the
unskilled, or non-University educated, workers could improve their productivity
and earnings.
The literature has noted that policy interventions in training can be justified
in terms of equality of opportunity (see e.g. Machin and Vignoles (2001), Green-
halgh (2002), Brunello et al. (2007) and Busemeyer (2014)).4 However, extensive
evidence suggests that there is inequality in training, i.e. more skilled workers are
offered more training opportunities. For instance, data from the European Com-
munity Household Panel analysed in Bassanini et al. (2007)) demonstrate that
there is a gap in training participation between workers of different education
levels and of different family backgrounds. Similarly, in Chapter 1, data from the
UK QLFS reveals a gap in training between workers of different education levels.
Given that training is related to labour productivity and returns, it is reason-
able to expect training inequality to feed into earnings inequality. The analysis in
3Note that here I refer to training of employees only, as opposed to training of unemployed
workers or individuals leaving the labour force to study. The literature reviewed in Chapter 1
has found that this second type of training activities is generally not effective.
4In contrast, policy interventions to encourage training for efficiency reasons are more con-
troversial as part of the literature argues that training under-provision as a result of market
failures is hard to estimate (see e.g. Bassanini et al. (2007) and Brunello and de Paola (2009)).
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Section 2.2.1, based on QLFS data, finds that education-based training inequality
is indeed related to education-based wage inequality. However, the implied elas-
ticity is small, suggesting that changes in training inequality are expected to have
a small impact on wage inequality.
It is hard to fully understand how job-related training determines its subse-
quent effects on wage growth and wage inequality. This complexity is mainly due
to the fact that job-related training takes place at the expense of work time, thus
it is largely dependent on firm’s choices and is affected by the structure of pro-
duction and by changes in other inputs. In particular, a firm’s decision to train
its employees depends upon factors such as: (i) the efficiency of training time in
creating labour productivity; (ii) the monetary costs for training; and (iii) returns
to improved worker productivity for a given increase in workers’ skills, which in
turn depends on the structure of production (e.g. capital-skill complementarity
and skill-unskilled substitutability).
In such a context, the government can encourage training by reducing the cost
of the investment in training by the firm, and, in particular, the monetary costs
associated with employees’ training.5 In my data analysis below, I show that UK
5The train-or-pay scheme, where firms face levies if they don’t train their workforce, has
been abandoned by UK due its unpopularity among entrepreneurs in the 90’s (see Bassanini et
al. (2007)). Also, Dostie (2015) reports that such a scheme does not have a significant impact
on training in Canada, one of the few countries still employing this scheme.
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firms that receive a higher financial training subsidy, train a higher proportion of
their employees.
In light of the above, I aim to evaluate the quantitative implications of policies
that increase employer’s incentives to train workers. I construct a dynamic general
equilibrium (GDE) model that is consistent with the main features of job-related
training and wage inequality outlined above and allows for the relevant policy
interventions. I focus on the effects of such policies on inequality in training,
skill and wages. To model job-related training and skill creation, I build on
a large literature of partial and dynamic general equilibrium models with job-
related learning and labour productivity in the form of human capital. Some of
these works are Huggett et al. (2006), Kim and Lee (2007), Mejía and St-Pierre
(2008), Moreno-Galbis (2012), Manuelli and Seshadri (2014) and Chen and Lai
(2015). The general idea is that, subject to a cost, a portion of the worker’s time
is invested in learning skills that will improve future productivity, so that job-
related training implies both a monetary and a time opportunity cost. In each
period, time in training is used with existing job-related skills to improve future
job-related skills. In turn, the stock of job-related skills and the worker time that
is not diverted to training are combined to create the effective labour input.
What defines this form of skill acquisition as job-related training is that, in my
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model, the decision to train is made by the employer and training time is explicitly
at the cost of work time. In particular, the firm assumes both the monetary and
opportunity costs related to training and decides which proportion of employees
(or, equivalently, of their time) to train. It simultaneously appropriates the rent
from having a more productive stock of labour. Workers benefit in that their
wages increase, albeit at a lower rate than their productivity, consistently with the
evidence discussed in the previous chapter. While this approach adds complexity
to the problem of the firm by making it intertemporal, it is more in line with
the empirical evidence. According to the evidence, firms, and not workers, cover
the training costs. It also follows that allowing the firms to decide on training
is essential for the evaluation of the effect of policy aimed at redressing training
inequality by incentivising job-related training.
I add wage inequality to this setup by allowing for ex ante heterogeneity be-
tween University and non-University educated workers and a production structure
that allows for capital-skill complementarity. In particular, University educated
employees work in occupations (or jobs) that are more complementary to capital
that those of non-University educated workers.6 This standard mechanism leads
6Since I focus on wage (and not wealth or income) inequality, I follow the unemployment
literature since Merz (1995) (see e.g. Rogerson and Shimer (2011) for a review) and simplify the
model by allowing for perfect consumption insurance between the University and non-University
educated, members of the same household.
87
to a University wage premium that has been extensively analysed in the literature,
see e.g. Krusell et al. (2000), Goldin and Katz (2008), and Acemoglu and Autor
(2011).
In the context of job-related training, this further creates different incentives
for the firm to train skilled (University educated) and unskilled (non-University
educated) employees. Since these employees have different marginal products
of effective labour, there is a different (and higher) marginal return to increasing
skilled, relative to unskilled, job-related skills and effective labour input. Moreover,
the elasticity of skill creation with respect to job-related training is allowed to differ
between the two types of workers, and thus is allowed to reflect differences in the
efficiency of training.
I calibrate the model to data from the UK and ensure that it generates training
and wage inequality that are consistent with the data. I then evaluate policies that
target training for the unskilled workers by subsidising the firms and reducing the
relevant financial cost. Regarding the magnitude of the effect of training subsidies
to training participation and of the effect of the reduction in training inequality on
wage inequality, the model predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence
collected. With respect to both relationships, the model predicts effects just below
the lower bound of my estimates. Yet, despite the conservative calibration, there
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is a significant impact on wages and earnings for workers. In particular, training
subsidies significantly increase wages and labour income of the target group, and
there are sizeable positive spillover effects from subsidising the training of each
group of workers to the other group.
For instance, a policy to subsidise a quarter of the costs to train unskilled work-
ers can increase their wages (earnings) by 0.23% (0.75%, for earnings), 10-years
following the implementation of the policy, and by 0.58% (1.06%, for earnings) in
the long-run. Moreover, there are sizeable effects on skilled workers, who benefit
from the increased productivity of unskilled workers. Continuing with the same
example, skilled workers would experience an increase in their wages (earnings)
by 0.06% (0.16%, for earnings), 10-years following the implementation of the pol-
icy, and by 0.42% (0.51%, for earnings) in the long-run. These positive spillover
effects are important in generating wider social gains from a more targeted policy.
My work is thus helpful in reconciling the small effect that training inequality has
on wage inequality in the data (and model) with the strong impact that training
has on wages in both the empirical literature and the model.
The increase in lifetime income, both in terms of labour income and in terms
of aggregate income, is greater than the present value of the resources required
for such a policy, implying fiscal multipliers that are greater than unity. What
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underlies these significant effects is: (i) the strong impact of training on returns to
labour, and (ii) the spillover effects that work, in general equilibrium, to enhance
the positive effect on any labour input.7
From one side, subsidies to increase job-related training of unskilled workers
lead to a fall in wage and income inequality, while subsidising training of skilled
workers leads to an increase in inequality. On the other hand, the positive impact
of training subsidies for skilled workers is bigger in terms of aggregate quantities.
Hence, the policy-maker faces a trade-off to be addressed by weighting the different
objectives.
The result of this exercise is far from being negative. Even though subsidising
job-related training does not have a big impact in reducing “inequality”, lower
skilled are benefited from the intervention. Furthermore, the positive spillovers
entail that unskilled training subsidies support the productivity of both skilled
and unskilled workers. Thus, it is only because skilled workers benefit indirectly
from the policy that the income (and wage) gap is reduced by a small amount.
In other words, the conclusion that training subsidies do not significantly reduce
inequality should be viewed as a welcoming consequence of the positive spillovers
that they create.
7The effect of the increase in training on wages that is implied by the model is consistent
with empirical estimates in Blundell et al. (1996).
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Chapter 2 presents a model that is a specific case of the more general case
developed in Chapter 3. This may raise a question about the value added of
the former. However, under a direct comparison of the results, it is possible to
observe that Chapter 2 allows to better appreciate the channels through which
a subsidy to training affects wages of both unskilled and skilled workers and the
whole economy. In fact, the added complexity of Chapter 3 model will hide some
of the results highlighted here e.g. the spillovers effects.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, I review existing
empirical findings and present additional empirical evidence on training, training
inequality and its relationship with wage inequality, as well as the importance
of subsidies for training decisions. In Section 2.3, I develop the model used for
the quantitative evaluation of the nexus between training, inequality and policy,
and I discuss its calibration and quantitative relevance. Section 2.4 shows the
effects of a positive innovation to total factor productivity. Then, in Section 2.5, I
evaluate the effects of policy aimed at mitigating inequality of training outcomes
by incentivising job-related training. Section 2.6 contains the conclusions.
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2.2 Training costs, returns and inequality
This section reviews and adds to the empirical evidence on the extent of job-related
training, its importance for employers and employees as well as its effect on wage
inequality. Job-related training refers to all training activities which individuals
who are in employment, i.e. workers, participate in.
The sub-plot (1,1) of Figure 2.1 shows workers’ participation in this type of
training in the UK, using quarterly data from the QLFS from 1995.1 to 2015.4.8
Training participation is measured as the proportion of workers who received
training within the 13 weeks prior to the interview date. As can be seen, follow-
ing a large rise in the 1990s, this proportion has stabilised in recent periods to
about 25%, implying that one in four workers receives some type of training every
quarter.9As extensively discussed in the first chapter, job-related training on this scale
should be motivated by significant returns. Indeed, empirical studies document
a strong positive effect from employee training to firm productivity, as well as a
positive relationship between wages and training (see e.g. Blundell et al. (1999),
8The QLFS provides data using international definitions of employment and unemployment
and economic inactivity, together with a wide range of related topics such as occupation, train-
ing, hours of work, and personal characteristics of household members aged 16 years and over.
Further details regarding the data can be found in Appendix A.
9The UK is not an outlier in the European context. In many other European countries
training participation is similarly high (see, e.g. Markowitsch et al. (2013) who use the CVTS
dataset from Eurostat).
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Figure 2.1: Stylised facts
Haelermans and Borghans (2012), and Méndez and Sepúlveda (2016)). The esti-
mated effects vary between different samples and methods used in the literature,
but overall imply benefits to both employers and employees from job-related train-
ing (for reviews, see Leuven (2004) and De Grip and Sauermann (2013)). Returns
to firms are typically estimated to be higher than returns to workers, and they are
more robustly significant (see, e.g. Hansson (2008)). A positive effect of training
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on productivity is also confirmed in studies for the UK, such as Dearden et al.
(2006).10
In theory, firms are more likely to cover the cost of employee training if the latter
is firm-specific. Otherwise, if it is mainly general purpose, workers are expected to
finance their training activities (see e.g. Becker (1962)), especially if firms engage
in poaching of employees from competitors. However, there is empirical evidence,
at least for the US, that firms support employee training despite poaching (see e.g.
Parent (1999)).11 As reported earlier, the data for the UK shows significant firm-
sponsored training activities, which are accompanied by high returns for firms
from training their employees; this suggests that training has both a general and
firm-specific component, and that firms can capture a great share of the returns
from training.
Data from the QLFS, CVTS, and ESS (see Chapter 1) demonstrate that firms
in the UK pay for more than 70% of job-related training, and that about half of
this training takes place during work time, implying that it is costly in terms of
foregone output. In recent years, UK Government subsidies have covered approx-
imately 2.4% of total training costs according to CVTS data (2005 and 2010)).12
10See again Chapter 1, Section 1.2.4, for more detailed information.
11The role of poaching will be discussed more extensively in Chapter 3.
12Note that this ratio is based on gross receipts over total training costs as reported by
surveyed firms, averaged across the two years available. It might be 1-2 percentage points larger
if I were to include tax deduction of training expenses, but, since deductions are possible only
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The importance of firms’ contribution to training expenses is also confirmed us-
ing European-level data. In particular, Bassanini et al. (2007), analysing Euro-
pean data from the European Community Household Panel, find that employer-
provided training represents a major component of training, and that workers do
not pay for job-related training through lower initial salaries or flatter wage-tenure
profiles. Their results also suggest that training spells paid by employers represent
about 70-80% of the total training expenditures.
As shown earlier, empirical research has linked job-related training to produc-
tivity gains. Moreover, existing empirical analyses have also demonstrated that
there is inequality in participation and in the returns from training. For example,
Bassanini et al. (2007)) report that, in most EU countries, there is a gap in train-
ing participation between workers of different education levels and of different
family background (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.1). Also, they find that training
increases wages more for better educated workers. I further elaborate on training
inequality and the relationship between training and wage inequality in the UK
in the following sub-sections.
if the firm makes profits, for simplicity I did not consider this component.
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2.2.1 Inequality in training and wage inequality
To analyse training and wages inequality, I use data from the UK QLFS on train-
ing, wages, employment and hours of work by education groups between 1995.1-
2015.4. I split the sample into the group of workers who have at least a bachelor’s
degree or high level qualification (University educated) and those without these
qualifications (non-University educated). For simplicity I call them skilled and
unskilled, respectively. For each education group, I compute the training partici-
pation rate as the ratio of workers who have been trained in the last quarter over
the total number of workers. To obtain a measure of training inequality between
the two groups, I calculate the ratio of the University educated to non-University
educated training participation rates (see sub-plot (1,2) in Figure 2.1). As can
be seen, despite significant reductions in the period 1995-2004, training inequality
remains high, at about 1.6, without significant reductions since 2005.
Since training contributes to increased productivity and returns, I expect train-
ing inequality to contribute to wage inequality. Although this is a plausible spec-
ulation, I am not aware of existing research demonstrating a direct link between
training inequality and wage inequality. The University skill premium has de-
clined in recent decades in the UK, as shown in sub-plot (2,1) of Figure 2.1 (see
e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and Brewer, Wren-Lewis (2015), Belfield et
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al. (2017) and Angelopoulos et al. (2017a) for an analysis of inequality in the
UK).13 This can be linked to increased University education, which implies that
the relative supply of skilled labour over unskilled has grown, as shown in sub-plot
(2,2) of Figure 2.1.14,15 Indeed, as the scatterplot in sub-plot (3,1) of the same
figure shows, there is a negative relationship between wage inequality and the
relative skill supply in the UK for the period 1995-2015. However, the decline in
wage inequality can also be linked to the decline in the training inequality, as the
scatterplot in sub-plot (3,2) of Figure 2.1 shows.
It is interesting to note that the trend in wage inequality is more consistent
with the trend in training inequality. In particular, the biggest reduction in wage
inequality took place between 1995-2004, the period where training inequality also
reduced significantly, whereas after 2005 both series exhibit a smaller slope. In
contrast, the growth rate of the relative skill supply increased after 2005, the slope
being smaller prior to this date.
To further investigate the relationship between wage inequality and training
13The skill premium is the ratio of the average skilled to the unskilled wage over the period
1995.1-2015.4. All working individuals who are between 25 and 65 years old are considered
workers. Hence, this definition include part-timers and public sector employees. The wage is
computed by dividing weekly labour income by the number of hours worked per week from the
main job.
14See Goldin and Katz (2008) for evidence on the role education plays in wage inequality.
15Using the same definitions for skilled and unskilled as above, the relative skill supply is
defined as the ratio of the product of skilled (weekly) working hours and the skilled population
share to the product of the same two measures for unskilled workers using QLFS data from
1995.1 to 2015.4.
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inequality, I regress the former on the latter and on the relative supply of skilled
to unskilled labour. In particular, I consider the following relationship:
wst
wut
= α1 + α2
pst
put
+ α3
nst
nut
+
∑3
i=1
γitQit + εt , (2.1)
where w
s
t
wut
is the ratio of wages for skilled or University educated, wst , to unskilled
or non-University educated, wut , employees in period t ;
pst
put
is the ratio of training
participation for skilled, pst , to unskilled, put , employees; and
nst
nut
is the ratio of
skilled, nst , to unskilled, nut , employees in the UK economy.16 Given that training
exhibits quarterly regular variation (see e.g. Felstead et al. (2013)), I include a
set of quarterly time dummies, i.e. ∑3i=1 γitQit . Finally, εt ∼ Niid(0,σ 2ε ) is the error
term.
Table 2.1: Wage and training inequality in the UK economy
α̂1 α̂2 α̂3 γ̂1t = γ̂2t = γ̂3t = 0 serial correlation
estimates 1.464 0.136 -0.093 F (3,78) 6.720 F (4,75) 0.340
p-value 0.000 0.020 0.078 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.852
The results for the coefficients of interest are reported in Table 2.1 and support
my hypothesis that training inequality is correlated with wage inequality.17 I
16For the present analysis I use the time series for the whole UK. Thus, the methodology
differs from the panel data analysis reported in Section 1.4. Yet, the two approaches lead to
consistent results.
17As already remarked, this relationship has been tested on a panel dataset composed of yearly
observations for 1-digit SIC UK sectors in Section 1.4. The results of the analysis, reported in
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also report an F -statistic for the joint significance of the three quarterly time
dummies. Finally, I present the F -statistic for a test of serial correlation, obtained
by regressing the residuals ε̂t on four lagged values and testing for their joint
significance.
As can be seen, the coefficients for pst /put and for nst/nut are significant at the 2%
and 7.8% levels respectively, and they both have the expected signs. The results
suggest that training inequality is positively related to wage inequality, even after
controlling for improvements in the education composition of the labour force.
Furthermore, the 95% confidence interval for α̂2 ranges from 0.022 to 0.249.
2.2.2 Cost-incentives matter
As discussed above, UK firms take on most of the training costs, and the govern-
ment contributions to the monetary costs are small. At this point, it is relevant
to know whether the decision to train employees is sensitive to subsidies to the
direct monetary costs that job-related training entails. I am not aware of existing
evidence on the link between training subsidies and training participation. In the
literature, empirical studies consider several determinants for training provision
at sectoral, regional or national level, such as economic density (e.g. Brunello and
Table 1.8, are consistent with the results of the time-series regression performed on the whole
UK economy and reported here. The coefficient α̂2 in that case was twice as large, suggesting
that the aggregation employed here partly hides the relationship between training and wage
inequality as sector level differences are netted out.
99
Gambarotto (2004)), market power (e.g. Bilanakos et al. (2017)), and size (e.g.
Almeida and Aterido (2015)). To the best of my knowledge, none of these works
have been able to control or study the effect of fiscal incentives, due to lack of
data. Thus, I explore this link by using sectoral data from the QLFS and the
CVTS, editions 2005 and 2010, which report information about training subsidies
and training costs for about 4000 UK companies.
I first compute the per firm nominal average training subsidies and training
costs by SIC sector according to the classification reported in each dataset. In
2005, the CVTS employs a classification with 35 sectors, while the 2010 edition
classifies firms into 25 different sectors.18 Due to changes in the classification, I
can only match 17 sectors between the two waves. Thus, to make best use of the
available data, I merge them into an unbalanced panel dataset. I use this data to
generate the ratio of training subsidies to training costs which is denoted subit in
the regression below.
Using the QLFS, I next compute the training participation rate for each two
digit SIC in 2005 and in 2010 in annual terms. The training participation rate is
defined as the ratio between the number of workers who have received training in
any quarter and the total number of workers. This variable is denoted sit in the
18Note that discontinuities in the sampling and classification prevent the use of the earlier
editions of the CVTS for the present analysis.
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regression below.
I finally combine the sectoral QLFS training participation rate data with the
corresponding sectors in the CVTS database. In some cases, I aggregate two or
more sub-sectors to match the definition used in the CVTS. In such instances,
the number of workers of each sector is used as weight to compute the average
participation rate.
Exploiting the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions in the sample dis-
cussed above, I undertake a panel data random effects analysis, estimating the
following model:
si ,t = β1 + β2subi ,t + β3sizei ,t + µi ,t , (2.2)
where sit is the share of employees in sector i that received training in period
t ; and subit , is the share of training costs that have been received as a training
subsidy, on average, by firms of sector i in period t = 2005, 2010. Given that
sectors with bigger firms may train a higher share of their employees to exploit
economies of scale in training provision, I also include the average number of
employees per firm, sizei ,t , in the model. Finally, I allow for further unobserved
sector heterogeneity captured by the error term and consistent with a random
effects specification.
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The results from estimating (2.2) are shown in Table 2.2. As can be seen, both
βˆ2 and βˆ3 are positive and significant. Moreover, the results of the Hausman test
indicate that the random effects assumption cannot be rejected in favour of the
fixed effects one. The estimate of coefficient of β̂2, indicates that an increase in the
subsidy (as a share of total training cost) of 1%, tends, on average, to increase the
share of workers that are trained by about 0.26%, suggesting an inelastic response.
Further note that the 95% confidence interval for this coefficient ranges from from
0.051 to 0.473.19
Table 2.2: Training subsidies and participation
β̂1 β̂2 β̂3 Hausman test
estimate 19.46 0.262 0.020 χ 2(2) 1.930
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 p-value 0.381
Unfortunately, having at disposition only two waves of data prevents me from
using more complicated econometric models. In particular, I am unable to make
claims about causality between subsidies and training. Yet, I can exclude the
hypothesis that subsidies crowd out private investments, i.e. firms’ expenditures
in training activities.20 In the next section, I introduce my theoretical model that
19As robustness check, I include as regressor the average contribution to training funds (as
a percent of training costs). The control variable is statistically and economically insignificant
and it does not affect the estimation of the β2 coefficient.
20The main confounding factor would be strong externalities, or spillovers, between one group
and the other. As I show with my model’s simulation, spillovers are likely to dampen the link
from training to wage inequality. A simple example may provide the basic intuition: once skilled
employees get trained, overall productivity of the training company increases, and this leads to
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replicates quantitatively the empirical results just presented.
2.3 The model
To evaluate the quantitative implications of policies that raise firms’ incentives to
train low (high) skilled workers, I construct a dynamic general equilibrium model
that coheres with the main stylised facts relating to the UK job-related training
and wage inequality data reviewed above. The key features of the model are
(i) ex ante skill heterogeneity between non-University educated (unskilled) and
University (skilled) workers, leading to wage inequality under capital-skill comple-
mentarity in production and (ii) job-related training and skill creation undertaken
by firms separately for skilled and unskilled workers.
When I analyse the quantitative implications of policies, I focus on their effects
on inequality in training, skill accumulation and wages. In particular, I examine
subsidies to encourage the productivity of training time and skill accumulation
which are financed by a lump-sum tax on the household. To gauge the effects of
such policies, I first solve the model at the steady-state, choosing the parameters
so that the steady-state is similar to the actual UK economy. I then take this as
the initial position of the economy and evaluate the effects of one-off, permanent,
relatively higher wages for the group of unskilled employees. Revisit Section 1.2.4.3 for more
empirical evidence of human capital (and training) spillovers.
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change in policy by simulating the economy as it converges to its new long-run
equilibrium.
2.3.1 Representative household
There is an infinitely lived representative household that is comprised of unskilled
and skilled members. Superscripts u and s are used in what follows to denote
unskilled and skilled respectively. I assume that household members share the
household labour and asset income and have equal consumption irrespective of
their labour market status as assumed in large part of the literature on unem-
ployment since Merz (1995). This allows me to focus on between-groups wage
inequality without additional modelling assumptions required to enrich the setup
with wealth and consumption inequality. In this context, the head of the house-
hold makes all choices on behalf of its members, differentiated in this case, by
labour market skills. In particular, the head of the household maximises dis-
counted lifetime utility:
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
c
ψ1
t
[
nu
(
1 − lut
) ]ψ2 [ns (1 − lst ) ]ψ3}(1−σ )
1 − σ , (2.3)
where, 0 < β < 1 is the time discount factor; ct is per capita consumption; ni
(i = u, s) is the share of each skill type to total household members (nu + ns = 1);
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lit is labour supply; σ > 1 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; and the
parameters 0 < ψ1,ψ2,ψ3 < 1, ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3 = 1, represent the weights that the
household attaches to consumption, unskilled leisure, (1 − lut ), and skilled leisure,(
1 − lst
) in utility respectively.
The household’s budget constraint is:
ct + kt+1 −
(
1 − δk
)
kt = n
uwut l
u
t + n
swst l
s
t + rtkt + pit −Tt , (2.4)
where kt is physical capital; 0 < δk < 1 is the capital depreciation rate; wit is
the wage rate; rt is the net return to capital; pit is profits; and Tt is a lump-sum
transfer. The labour productivity advantages, for University educated workers,
work directly via differences in wst versus wut , which in turn capture differences
between the marginal productivity of skilled versus unskilled labour input, as it
will become clearer when I examine the production side of the model economy.
The Lagrangian for the household is given by:
L =
∑∞
t=0{βt
{
c
ψ1
t [nu(1−lut )]ψ2[ns(1−lst )]ψ3
}(1−σ )
1−σ − βtλkt [ct + kt+1 −
(
1 − δk ) kt−
−nuwut lut − nswst lst − rtkt − pit +Tt ]},
(2.5)
where λkt > 0, is the Lagrange multiplier. The household chooses
{
ct , l
s
t , l
u
t ,kt+1
}∞
t=0
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taking the initial condition, k0, the policy variable, {Tt }∞t=0, prices,
{
wut ,w
s
t , rt
}∞
t=0
and profits {pit }∞t=0 as given. The first-order condition (FOC) with respect to
consumption:
λkt =
ψ1
[ (
nu
[
1 − lut
] )ψ2 (ns [1 − lst ] )ψ3 ]1−σ
c
1−ψ1(1−σ )
t
, (2.6)
states that the shadow price of the budget constraint (2.4) is equal to the marginal
utility of consumption, ∂U∂ct , at time t .
The intratemporal FOCs with respect to unskilled and skilled labour supply:
ψ2
ψ1
ct
nu
(
1 − lut
) = wut , (2.7)
and
ψ3
ψ1
ct
ns
(
1 − lst
) = wst , (2.8)
imply that the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption at time t , i.e. ∂U
∂(1−l it )/
∂U
∂ct
, is equal to the unskilled and skilled wage
rates, for unskilled and skilled workers respectively.
Finally, the Euler equation for capital:
1
β
[
c
ψ1
t
(
nu
[
1 − lut
] )ψ2 (ns [1 − lst ] )ψ3
c
ψ1
t+1
(
nu
[
1 − lut+1
] )ψ2 (ns [1 − lst+1] )ψ3
]1−σ
ct+1
ct
= 1 + rt+1 − δk (2.9)
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says that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t and
t + 1, λ
k
t
λkt+1
≡ ∂U∂ct / ∂U∂ct+1 , is equal to the gross return to capital, 1+ rt+1, net of capital
depreciation.21
2.3.2 Representative firm
There is an infinitely lived representative firm, which is owned by the household
and employs capital, unskilled and skilled labour to produce a homogeneous final
good. Production takes place using the following constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production technology:
y˜
f
t = A
{
µ
(
qut
)α
+ (1 − µ)
[
ρ
(
k
f
t
)ν
+ (1 − ρ) (qst )ν ] αν } 1α , (2.10)
where, y˜ ft is the firm’s output; A > 0 is total factor productivity; 0 < µ, ρ < 1 are
the factor share parameters; qit is the effective labour input used in production;
k
f
t is the demand for capital; and α ,ν < 1 are the parameters defining the factor
elasticities, i.e. 1/(1 − α) is the elasticity of substitution between capital and
effective unskilled labour as well as between effective skilled and effective unskilled
labour; whereas 1/(1 − ν ) is the elasticity of substitution between capital and
effective skilled labour. Capital-skill complementarity in production, which is
21Expectations are not taken into account here since the absence of uncertainty does not play
a relevant role in the policy exercise I conduct.
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obtained in this setup when α > ν , has been shown to be empirically relevant and
a contributor to wage inequality. This is because an increase in capital stock and
capital augmenting technology in this setup are skill biased (see e.g. Krusell et
al. (2000), Hornstein et al. (2005), Caselli et al. (2006), and Goldin and Katz
(2008)).
The firm hires l f ,it hours from the labour market, but not all of it is used
for production, as some of the workers’ time is used for training purposes. By
denoting the share of workers’ time in job-related training by t it , this implies that
the net time actually used for production is given by l f ,it
(
1 − t it
), whereas l f ,it t it is
the actual time devoted to job-related training. Training increases next period’s
labour productivity. Building on the human capital tradition since Ben Porath
(1967), and following e.g. Huggett et al. (2006), I assume that labour productivity,
or else the stock of skills accumulated via job-related training evolves according
to the following laws of motion:
hut+1 = (1 − δu)hut + Hu
(
l
f ,u
t t
u
t h
u
t
)γu
, (2.11)
hst+1 = (1 − δs)hst + H s
(
l
f ,s
t t
s
th
s
t
)γ s
, (2.12)
where 0 < δu , δs < 1 are the depreciation rates for the skills accumulated by
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unskilled and skilled workers respectively; the stock of skills for each group is
measured by the variable hst and hut , respectively; H i
(
l
f ,i
t t
i
th
i
t
)γ i (i = s ,u) represents
the new skills created at time t ; H i > 0 is the productivity in new skill creation;
and γ i < 1 captures the elasticity of new skills with respect to existing skills
and training time. On-the-job training skills are firm-specific as it is assumed
that workers cannot change employer to free-ride on the training they received.
Also, note that both H i and γ i are related to workers’ learning ability, i.e. the
ability of the workers to use existing skills and their training time to create new
labour skills (see e.g. Huggett et al. (2006)). This ability is fixed at the point
of their entry in the labour market. Since both sets of parameters relate to the
same economic concept, I will normalise in what follows H i to be unity and let γ i
capture differences in learning ability associated with University education.
The restriction that γ i < 1 guarantees that there is well-defined (bounded)
steady-state value for hi , thus precluding growth in the stock of skills in the
long-run. At the same time, γ i < 1 leaves open the possibility of increasing or
decreasing returns to scale in creating labour productivity. Importantly, following
a basic assumption largely employed in the literature since the seminal work of
Mincer (1992), I allow learning ability to differ between skilled and unskilled
workers, reflecting their different education status prior to entering the labour
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market.
The firm thus incurs an opportunity cost in terms of foregone workers’ time
when it decides to train its employees. Moreover, I assume that it incurs a mon-
etary cost. The benefit for the firm is that the labour productivity generated by
job-related training increases effective labour input. In particular, the effective
labour input qit is a function of workers’ time and of labour productivity:
qst =
[
l
f ,s
t
(
1 − tst
) ]ω [
hst
]1−ω , (2.13)
qut =
[
l
f ,u
t
(
1 − tut
) ]ω [
hut
]1−ω , (2.14)
where 0 < ω < 1 measures the elasticity of effective labour with respect to pro-
duction time. Note that the constant returns to scale restriction in (2.13)-(2.14)
implies that the production function (2.10) is also constant returns to scale in its
five inputs
{
l
f ,i
t
(
1 − t it
)
,hit
}
i=s ,u
and k ft .
This setup implies that it is the firm, and not the worker, which assumes the
costs of training and owns job-related skills associated with hit , thus capturing
firm-specific skills that are augmented by job-related training.22 As explained in
Section 2, this is consistent with empirical evidence which suggests that (i) firms
22This is therefore different from partial or general equilibrium studies where on-the-job train-
ing is modelled as a household’s decision variable, as in e.g. Huggett et al. (2006) or Kim and
Lee (2007).
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pay for the majority of job-related training of their employees and (ii) that the
returns to productivity and firm profitability/returns from job-related training are
estimated to be larger than the effect of job-related training on workers’ wages,
implying rents for the firms associated with job-related training.
Indeed, in this specification, and given that the production function in (2.10)
is constant returns to scale, the compensation to labour productivity in the form
of hit is captured by the firm as a rent associated with training its employees,
and takes the form of profits. Therefore, the higher the contribution of the firm-
owned factor hit in production, which is captured by a lower ω, the higher the
firm’s profitability associated with investment in employee training.
The firm’s problem is formalised as follows. The representative firm aims to
maximise the present discounted value of lifetime profits (e.g. Chen and Lai
(2015)):23
Π f =
∞∑
t=0
Qtpit , (2.15)
where
Qt =
t−1∏
j=0
(
1 + rj+1 − δk
)−1
, (2.16)
23Note that, in the setup in Chen and Lai (2015), all new hires are unskilled and firms train
automatically all new recruits who then become skilled in the second period. Hence, in their
setup, training does not increase the productivity of skilled and unskilled workers in their tasks,
but rather serves as a means to move workers through tasks.
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defines the discount factor24 and
pi
f
t = y
f
t − rtk ft −wut l f ,ut −wst l f ,st − φutut l f ,ut (1 − τu) − φstst l f ,st (1 − τ s) , (2.17)
denotes profits, which are defined as the revenue from selling the final good, minus
the costs of capital, the costs of unskilled and skilled labour, as well the monetary
training costs for unskilled and skilled labour. The parameter 0 < φi < 1 refers
to the monetary cost per training hour; and τ i is a subsidy or tax on training
activities.
The intertemporal trade-off associated with training time is evident in equations
(2.10)-(2.14) and (2.17). In particular, ceteris paribus, an increase in training time
raises new skills at time t and the stock of skills in t + 1. Hence, effective labour
and output in t + 1 increase. However, training incurs a resource outlay, and by
lowering the time available for work at time t , effective labour and output at time
t fall.
This setup further creates different incentives for the firm to train its skilled and
unskilled employees which I observe in the UK data (see Section 2.2). In particular,
since the employees have different marginal products of effective labour, there is
24It holds that: Q0 =
−1∏
j=0
(
1 + r j+1 − δk
)
= 1.
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a different (and higher) marginal return to increasing skilled, relative to unskilled,
job-related skills and effective labour input. Moreover, if the learning ability for
skilled workers is higher, i.e. γ s > γu , then the increase in labour productivity is
higher, for a given amount of training time, for skilled versus unskilled workers (see
e.g. Almeida and Faria (2014)). On the other hand, if training skilled workers
implies a relatively higher monetary cost (i.e. if φu < φs), then the firm has a
disincentive to train skilled, versus unskilled workers. In this case, relative size of
training investments, of skilled and unskilled workers, depends on the quantitative
evaluation of these trade-offs.
Taking the initial conditions,
{
k
f
0 ,h
s
0,h
u
0
}
, prices, {wst ,wut , rt }∞t=0, policy rates
{τ s , τu}∞t=0 and the discount factor {Qt }∞t=0 as given, the firm chooses {k ft , l f ,ut , l f ,st , tut ,
tst ,h
u
t+1, h
s
t+1}∞t=0 to maximise (2.15), subject to (2.11) and (2.12).25 The Lagrangian
for the firm is given by:
Λ =
∑∞
t=0{Qt {y ft − rtk ft −wut l f ,ut −wst l f ,st − φutut l f ,ut (1 − τu) − φstst l f ,st (1 − τ s)}−
−Qtλut [hut+1 − (1 − δu)hut − Hu
(
l
f ,u
t t
u
t h
u
t
)γu ]−
−Qtλst [hst+1 − (1 − δs)hst − H s
(
l
f ,s
t t
s
th
s
t
)γ s ]},
(2.18)
25This is equivalent to a setup where: (i) a branch of the firm faces a static problem and
decides on capital and labour demand, taking training time and labour productivity as given;
and (ii) another branch faces the intertemporal problem of choosing training time and labour
skill acquisition, as long as both branches have the same objective function in (2.17).
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where λit are the shadow prices associated the skill accumulation constraints (2.11)
and (2.12); and where y ft , substituting out qst and qut , is defined as:
y
f
t = A
{
µ
( [
l
f ,u
t
(
1 − tut
) ]ω [
hut
]1−ω )α
+
+ (1 − µ)
[
ρ
(
k
f
t
)ν
+ (1 − ρ)
( [
l
f ,s
t
(
1 − tst
) ]ω [
hst
]1−ω )ν ] αν } 1α . (2.19)
The intratemporal FOCs with respect to capital, unskilled and skilled labour:26
rt =
∂y
f
t
∂k
f
t
, (2.20)
wut + φ
utut (1 − τu) =
∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,u
t
+ λut
∂hut+1
∂l
f ,u
t
, (2.21)
and
wst + φ
stst (1 − τ s) =
∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,s
t
+ λst
∂hst+1
∂l
f ,s
t
, (2.22)
equate their respective marginal costs to their marginal products. In the presence
of job-related training and skill accumulation, marginal costs are comprised of the
wage costs, wit , and the marginal increase in monetary costs of training, φit it , net of
the tax or subsidy, τ i . The corresponding marginal products are comprised of the
marginal product of labour in output, ∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,i
t
, plus the marginal product of labour
26All of the derivatives listed in the following FOCs are defined in Appendix B.
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in skill accumulation, ∂h
i
t+1
∂l
f ,i
t
, valued by its corresponding shadow price, λit . Hence,
the second term in the right hand side of these two FOCs captures the benefit to
the firm from increasing work time since this allows for more time to train and
thus for higher future labour productivity.
The intratemporal FOCs with respect to unskilled and skilled training time:
φul
f ,u
t (1 − τu) −
∂y
f
t
∂tut
= λut
∂hut+1
∂tut
, (2.23)
and
φsl
f ,s
t (1 − τ s) −
∂y
f
t
∂tst
= λst
∂hst+1
∂tst
, (2.24)
equate their respective marginal costs to their marginal products. Marginal costs
are equal to the opportunity cost of foregone output, ∂y
f
t
∂t it
, due to time being
diverted from work, plus as above, the marginal increase in monetary costs of
training time, net of the tax or subsidy. The corresponding marginal products are
the marginal product of training time in skill accumulation, ∂h
i
t+1
∂t it
, valued by its
corresponding shadow price, λit .
Finally the Euler equations for unskilled and skilled skills acquisition:
λut =
Qt+1
Qt
(
∂y
f
t+1
∂hut+1
+ λut+1
∂hut+2
∂hut+1
)
, (2.25)
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λst =
Qt+1
Qt
{
∂y
f
t+1
∂hst+1
+ λst+1
∂hst+2
∂hst+1
}
, (2.26)
state that the shadow price of skill acquisition at time t , λit is equal to the dis-
counted value of the net benefits to skill accumulation, ∂y
f
t+1
∂hit+1
+ λut+1
∂hit+2
∂hit+1
, where
∂y
f
t+1
∂hit+1
is the increase in output due to increased labour skills at t + 1 and ∂h
i
t+2
∂hit+1
is
the increased labour skills in t + 2 that result from increased skills in t + 1, valued
by its corresponding shadow price in t + 1, λit+1.2
2.3.3 Government budget
To focus on policies to reduce training inequality, I assume the following balanced-
budget constraint for the government:
Tt = τ
u
(
φutut l
f ,u
t
)
+ τ s
(
φstst l
f ,s
t
)
, (2.27)
which equates the lump-sum transfer/tax, Tt , with the expenditure to subsidise the
monetary costs of training time, φit itl f ,it . To ensure that the government budget
is balanced, Tt , is the residual policy instrument in the analysis below. These
assumptions will be relaxed in the next Chapter.27
27As already discussed, the current aim is to evaluate training subsidies and understand their
transmission mechanism without confounding factors, e.g. distortionary taxation effects.
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2.3.4 Market clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions for physical capital, unskilled and skilled labour,
dividends and goods markets are respectively:
k
f
t = kt , (2.28)
l
f ,u
t = n
ulut , (2.29)
l
f ,s
t = n
slst , (2.30)
pi
f
t = pit , (2.31)
and
y
f
t = ct + kt+1 − (1 − δk)kt + φutut l f ,ut + φstst l f ,st . (2.32)
2.3.5 Initial and transversality conditions
To ensure the existence of a solution, I assume that:
k0 = k¯ > 0, (2.33)
hs0 = h¯
s > 0, (2.34)
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and
hu0 = h¯
u > 0, (2.35)
where k¯, h¯s , and h¯u could take any strictly positive number, as production cannot
take place if any of these inputs is null. Further, since agents are infinitely-living,
to ensure a finite and unique solution to the model exists, I impose the following
transversality conditions:
lim
t→∞Etβ
tλht kt+1 = 0, (2.36)
lim
t→∞Etβ
tλht h
s
t+1 = 0, (2.37)
and
lim
t→∞Etβ
tλht h
u
t+1 = 0 (2.38)
which in this context are bound to hold, since e.g. my assumptions on skill-stock
accumulation parameters entail that (2.37) and (2.36) cannot be violated.
2.3.6 Decentralised Equilibrium
Given initial conditions and policy rates {τs , τu}, the decentralised equilibrium is
defined to be an allocation
{
ct , l
u
t , l
s
t , pit , l
f ,u
t , l
f ,s
t ,k
f
t , pi
f
t , t
u
t , t
s
t ,h
u
t+1,h
s
t+1
}∞
t=0
, prices{
rt ,w
u
t ,w
s
t
}∞
t=0, shadow prices
{
λkt , λ
u
t , λ
s
t
}∞
t=0, and the policy instrument, {Tt }∞t=0,
such that (i) households and firms undertake their respective optimisation prob-
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lems taking aggregate outcomes as given; (ii) all constraints are satisfied; and (iii)
all markets clear.
Using Walras’ law I discard the household’s budget constraint (redundant),
thus the DE consists of the following 19 equations: (i) the household’s 4-FOCs,
equations (2.6)-(2.9); (ii) the firm’s 2-skill accumulation equations (2.11)-(2.12);
(iii) the firm’s 7-FOCs, equations (2.20)-(2.26); (iv) the government’s budget con-
straint, equation (2.27); and (v) the 5-market clearing conditions, equations (2.28)-
(2.32).
2.3.7 Model calibration and steady-state
The parameters appearing in the DE equations are set with the overall aim that
the model generates a steady-state solution implying model generated quantities
similar to the actual data for the UK. The calibrated parameters are summarised
in Table 2.3. More details on data sources used can be found in Appendix A.
The productivity parameters which work as scaling factors {A,Hu ,H s} are all
normalised to unity. Also, following many dynamic general equilibrium studies, I
set the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 2.28 Similarly, I set the depreciation
rate of capital, δk = 2.5%, which is commonly used in dynamic general equilibrium
studies for the UK economy, see e.g. Harrison and Oomen (2010).
28For example, Browning et al. (1999), Ionescu (2009) and Bakış et al. (2015).
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Given that the depreciation of job-related skills is hard to measure, I assume
δs = δu = δk . The literature on work-related human capital, e.g. Blundell et
al. (1999), suggests that skills depreciate within a decade or so, which implies a
yearly depreciation rate of about 10%. Indeed, Mincer and Ofek (1982) estimate
the annual rates of individual-level depreciation to be between 3.3% and 7.6%,
while Heckman (1976) reports a confidence interval between 3.7% and 8.9%. To
these figures, one needs to add the value of human capital stock lost because of
retirees, which, according to Stokey and Rebelo (1995), amounts to 2.5% up to 4%
of the total stock. Based on this evidence, the quarterly depreciation rate should
lie between 1.45% and 3.26%. Thus, my assumption of 2.5% is in-between these
estimates.
Next, I set the quarterly discount factor of β = 0.995 to ensure that the annu-
alised risk-free interest rate net of depreciation is equal to 2.9 percentage points in
the steady-state.The latter is the value obtained from the real rate of discount on
3 month Treasury bills, net of inflation, averaged over the periods 1995q1-2008q4.
Finally the population shares nu and ns are obtained from the QLFS dataset, and
correspond to the average shares over the period 2000q1-2015q4.
Data about training subsidies to firms is available from CVTS 3 & 4. I divide
these subsidies by the training costs, the for the firms whose data is available,
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and find that the subsidies amount, on average, to about 2.4% of firms’ train-
ing costs. The CVTS dataset does not distinguish training subsidies for skilled
workers separately from those for unskilled workers, and current fiscal policies do
not discriminate between training recipients with respect to job-related training
paid by companies. I thus set τu = τ s = 2.4%, assuming that training is equally
subsidised.
The parameters {ψ2,ψ3} (recall that ψ1 follows from ψ1 + ψ2 + ψ3 = 1) are cal-
ibrated to match labour supply for skilled and unskilled workers. In particular,
the QLFS database reports the average weekly hours of work of skilled and of
unskilled workers over the periods 1994.1-2015.4. I normalise these by the num-
ber of daytime hours (i.e. 16 × 7) in a week to calculate the labour supply of
skilled and unskilled workers as 0.31 and 0.29, respectively. Conditional on the
remaining parameters, {ψ2,ψ3}, are obtained from the labour supply conditions
to ensure ls = 0.31 and lu = 0.29 at equilibrium.
I next move to the group of parameters relating to training and production
{ν ,α , µ, ρ,φu ,φs ,γu ,γ s ,ω}. I start with the parameter ω, which, as previously dis-
cussed, is directly linked to firms’ profitability and to the returns associated with
job-related training, i.e. firm-specific rents. To the best of my knowledge, data for
the UK on firms’ returns, in terms of profitability, associated with firms’ expenses
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Table 2.3: Calibration
symbol value definitions
Household
β 0.995 quarterly time discount factor
ψ1 0.320 consumption weight in utility
ψ2 0.370 unskilled leisure weight in utility
ψ3 0.310 skilled leisure weight in utility
δk 0.025 quarterly capital depreciation rate
σ 2.000 coefficient of relative risk aversion
ns 0.340 share of unskilled to total household members
nu 0.660 share of skilled to total household members
Firm
ν −0.495 effective skilled labour to capital substitution parameter
α 0.401 effective unskilled labour substitution parameter
ω 0.9416 elasticity of effective labour with respect to time
A 1.000 total factor productivity
δu 0.025 depreciation rate for accumulated skills (unskilled)
δ s 0.025 depreciation rate for accumulated skills (skilled)
Hu 1.000 productivity of new skill creation (unskilled)
H s 1.000 productivity of new skill creation (skilled)
µ 0.589 share of composite input to output
ρ 0.881 share of capital to the composite input
φu 3.234 fixed cost per training hour (unskilled)
φs 4.445 fixed cost per training hour (skilled)
γu 0.589 returns to scale for creating new skills (unskilled)
γ s 0.622 returns to scale for creating new skills (skilled)
Policy
τu 0.024 public subsidy for training activities (unskilled)
τ s 0.024 public subsidy for training activities (skilled)
on job-related training do not exist. Blundell et al. (1999) estimate the private
return to participating to job-related training in the UK to be up to 10% and
Dearden et al. (2006) estimate the partial effect of training time to firms’ profits,
alongside other factor inputs in a regression analysis. However, it is difficult to ex-
press such partial effects in model-relevant quantities. I thus choose ω by relating
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firm profitability to a monetary valuation of the investment in job-related training,
as measured by the ratio of firm’s profits over total monetary costs of training (in-
cluding both direct and indirect costs), i.e. pit
φutut l
f ,u
t (1−τu )+φs tst l f ,st (1−τ s )+wut tut l f ,ut +wst tst l f ,st
.
The advantage of using this ratio is that it is free of units of measurement, and
thus useful for model calibration purposes. Almeida and Carneiro (2009) esti-
mate this return to be between 8.6 and 13.8 percentage points for training firms
in Portugal. Given this available information, I choose ω so that, in conjunction
with the remaining parameters, firms’ returns on investment in training, defined
as above, are about 10%.
I also have data on the: (i) labour income share, ns lsws+nuluwuy ; (ii) capital-to-
output ratio, ky ; (iii) skill premium, w
s
wu ; (iv) training costs as a percent of GDP,
φs t
s lsns+φut
ulunu
y ; (v) unskilled training share, tu ; and (vi) skilled training share, ts .
These are obtained, respectively, from: (i) data from the OECD (2015) report;
(ii) GDP and capital stock series published by the ONS; (iii) my own calculations
from the UK QLFS data;29 (iv) ONS data on gross value added (GVA) and
the estimates of the total training costs reported in the 2011 ESS; (v) my own
calculations, based on ESS estimates of total training time per employee, the
population shares, and the average training participation rate of non-University
29The skill premium is obtained by averaging the ratio of the hourly wage of University
educated workers and that of non-University educated workers over the period 1995q1-215q4
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educated workers.30; (vi) same as (v), but with respect to University educated
workers. Together, these data provide six targets.
Following common practice in the literature using general equilibrium calibrated
models with the CES production function (see e.g. Lindquist (2004) and Pour-
pourides (2011)), I set the elasticities of substitution ν = −0.495 and α = 0.401,
based on the estimates by Krusell et al. (2000). I then choose the remaining
parameters in the production function so that the model’s steady-state solution
is consistent with factor income shares and inequality indices. In particular, I
choose {µ, ρ,φu ,φs ,γu ,γ s} so that the model’s steady-state predictions regarding
the targets
{
ns lsws+nuluwu
y ,
k
y ,
ws
wu ,
φs t
s lsns+φut
ulunu
y , t
u , ts
}
are similar to the data.
Table 2.4: Steady-state
variable definition model data
ws
wu skill premium 1.675 1.671
ts skilled training to total time share 0.023 0.023
tu unskilled training to total time share 0.013 0.013
ts/tu training differential 1.743 1.746
t s l f ,s+tu l f ,u
(1−t s )l f ,s+(1−tu )l f ,u training to work time share 0.019 0.017
ls skilled labour to total hours 0.316 0.310
lu unskilled labour to total hours 0.292 0.290
k/y capital-to-output 10.25 10.30
φs t s l sns+φu tu lunu
y monetary training costs-to-output 0.025 0.026
T /y public spending on training costs-to-output 0.0006 0.0006
rk/y capital income-to-output 0.306 0.299
ns l sws+nu luwu
y labour income-to-output 0.665 0.671
30The population shares and the training participation rates are derived from the QLFS with
the waves from 1995q1 to 2015q4.
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The steady-state solution implied by the parametrisation in Table 2.3 is sum-
marised in Table 2.4. As can be seen, the model’s predictions for the long-run
quantities are close to the data. Moreover, I can simulate the model to evaluate
its predictions regarding the elasticity of training (average across the two types
of workers) with respect to changes in subsidies. Recall that the empirical evi-
dence in Section 2.2 demonstrates a significant, but small effect of an increase in
subsidies on training shares, i.e. 0.26% with a 95% confidence interval implying
a range from 0.14% to 0.39%.31 Given that I cannot differentiate between skilled
and unskilled workers in the data, this estimate refers to an average effect, across
worker types. Thus, I examine the response of the model to increasing both τu
and τ s by 1%, starting from the state in Table 2.4.
The model simulation reveals that, on average, across skilled and unskilled
workers, training increases by 0.03%. Thus, the elasticity of training time with
respect to training subsidies implied by the model is on the conservative side with
respect to the empirical evidence reported in Section 2.2. Before focusing on the
fiscal policy, the next section reports the effect of a positive innovation to the total
factor productivity.
31Note that under the assumption of homoskedasticity, the interval is larger and it extends
from 0.05% to 0.47%
125
2.4 Total factor productivity innovations
Chapter 1 emphasises that, in the UK, the training participation rate is acyclical,
at least when the business cycle is represented by GDP fluctuations from its HP-
filtered trend. A large strand of the literature, started with Lucas (1977) and
revamped by King and Rebelo (1999), has tried to identify stylised facts with
respect to business cycle properties of macroeconomic aggregates, e.g. GDP and
employment. A main feature of the standard RBC model is that it focuses on
total factor productivity as the driver of economic fluctuations.32
The present work does not pursue matching second, or higher, moments as
it focuses on policy analysis and the time-frame adopted is the medium or long
run.33 For this reason, this section aims to show that the model’s behaviour does
not differ from the typical behaviour of RBC models.
To do this, I assume that total factor productivity, At , is time-varying. This
variable follows an the first order autoregressive AR(1) process:
32This rigid assumption prevents the model from replicating some of the stylised facts observed
in the data (see e.g. Hansen (1985) and more recently DeJong and Ingram (2001)). Nonetheless,
the framework is still used extensively for research purposes.
33The literature has already used a model with training to match data moments. One example
is Einarsson and Marquis (1998). As their attempt partly fails, they argue that a model with
training investments can improve its fit to training data (at business cycle frequencies) only
introducing additional shocks to the human capital law of accumulation.
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log(At ) = ρalog(At−1) + ϵa,t , (2.39)
where ϵa,t is an i.i.d. innovation that has zero mean and constant variance, and
the autocorrelation coefficient, ρa, is set to 0.89 following the estimation performed
by Harrison and Oomen (2010).34 As usual, I simulate a 1% shock to total factor
productivity and report in Figure 2.2 the impulse response functions (IRFs).
Figure 2.2 shows that the increase in productivity leads to larger investments
into physical capital (sub-plot (1,3)). To meet the excess final good demand,
producers increase supply by using more labour input. Firms offer higher wages
so that workers will supply the desired quantity of labour. Moreover, firms reduce
the share of time dedicated to training to boost output. Higher wages entails that
consumption rises, increasing further the demand of output.
Notice that the increase in labour is larger than the decrease in training time
share, therefore the net effect on skill accumulation is still positive as confirmed
by the dynamics of human capital stock (sub-plots (1,4) and (2,4)). After all, a
higher human capital stock is beneficial to firms since they can generate larger
streams of profits even after the productivity boost dissipates.
Wage inequality falls initially as the unskilled labour supply is less elastic than
34This will differ from the autocorrelation coefficient used to compare my model to the liter-
ature in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.2: Temporary increase in total factor productivity by 1%
that of skilled workers. Thus, firms offer relatively higher wages to unskilled
workers. Unfortunately for this group, the complementarity between physical
capital and skilled labour entails that firms have greater incentives to accumulate
skilled human capital, and in turn this leads to skilled workers facing better salaries
in relative terms than unskilled ones. As a consequence, wage inequality rises in
the medium run (sub-plot (4,1)).
Figure 2.3 directly compares the impulse response functions of my model and
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Figure 2.3: Comparison between current and the classical RBC model
that of King and Rebelo’s model after a 1% temporary shock to the TFP.35 Even
though the model with training looks very different from the model in King and
Rebelo (1999), the response of main aggregate variables is very alike.
Wage, the interest rate, and output all react very similarly after the TFP shock.
It seems that investments react less in the training model at impact and the
accumulation of physical capital is lower overall. Yet, investments decline faster
35The data for the plots are my own, obtained replicating the original work of King and Rebelo
(1999). The code is available on request. Since they used a higher autocorrelation coefficient,
i.e. ρa = 0.979, the IRFs in figure 2.3 vary marginally from those reported in Figure 2.2 as in
the latter I follow King and Rebelo’s calibration for comparison purposes.
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in King and Rebelo’s model. Thus, after about 70 periods, the physical capital
percent deviation is higher in the training model. As a consequence, the same
shift can be observed in the paths of consumption and aggregate output.
With respect to the average labour supply, the dynamics is similar between the
two models: a first period where supply is above steady state, followed by a long
period of low labour supply. Even the timing of this transition is similar. It is
only slightly delayed by the presence of training and skills capital in the model
proposed in this chapter.
After showing that, despite the innovations, the model does not differ substan-
tially from the classical real business cycle model as presented by King and Rebelo
(1999), I perform policy exercises to evaluate the desirability of training subsidies
using the proposed framework.
2.5 Policy analysis
This section examines the dynamic effects of training subsidies on training, wages
and earnings. To solve for the transition paths, I assume that the economy is
at its steady-state, when a one-off, permanent, change takes place in either τu or
τ s . I solve for the dynamic paths of the endogenous variables of the system as
this moves towards the new steady-state by obtaining the dynamic solution of the
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DGE system of equations for S periods. The rational-expectation path is solved
non-linearly using standard numeric methods with Dynare (see Adjemian et al.
(2011)). I set S = 1000 to ensure that convergence is achieved.36
2.5.1 Some preliminary results
The effect of training subsidies on training time can be derived analytically. The
conclusion I draw is expected to hold for most (reasonable) values of training
subsidies, but will not hold for all values because very large subsidies can have
undesirable general equilibrium repercussions. To see the effect of increases in τ i
on training time for skill group i, recall that the first-order condition with respect
to training time can be re-written as:
φil
f ,i
t
(
1 − τ i ) = λit ∂hit+1
∂t it
+
∂y
f
t
∂t it
, (2.40)
and implies that a reduction in the training costs requires an increase of training
time. In fact, since the left-hand side has fallen, the right-hand side of (2.40) must
also fall. The lever for the firm is to increase the training time t it , since both
∂hit+1
∂t it
36For most levels of subsidies, convergence is achieved in a modest number of periods.
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and ∂y
f
t
∂t it
are a decreasing function of t it :
∂
{
λit
∂hit+1
∂t it
+
∂y
f
t
∂t it
}
∂t it
< 0. (2.41)
The first result is a direct consequence of the calibration of each γi , which entails
that the skill creation function is concave in training time, labour, and human
capital stock. The second result can be proven by using the production function
(2.10) where ∂y
f
t
∂qit
> 0, and Equation (2.14) where ∂q
i
t
∂t it
< 0 and ∂
2qit
∂2t it
< 0. It follows
that ∂y
f
t
∂t it
=
∂y
f
t
∂qit
∂qit
∂t it
< 0 and ∂
2y
f
t
∂2t it
=
∂
[
∂yft
∂qit
∂qit
∂t it
]
∂t it
=
∂y
f
t
∂qit
∂2qit
∂2t it
< 0.
Therefore, a rise in subsidies τ i tends to create a rise in t it via the substitution
effect – cheaper training leads to more training efforts. However, since ∂y
f
t
∂t it
is also a
decreasing function of t it , this means that the increase in indirect costs of training
mitigates the impact of the policy. In other words, a higher share of training time
increases the opportunity costs of further marginal increases in training time and
dampens the reaction of t it to changes in τi .
All this holds as a partial equilibrium analysis, and it is evident that indirect
channels may affect the final allocation of training time. Yet, as simulations
have confirmed, the general equilibrium effects are of second order importance
and do not spoil this result, unless the training subsidy is so large that distortions
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alter drastically the allocation of all factors and resources leading to contradictory
results (e.g. training subsidy crowding out training investment). Given the model
features, and the current calibration, crowding out is not meant to occur.
With respect to changes in labour for skill group i, there is no general result
that I can present. The generic first order condition with respect to labour input
for skill group i can be re-written as labour demand:
wit =
∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,i
t
+ λit
∂hit+1
∂l
f ,i
t
− φit it
(
1 − τ i ) , (2.42)
and suggests that as training time increases, ∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,i
t
and λit
∂hit+1
∂l
f ,i
t
, while λit
∂hit+1
∂l
f ,i
t
is likely
to decrease (since the elasticity of training time to training subsidies shouldn’t be
larger than one). Thus, the labour demand is shifting to the right. Yet, as I show
below, the supply of labour also shifts to the right. Thus, while equilibrium labour
will increase, it is impossible to predict whether wage will rise or decrease.
2.5.2 Income and inequality effects
The effects of a permanent increase in τu from 0.024 to 0.5 are shown in Figure
2.4. The policy implies that the government subsidises half of the training cost
for unskilled workers. A permanent rise in training subsidies, τu , increases train-
ing time for unskilled workers (see sub-plot (1,2) for tut ) and this influences the
133
allocation of all other resources.
The effect of τu on training time has been discussed in Subsection 2.5.1. As
implied by the first-order condition (2.23), the (predominating) substitution ef-
fect entails that the representative firm increases training time since this is now
cheaper, ceteris paribus. The increase in tut will lead to the accumulation of higher
worker skills (see sub-plot (2,1) for hut ).
For τu = 0.5, the incentives offered by the policy are large enough to entail
an increase of the unskilled labour demand which puts upward pressure on un-
skilled wage. The additional labour input more than compensates the reduction
of time due to increased training efforts, as can be observed from sub-plot (2,3)
for lut
(
1 − tut
). With time, the accumulated human capital stock increases labour
productivity, and this works to further increase the aggregate labour demand.
On the other hand, the increase in the unskilled labour input tends to decrease
the marginal product of unskilled labour (see sub-plot (5,1)), due to decreasing
marginal returns. This counterbalances the increase of value of investing labour
input to train unskilled workers. At the same time, the households predict higher
future output and expand the unskilled labour supply to increase current income
(thus consumption). At impact, the general equilibrium effect of these forces
is resolved into an increase in l f ,ut (see sub-plot(4,3)) and a very modest – and
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Figure 2.4: Permanent increase of unskilled training subsidy to 0.5
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temporary – fall of unskilled wage (see sub-plot (3,3)).37
For skilled workers, the labour demand is not supported by the increase in the
value of training whereas the labour supply expands as for unskilled workers.38
As a consequence, the equilibrium skilled wage falls more intensely (see sub-plot
(3,4)) than unskilled wage at impact. Later on, as the additional training efforts
pay their dividends in terms of increased skill capital, the labour productivity
picks up and firms are willing to offer increasingly higher skilled (and unskilled)
wages.
The positive developments in the labour market for unskilled labour and the in-
crease in the unskilled effective labour input qut (see sub-plot (3,1)), have positive
spillover effects on the productivity and returns to skilled labour. In particular,
after the initial decline, the marginal product of skilled labour and thus skilled
wages increase (see sub-plots (5,2) and (3,4) respectively). Following these dy-
namics, capital stock is also increasing (see sub-plot (4,2)). Hence, the increased
labour productivity and employment for unskilled workers initially crowds out
capital, skilled training and skilled labour productivity (see sub-plots (1,3) and
(2,2) for tst and hst , respectively). However, as more resources are diverted to-
37As discussed earlier, the impact reaction of unskilled wage would have been different if the
subsidy increase were smaller.
38Remember that, for simplicity, I assume a single household reunites unskilled and skilled
members.
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wards unskilled labour during the initial phase of the adjustment towards the new
steady-state, the increased effective unskilled labour input eventually crowds in
capital and skilled training as well as skilled hours (see sub-plot (4,4) for l f ,st ). The
changes in wages and hours imply that earnings are also increased (see sub-plot
(5,4) for wst lst ).
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Figure 2.5: Permanent increase of skilled training subsidy to 0.5
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In summary, increased training subsidies for unskilled workers create benefits
to both skilled and unskilled workers, in terms of wages and earnings. The effect
is stronger for unskilled workers, so that wage inequality is reduced. Hence, this
is a policy intervention which, in terms of labour income, is beneficial for all the
agents and it reduces inequality.39
Very similar dynamics can be observed in the case that the government increases
subsidies to skilled training. In this case, the spillovers come from the positive
developments in the labour market for skilled labour, and produce an improvement
of working conditions of unskilled workers. Figure 2.5 shows the effects of a
permanent increase in τ s from 0.024 to 0.5, which implies that the government
subsidises half of the training costs for skilled workers. This can be compared to
previously discussed τu policy as this is also reported in the same figure. In this
case, although increasing τ s improves both households’ labour income and overall
output increases more, it increases inequality.
Table 2.5 summarises the effects of different increases in τu and τ s on training,
wages and earnings for both types of workers, as well as on the relevant measures
of inequality. For each tax instrument, I consider three different magnitudes of
training subsidies, in particular τ i = 0.25, τ i = 0.5 (which was analysed in Figures
2.4 and 2.5), and τ i = 1 for i = u, s. Therefore, each column contains information
39Conditional on the assumptions about the financing of the fiscal subsidies.
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about a subsidy of different size, and the rows take into consideration the effect
on different variables, e.g. unskilled training in the first row or skilled income
in the eighth row. The effect is measured in terms of percentage change of each
variable from the original steady state to the new one where the fiscal policy is
permanently implemented.
The increase in τu to 0.25, increases training for unskilled workers by nearly
18% (see cell (1,1) of Table 2.5), implying an increase from 3.4 days of average
training to 4 days. Similarly, the increase in τu to 0.5 implies an increase from 3.4
days of average training to 5 days.40 In terms of implied elasticities, these effects
suggest that an increase by 1% in τu increases training for the unskilled workers
by 0.02%, which is at the lower bound of the estimates in Table 2.3.41 Hence,
although consistent with the lower values of the empirical estimate for the effect
of financial incentives on training, training subsidies produce sizeable increases in
training.
In turn, these lead to smaller, yet quantitatively significant, increases in wages
for the unskilled. The effect of the increase in training on wages is also consistent
40Using ESS and QLFS data, I estimate average unskilled training time to be 3.4 days per
year, by combining the information about the average days of training per worker, the population
share of skilled and unskilled workers, and the ratio of unskilled training participation to skilled
training participation rate.
41The model-simulated elasticity I mention is obtained as the ratio between the percentage
change in unskilled training over the percentage change in unskilled training subsidy, i.e. the
value of cell(1,1) divided by 100(0.25/0.024 − 1)%.
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with previous econometric evidence (see e.g. Table 2 in Blundell et al. (1999)). In
particular, I find in Table 2.5 (using the case for τu = 0.5 as an illustration) that an
increase in training by about 1.6 days increase wages by 1.45%. Since the average
days of training in a year are 3.4, this implies that training a worker increases
her wage by about 3.1%, which is consistent with the estimates in Blundell et al.
(1999) regarding the effect of employer-provided training courses on the wage of
the average worker.
In terms of inequality, training subsidies for unskilled workers reduce slightly
wage inequality, because of the concurrent increase in wages for the skilled. Earn-
ings inequality is reduced by more, due to the positive effects of increased training
on unskilled hours. The relationship between wage inequality and training inequal-
ity, as shown in Table 2.5, is also consistent with the empirical estimates reported
in Table 2.2. The results in Table 2.5 imply that a decrease in training inequality
by 1% leads to a fall in wage inequality by about 0.011%, which is at the lower
bound of the confidence interval for β̂2 from Table 2.2.42
The effect of a subsidy to skilled training on training time is slightly lower than
that of subsidies to unskilled training. However, the effect on wages is larger. This
42The model-simulated elasticity varies with the size of the intervention. For simplicity, I
take the (τu = 0.25) case as reference, i.e. column one of Table 2.5, and I compute the elasticity
as the ratio between the percentage change in wage inequality over the percentage change in
training inequality, i.e. sixth row divided by the third row. This equals to 0.011% and it can be
compared to the empirical estimates (taking the exercise with a pinch of salt).
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Table 2.5: Steady-state effects of increasing the training subsidies
permanent increase in τu permanent increase in τ s
τu = 0.25 0.5 1 τ s = 0.25 0.5 1
%∆tu 17.85 49.58 214.9 0.41 0.99 2.60
%∆ts 0.27 0.65 1.81 16.54 44.88 172.37
%∆ t
s
tu -14.92 -32.71 -67.67 16.06 43.46 165.47
%∆wu 0.58 1.45 4.39 0.61 1.46 3.85
%∆ws 0.42 1.04 2.89 0.89 2.20 6.40
%∆w
s
wu -0.16 -0.41 -1.44 0.28 0.73 2.46
%∆wulu 1.06 2.76 9.83 0.64 1.61 5.11
%∆wsls 0.51 1.30 4.49 1.54 3.95 13.05
%∆ w
s l s
wu lu -0.55 -1.42 -4.86 0.9 2.30 7.56
can mainly be attributed to the skill-capital complementarity that allows a greater
increase in overall labour productivity. Even though the policy produces higher
inequality, I observe important spillovers especially with respect to the unskilled
wage.
The message from Table 2.5 is that while the results are on the conservative side
of the estimates regarding the effects of training subsidies on training and wage
inequality, they nevertheless imply significant gains in terms of wages and income
for unskilled workers. Therefore, although subsiding job-related training may not
be the most effective policy tool in reducing inequality, it has strong potential to
support the income of the lower skilled. In the next sub-section, I explore further
the resource effectiveness of these income gains using fiscal multipliers.
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2.5.3 Multiplier analysis
I next measure the effectiveness of job-related training subsidies with respect to
increases in income and other monetary values quantities, compared to the re-
sources required for their funding. To do so, I compute fiscal multipliers based on
the simulation exercise described above. In particular, I define the impact mul-
tiplier for the variable x as the difference between xt and its value in the initial
steady-state x , divided by the difference in government spending at time t and its
initial steady-state, Tt − T , which is the period in which the new fiscal policy is
introduced. Similarly, and following the large strand of literature on fiscal policy
evaluation (see e.g. Leeper et al. (2010)), I compute the lifetime multiplier of e.g.
the variable x according to the formula:
lifetime multiplier =
S∑
t=0
Qt (xt − x)
S∑
t=0
Qt (Tt −T )
(2.43)
where Qt is the household discount factor introduced in (2.16). I simulate S = 2000
periods after the shock to compute (2.43). The multipliers for the training subsidy
policies are reported in Table 2.6.
Focusing on the top half of the table (unskilled policies), it can be observed that
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Table 2.6: Multiplier effects of increasing the unskilled and skilled training subsidies
impact multiplier lifetime multiplier
income measures τu = 0.25 0.5 1 τu = 0.25 0.5 1
wulu 0.75 0.72 0.66 1.74 1.60 1.25
wsls 0.09 0.10 0.10 1.23 1.12 0.82
wulu +wsls 0.32 0.31 0.29 1.40 1.28 0.97
(1 + r − δk )k -0.19 -0.14 -0.07 7.99 7.46 5.93
y 0.24 0.24 0.24 1.62 1.46 1.07
impact multiplier lifetime multiplier
τ s = 0.25 0.5 1 τ s = 0.25 0.5 1
wulu 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.76 0.69 0.52
wsls 1.82 1.68 1.41 3.29 3.02 2.38
wulu +wsls 1.31 1.21 1.00 2.43 2.23 1.74
(1 + r − δk )k 0.03 0.00 -0.08 25.6 22.3 14.6
y 0.40 0.36 0.27 2.14 1.90 1.32
all multipliers (except on impact for capital income) are positive and most of the
lifetime multipliers are larger than unity. Therefore, over the lifetime, the increase
in benefits is greater than the increase in resources required to finance the policy.
As expected, given the dynamics observed in Figure 2.4, and since the benefits
increase over time, the lifetime multipliers are greater than the impact multipliers,
but it is noteworthy that the benefits materialise even in the short-run. Also, the
multipliers are decreasing as τu gets larger, which implies decreasing returns to
policy interventions in the training sector.
In the second half of Table 2.6, I report the multiplier effects for permanent in-
creases of the training subsidies to skilled training, τ s . The results are comparable
to those of the first half, although in general the positive effects are stronger at the
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aggregate level. This is explained by the central role of skilled labour in produc-
tion, since its complementarity with capital acts as an amplification mechanism
for the policy intervention at the aggregate level.
2.6 Conclusions
To understand whether subsides to job-related training could improve earnings for
the lower skilled workers and reduce wage inequality, as measured by the distance
between wages and earnings of the skilled and unskilled workers, I developed a
dynamic general equilibrium model for the UK. This model, incorporating skilled
and unskilled labour, capital-skill complementarity in production and an endoge-
nous training allocation, performed well with respect to replicating key long-term
relationships in the UK data.
The quantitative policy analysis suggests that training subsidies for the un-
skilled have a significant impact on their labour income. These subsidies also
increase earnings for skilled workers and raise aggregate income with implied life-
time multipliers exceeding unity. The latter result implies that the increase in
benefits accruing from the policy is greater than the increase in resources required
to finance the policy. It should be noted, however, that a given increase in re-
sources to finance training subsidies can have additional cost implications for the
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society depending on the type of revenue-generating policy implemented.43
Training subsidies to skilled workers, while increasing skilled and unskilled earn-
ings, raise the former by more, worsening wage inequality. Therefore, there is a
trade-off associated with subsidies to skilled training. In contrast, training subsi-
dies to unskilled workers improve earnings for both skilled and unskilled workers
without a negative impact on inequality.
The positive spillover effects to skilled workers imply that the effects of training
subsidies on inequality are small. As a result, training subsidies that are targeted
to unskilled workers are not a very effective tool for reducing inequality. However,
this finding is a consequence of the effectiveness of the policy to propagate benefits
throughout the labour force and thus works to increase the social value of such
interventions.
For this analysis, I assumed that the market provision of training is efficient.
Although this is a rather extreme assumption, it helps focusing on the redistribu-
tive aspect of the fiscal policy. Moreover, I can test the model fitness and its
consistency with UK empirical evidence, and I can draw clearer conclusions about
the channels and the primary effect of training subsidies.
Yet, to fully understand the consequences of fiscal policies in the training sector,
it is important to consider the role of externalities. This allows to perform a policy
43This issue will be addressed in Chapter 3.
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evaluation based on welfare measures, and to reach stronger conclusions about the
effectiveness of this fiscal policy tool. For this reason, my third chapter will present
an extended and more realistic version of the core model, where channels such as
distortionary taxation and externalities are included.
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”Developing skills is as important as training. A
larger effort is needed to create a skilled workforce
with employment potential.”
Pallam Raju, politician
3
The welfare effects of training subsidies
3.1 Introduction
The empirical evidence of the previous chapter shows that training provision has
a moderate impact on wage inequality. I provide a potential explanation of this
evidence with a general equilibrium model calibrated on UK data. The proposed
framework has the advantage of being simple enough to allow a clear understand-
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ing of the channels through which fiscal subsidies affect training provision and
wages. Yet the model has several limits since it abstracts from many real-economy
features. The chapter addresses this issue by providing new evidence and present-
ing an extended model for policy purposes.
The assumption that training provision is efficiently provided by market forces
is particularly restrictive. As shown in Chapter 1, a large strand of the literature
has posited that training is likely to be under-provided. Chapter 3 proposes a more
realistic setup, where firms fail to fully internalise training returns, thus they offer
less training than optimal. I present empirical evidence that the proposed channel
actually plays a role in the determination of the training participation rate at the
aggregate level. In particular, I find a statistically significant relation between
the separation rate of workers and their training probability, after controlling for
endogeneity.
The new theoretical framework introduces two different representative house-
holds, a skilled and an unskilled one, as well as progressive, and distortionary,
taxation on households’ total income. These innovations create a more realistic
setting for policy analysis purposes.
To summarise, the main contributions of my work are three: (i) I build a new
stylised model which features a range of endogenous channels affecting training
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provision and wage and productivity outcomes and a more complex fiscal menu
at disposition of the policy-maker; (ii) I find novel and compelling evidence that
training provision is negatively affected by the separation rate of workers, the so
called poaching externality; and (iii) I provide a first quantitative evaluation of the
effects of fiscal policies with respect to training subsidies that the UK government
could implement.
Also, in comparison to Chapter 2, introducing two separate households, skilled
and unskilled, allows to employ additional inequality measures, such as total in-
come inequality or capital income inequality, and it has the advantage of not
relying on an implicit consumption-insurance assumption, as with a single repre-
sentative household. Such innovations allow to perform the welfare evaluation of
fiscal policies related to training.
Within the new framework, training subsidies can be Pareto improving, yet
there is a level of subsidization above which the distortions caused by income
taxation outweigh the benefits of the intervention. Measuring welfare for ex-ante
different households, it can be observed that the optimal subsidy is different for
unskilled compared to skilled workers. For example, the former (latter) desire
higher (lower) unskilled training subsidies. Even in this case, the government
faces a trade-off between maximizing the total welfare and reducing the inequality
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between unskilled and skilled workers.
Once I impose a criterion for optimality, e.g. the average worker’s welfare, I
can identify the optimal combination of skilled and unskilled training subsidies.
Both households will benefit by training subsidies, however only for small subsidy
rates. For higher rates, average welfare may still increasing, but the benefits are
unevenly distributed between workers. As a consequence, in this case, there is at
least one group who opposes the policy reform.
Chapter 3 is organised as follows: I first introduce additional empirical motiva-
tion that supports the assumptions used for the model; then, Section 3.4 presents
the new framework; finally, Section 3.5 reports the results of the several counter-
factual exercises run for policy purposes.
3.2 Empirical motivation
Building on the results discussed in the previous chapters, the main intent of
this section is to provide evidence suggesting that the level of training provided
by companies is suboptimal. In this regard, Brunello and Gambarotto (2004)
provides compelling evidence that firms located in denser areas of the UK are less
willingly to train workers. In their view, the high likelihood that employees get
poached by competitors reduces the incentive to train their workforce as they ’free
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ride’ on training activities of other firms located in the same district. Technical
reports from institutions are particularly concerned about the negative effects of
workers’ excess mobility which reduces firms’ incentives to invest on their skills
and leads to inefficient training outcomes, see e.g. OECD (1995) and the Sveriges
Riksdag (1999), and Wolter and Stiftung (2018).
Academics have also shared this view, e.g. Booth and Snower (1996) and Ace-
moglu and Pischke (1999). Theoretical work, e.g. Katz and Ziderman (1990) and
Stevens (1994), has shown that, under no commitment, the provision of general
training is inefficient due to the poaching externality. In the same lines of thought,
Moen and Rosén (2004) argue that, albeit worse than under commitment, the mar-
ket equilibrium with poaching can be considered as ’constrained efficient’; that is
the social planner would implement the same allocation as private firms, if all
other choices were taken as given.1 Yet, this result relies on the assumption that
workers with different training levels separate into different sub-markets which,
in turn, requires complete information to sort the workers according to their pro-
ductivity and learning ability. The authors’ opinion is that their assumption is
restrictive, but may be partly verifiable. Hence, they do not exclude that training
subsidies may be welfare improving (as long as sorting is imperfect).
1Under their set of assumptions, it is still possible to achieve the first best. However, to
achieve the latter, a more complex policy is required. Depending on the model calibration, it
might be necessary a specific combination of payroll taxes and either training subsidies or taxes.
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Ideally, companies can engineer optimal contracts to internalise training exter-
nalities, for example making workers pay if they get hired by competitors, however
it is a situation that rarely occurs due to limits to private contracting. The lit-
erature has observed few cases of formal enforcement. For example, Liebeskind
(1997) reports that contracts that protect firm’s knowledge from appropriation
by rivals are costly and hard to enforce. When stakes are higher, e.g. to protect
patents and R&D, companies do recur to non-compete clauses in employment
contracts (see Marx (2011)), but this practice is limited to small segments of the
labour market. In the case of firm-provided training, which has a general human
capital component (see the literature review in Chapter 1), it is natural to expect
that almost all workers have the alternative to change employer retaining valuable
know-how and knowledge previously gained.
Empirically, this inefficiency channel has been found to have an economically
relevant effect on apprenticeship provision in Germany. Dustmann and Schoen-
berg (2012) argue that apprenticeships with no commitment are only 28% as
intensive as activities where firms have committed to high training levels. The
low quality of the offer leads to fewer workers looking for apprenticeships as these
programmes are less beneficial they would otherwise be. To strengthen this evi-
dence, the next section studies the relationship between workers’ separation rates
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and their training probability.
3.2.1 Poaching as source of training under-provision
The section shows that a higher separation rate affects negatively the workers’
training probability. Using QLFS data, I create a cell ”ID” based on the interac-
tion between 8 industrial sectors, 9 occupational classes and 6 UK subregions.2
The rationale for this choice is that what matters for firms are the local labour
market conditions for a specific combination of skills. For example, a company
which hires and trains software developers in Cambridge has to retain workers with
specific IT skills and competencies (see e.g. Gathmann and Schönberg (2010)).
I compute the average separation rate of each cell by counting how many workers
employed in a quarter are ”new hires” in the next quarter and dividing it by the
total number of workers.3 Next, I assign to every observation (i.e. worker) the
separation rate of the cell she belongs to.
The average training participation rate is negatively correlated with the cell’s
2The starting point is the dataset employed in Chapter 1. Stata code is available on request.
The classification is selected as to balance a greater level of detail with a sufficiently high number
of responses within each cell. A finer classification, e.g. between sub-sectors or sub-regions,
would compromise robust inference.
3As before, only employees who are 25 to 65 years old are kept. Also, I compute the separation
rate only if there are more than 49 workers (for robustness) and I drop all observations with 0%
separation rate. Only a negligible share of sectors has a 0% separation rate, i.e. less than 1% of
the total observations. Thus, keeping these extra observations does not affect the results. Finally,
I use only observations from 2005 to 2016 for two reasons: (i) to reduce the computational burden;
and (ii) to have a more homogeneous reference period (also, this sub-sample is less unbalanced).
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separation rate, but a standard regression could suffer from endogeneity of training
and job-seeking outcomes. Notice that the relationship could even be positive as
a higher turnover implies that there is a larger group of new hires that has to be
trained. To control for endogeneity, I run an IV-probit model using three lags of
the job separation rate as instrument variables of the current separation rate.4 In
more detail, the model I estimate is:
yi ,j ,t = 1
[
α1Zj,t + X
0
i ,j,t α¯ + αj + γt + εi ,t ≥ 0
]
(3.1)
in which yi ,j ,t is a binary outcome variable that describes whether a worker i in cell
j at time t has received training; 1 [·] is an indicator function that assumes a value
of either 0 or 1, depending on whether the latent variable inside the brackets is
non-negative or positive; X 0i ,t is a 1 × L vector of exogenous explanatory variables;
and the endogeneity of the separation rate Zj,t is addressed by estimating the first
stage regression:
Zj,t = βj + β1Zj,t−1 + β2Zj,t−2 + β3Zj,t−3 + X 0i ,j,t β¯ + ϵt (3.2)
4Using any set of lags, from one to three, provides the same qualitative results, but different
point estimates. Also, it is possible that the estimation sample differs depending on the number
of lags set for the model.
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where Zj ,t is the job separation rate observed for cell j in the period t ; X 0i ,j ,t is
the set of exogenous variables that appear also in the main model and β¯ is the
L × 1 parameter vector. Additionally, (εi ,t , ϵt ) is assumed to be distributed as a
multivariate normal, ∼ N (0, Σ), where, for identification purposes, the element σ11
is normalised to 1. For further assumptions on the validity of an IV-probit model
and its solution methods see Amemiya (1978) and Wooldridge (2010).
Table 3.1: Effect of the separation rate on training probability
skilled workers unskilled workers
average marginal effect -0.642 -0.330
p-value 0.00 0.00
implied elasticity -0.038 -0.037
From Table 3.1, it can be observed that a higher separation rate causes the
probability of training of the average worker to fall. The effect is small but signif-
icant at the 1% level. Also, the effect is twice as large for skilled workers than for
unskilled workers. This is in line with the strand of literature that reports greater
benefits from training for skilled workers, who are, ceteris paribus, more likely to
change employers, and end up having a greater bargaining power when negotiat-
ing their wages (see e.g. Gertler et al. (2016)). The evidence suggests that, even
though skilled workers are more likely to be trained, they suffer from the poaching
externality more than unskilled workers and train less than the optimal amount.
I performed a series of robustness checks to validate my results. Using only one
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lag of the separation rate as instrumental variable, does not affect qualitatively
the results (the coefficient is negative and statistically significant). However, using
three lags of the separation rate as IV allows me to test for the over-identifying
restrictions, that is I can verify whether the data suggests that my instrumental
variables are endogenous. The Hansen J statistics has a p-value of 0.35, which
means the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected. Like-
wise, the Kleibergen-Paap LM and F tests do not provide any evidence that the
estimation suffers from for weak instruments or under-identification.5
For calibration purposes, the elasticity is a more relevant information. I use the
average separation rate and training rates to compute the elasticity of training
to an increase in the separation rate for skilled and unskilled workers. Those are
-0.038 and -0.037, respectively. As reported in Table 3.1, the elasticity is similar
between the two groups of workers despite the marginal effect is almost twice as
large for skilled workers. This is due to the fact that skilled workers have, ceteris
paribus, lower separation rates and higher training participation rates.6
The new compelling evidence suggests that training is under-provided and mo-
5These tests can be computed in Stata with the command ”ivreg2” after estimating a linear
model. At the moment, the implementation of the tests does not support non-linear regression
models, so running a linear model for the robustness checks is the best that can be done. Also,
it must be noted that linear models have been frequently used in the literature on job-related
training. References for the techniques employed can be found in Baum et al. (2018) and
accompanying material.
6As usual, the elasticity is defined as ∆t∆s st , where s is the separation rate, t is the training
participation rate, and ∆t∆s is the average marginal effect reported above.
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tivates building a general equilibrium model to study the effects of policies that
address this inefficiency. That is the objective of Section 3.5. Before that, I discuss
some of the assumptions imposed in the chapter.
3.3 Theoretical motivation
The models of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are based on the assumption that house-
holds, or agents, differ from one another only in respect to ex-ante characteristics
(i.e. educational attainment). At a first glance, a model featuring (ex-post) het-
erogeneous workers sounds more appealing as it better captures the process that
leads to training outcomes, e.g. think about the state dependence of training out-
comes discussed in Chapter 1. However, I argue that the latter approach has a
series of drawbacks and disadvantages, which lead me to opt for the representative
agent fiction.
A main reason for such a choice is that previous works have found large exter-
nalities of training across workers.7 For example, Metcalfe and Sloane (2007) find
that increasing the education level of all co-workers by about one year results in
larger wage increases (∼12%) than increasing the worker’s education by one year
(∼7%). Other works suggesting large spillovers from education of co-workers are
7This represents an extension of the strand of the literature looking at human-capital exter-
nalities.
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Battu et al. (2003), for UK, and Bratti and Leombruni (2014) for Italy.8
All these interactions would be lost in a wage bargaining model à la Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999), or, if included, they would make the model intractable
Conversely, by using a closed-form equation for the accumulation of skills, I obtain
a more compact and more limpid model. Also, I bypass any issue with this kind of
externality, as their effects are already accounted for by the representative agent
fiction. While a fancier model would require information that is not currently
available, the calibration of my model is straightforward since it has predictions
that can be directly compared to the empirical estimates I perform or report.
Lastly, thinking in terms of aggregate quantities, the attention can be focused
on the poaching externality as a channel of inefficiencies in the training sector.
The complexity of an heterogeneous agent model would not add sufficient benefits
to justify its use.
3.4 The model
To evaluate the quantitative implications of policies that raise firms’ incentives
to train differently educated workers, I construct a dynamic general equilibrium
8These works are an extension to the literature that finds human-capital spillovers on average
productivity (and wages), at the level of the sector, region, or even a whole country. See, among
the others, the work of Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and that of Moretti (2004a). A summary
of the early literature can be found in Moretti (2004).
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model that coheres with the main stylised facts relating to the UK job-related
training and wage inequality data. The key features of the model are: (i) ex ante
skill heterogeneity between non-University educated (unskilled) and University
(skilled) household, leading to wage inequality under capital-skill complementarity
in production; (ii) a government collecting revenues through a progressive income
tax; (iii) training and skill creation undertaken by firms separately for skilled and
unskilled workers; and, most importantly, (iv) under-provision of training at the
steady state as firms fail to fully internalise training returns.
I calibrate the model in such a way that its steady state matches key quantities
observed for the UK economy. Also, I verify that the model’s predictions are in
line with the empirical estimates reported in Section 3.2.9 This constraint allows
to identify the size of the externality in the theoretical model. Then, I simulate
deterministic transition paths leading to new steady-states characterised by larger
training subsidies.
A first exercise follows closely the one presented in Chapter 2, by considering
separately unskilled and skilled training subsidies reforms. The exercise allows
me to evaluate the effect of increasing subsidies to training in terms of efficiency,
measured as total welfare gains, and equity, measured as either wage or income
9The model’s dynamics after a permanent change in the poaching externality is reported in
Appendix F.
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premium. To complete the picture, I present an optimal policy exercise based on
few basic objective functions, e.g. welfare, inequality, or productivity.10 All the
results are reported in Section 3.5.
3.4.1 The households
I introduce ex-ante heterogeneity between two households whose size is constant
and equal to nu and ns = 1 − nu , as total population is normalised to 1.11 Both
households can accumulate physical capital stock, but only skilled workers can
purchase equity. With respect to the former, the two households face different (but
finite) capital holding costs, while only the skilled household faces equity holding
costs. These costs are modelled following closely the literature, e.g. Persson and
Tabellini (1992) and Benigno (2009). The government collects revenues through
a progressive income tax on total income of each household.
10This exercise is performed to emphasise that, depending on the policy-maker’s goal, the
optimal policy may be very different.
11In the current framework, workers’ educational attainment is assumed to be exogenous. This
assumption greatly simplifies the model and the general equilibrium solution. Also, I found no
evidence suggesting that workers decide whether to study or to work depending on their training
opportunities. Although a higher training provision leads to steeper wage profiles, returns to
education are large enough to provide the strongest incentive to pursue a University degree or
higher education. Arguably, higher training subsidies should impact workers’ education decision
only marginally; thus, the assumption can be considered a good approximation.
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3.4.1.1 Skilled workers household
This infinitely-lived representative household is comprised of skilled members only.
Thus, the superscript s distinguishes this household from the unskilled one. The
head of the household makes all choices on behalf of its members. She maximises
the discounted lifetime utility of its members:
U s =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{(
cst
)ψs [ (1 − lst ) ]1−ψs }(1−σ )
1 − σ , (3.3)
where 0 < β < 1 is the time discount factor (identical for both households); cst
is consumption; lst is skilled labour supplied to firms; σ > 1 is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion; and the parameter 0 < ψs < 1 represents the weight that the
household attaches to consumption and leisure (1 − lst ) in utility. The household’s
budget constraint is:
cst + I
s
t +z
s
t+1P
z
t =
(
wst l
s
t + rtk
s
t + z
s
tpit
) (
1 − τh,st
)
−ψks
(
kst
)2
+zstP
z
t −ψ zs
(
zst
)2−T st , (3.4)
where kst is physical capital; 0 < δk < 1 is the capital depreciation rate; wst is the
skilled wage rate; rt is the net return to capital; zst is the (predetermined) share of
firms’ equity owned by the skilled household. In each period, the household earns
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a fraction of the firms’ dividends pit proportional to the shares it owns, then, given
the price Pzt , it can decide how many shares to hold, i.e. zst+1. Under this assump-
tion, the discount factor for the profits of the representative firm can be easily
derived. This assumption has been used extensively in the literature, e.g. Merz
and Yashiv (2007), Lee (2008), and Cheng and Lai (2015). The skilled household
faces finite holding costs for both capital, ψks , and firm equity holdings, ψ zs . The
latter is calibrated to match the value of equity to total wealth of skilled workers.
Investments, I st , drive the accumulation of physical capital stock according to the
law of motion:
kst+1 = (1 − δk)kst + I st (3.5)
The Lagrangian for the household’s maximization problem is:
Λs =
∑∞
t=0
{
βt
[(cst )ψs (1−lst )1−ψs ] (1−σ )
1−σ − βtλb,st [cst + kst+1 − (1 − δk)kst + zst+1Pzt −
− (wst lst + rtkst + zstpit ) (1 − τh,st ) − zstPzt +ψ zs (zst )2 +ψks (kst )2 +T st ]}
(3.6)
where λb,st > 0, is the Lagrange multiplier for the household budget. The house-
hold chooses {cst , lst ,kst+1, zst+1}∞t=0 taking the initial conditions, {ks0, zs0}, fiscal policy{
T st , τ
h,s
t
}∞
0
, prices, {wst , rt , Pzt }∞t=0, and profits {pit }∞t=0 as given. The static first-order
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condition (FOC) for consumption:
λb,st = ψs
(
1 − lst
cst
)1−ψs [ (cst )ψs(
1 − lst
)1−ψs
]σ
(3.7)
states that the shadow price of the budget constraint (3.4) is equal to the marginal
utility of consumption, ∂U s∂cst , at time t .
The intratemporal FOC for skilled labour supply:
1 −ψs
ψs
(
cst
)1+ψs(
1 − lst
)−ψs = wst (1 − τh,st ) (3.8)
implies that the marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption
at time t , i.e. ∂U s
∂(1−lst )/
∂U s
∂cst
, is proportional to the after-tax skilled wage rate.The
Euler equation for capital:
λb,st
λb,st+1
= β
[
1 − δk + rt+1
(
1 − τh,st+1
)
− 2ψks
(
kst+1
) ] , (3.9)
says that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t and
t + 1, λ
k ,s
t
λk ,st+1
≡ ∂U s∂cst /
∂U s
∂cst+1
, is equal to the gross return to capital, 1+rt+1, net of capital
depreciation and a function of capital holding costs, all multiplied by the discount
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rate β . Finally, the first order condition with respect to the equity holdings:
Pzt = β
λb,st+1
λb,st
[
pit+1
(
1 − τh,st+1
)
+ Pzt+1 − 2ψ zs
(
zst+1
) ] (3.10)
links the asset price at time t to its future price and the dividends it will pay out.
3.4.1.2 Unskilled workers household
The second infinitely-lived household is comprised of unskilled members only, and
the superscript u is to denote such attribute. As above, the head of the household
makes all choices on behalf of its members. In particular, she maximises the
discounted lifetime utility:
U u =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[ (
cut
)ψu (1 − lut )1−ψu ]1−σ
1 − σ , (3.11)
where 0 < β < 1 is the time discount factor; cut is unskilled consumption; lut is the
unskilled labour supplied to firms; σ > 1 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion;
and the parameters 0 < ψu < 1 represents the weight that the household attaches
to consumption and leisure (1 − lut ) in utility, respectively.
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The household’s budget constraint is:
cut + I
u
t =
(
wut l
u
t + rtk
u
t
) (
1 − τh,ut
)
−ψku
(
kut
)2 −Tut , (3.12)
where kut is physical capital; 0 < δk < 1 is the capital depreciation rate; wut is the
wage rate; rt is the gross return to capital; ψku > 0 measures the holding costs for
capital; and Tut is lump-sum transfers from the government. I assume that, unlike
skilled workers, unskilled workers cannot purchase the equity of the firm. Such
assumption does not affect quantitatively the results, and it allows to simplify the
discount factor used by the representative firm.12
This assumption is also well grounded in empirical research and used in theoret-
ical work. According to the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS), in the years 2012-
2014, unskilled workers owned a small amount of equity, which represents only
4% of their total wealth.13 Also, empirical evidence suggests that non-University
educated workers have little financial literacy. For example, Lusardi and Mitchell
(2014) reports that college-educated individuals scored more than twice than high-
12Imagine that, if equity were shared between households, the discount factor would be a
time-varying endogenous function of equity share, income tax rate, and marginal utility of
consumption of each household.
13This figure is computed from the raw database, selecting individuals who are between 25 and
65 years old and controlling for educational attainment. Thus, the classification is as consistent
as possible with the classification used for the data from the QLFS. In case of individuals with
positive net wealth, I calculate the ratio between the financial (equity) assets and the total
wealth. Then, I average the ratio across all individuals.
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school educated individuals in a financial literacy test of US households. In turn,
financial literacy strongly correlates with participation in stock markets (see Yoong
(2010) and Arrondel et al. (2012) among the others). Although participation may
influence the level of financial literacy, the literature favours the other direction
of causality. For example, according to Campbell (2006), poorer and less edu-
cated workers are bad investors and, as they are aware of their limitations, they
avoid purchasing equity. Hence, it is not a surprise if theoretical models gen-
erally assume that unskilled workers do not have access to equity markets (e.g.
Favilukis(2013)) or any savings (e.g. Gali et al. (2004)).
To conclude the presentation of the unskilled household’s constraints, invest-
ments Iut drive the accumulation of physical capital stock according to the law of
motion:
kut+1 = (1 − δk)kut + Iut . (3.13)
Accordingly, the Lagrangian for the household is given by:
Λu =
∑∞
t=0
{
βt
[(cut )ψu (1−lut )1−ψu ]1−σ
1−σ − βtλb,ut [cut + kut+1 − (1 − δk)kut −
− (wut lut + rtkut ) (1 − τh,ut ) +ψku (kut )2 +Tut ]} (3.14)
where λb,ut > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. The household
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chooses {cut , lut ,kut+1}∞t=0 taking the initial condition, {ku0 }, fiscal policy, {Tut , τh,ut }∞0 ,
and prices, {wut , rt }∞t=0, as given. The first-order condition (FOC) for consumption:
λb,ut = ψu
(
1 − lut
cut
)1−ψu [ (cut )ψu(
1 − lut
)1−ψu
]σ
(3.15)
states that the shadow price of the budget constraint (3.12) is equal to the marginal
utility of consumption, ∂U u∂cut , at time t .
The intratemporal FOC for unskilled labour supply:
1 −ψu
ψu
(
cut
)1+ψu(
1 − lut
)−ψu = wut (1 − τh,ut ) (3.16)
implies that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption at
time t , i.e. ∂U u
∂(1−lut )/
∂U u
∂cut
, is proportional to the unskilled wage rate, net of income
tax. The Euler equation for capital:
λb,ut
λb,ut+1
= β
[
1 − δk + rt+1
(
1 − τh,ut+1
)
− 2ψku
(
kut+1
) ] , (3.17)
says that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t and
t + 1, λ
k ,u
t
λk ,ut+1
≡ ∂U u∂cut /
∂U u
∂cut+1
, is equal to β times the gross return to capital, 1 + rt+1, net
of capital depreciation and marginal capital holding costs.
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3.4.2 Representative firm
For the production sector, I assume that there is an infinitely-lived representative
firm, which is owned by skilled households and which employs capital, unskilled
and skilled labour to produce a homogeneous final good. Production takes place
using the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technol-
ogy:
y˜
f
t = A
{
µ
(
qut
)α
+ (1 − µ)
[
ρ
(
k
f
t
)ν
+ (1 − ρ) (qst )ν ] αν } 1α , (3.18)
where, y˜ ft is the firm’s output; A > 0 is total factor productivity; 0 < µ, ρ < 1 are
the factor share parameters; qit is the effective labour input used in production
(i = s ,u); k ft is the demand for capital; and α ,ν < 1 are the parameters defining
the factor elasticities, i.e. 1/(1 − α) is the elasticity of substitution between capital
and effective unskilled labour as well as between effective skilled and effective
unskilled labour; whereas 1/(1 − ν ) is the elasticity of substitution between capital
and effective skilled labour. Capital-skill complementarity in production, which
is obtained in this setup when α > ν , has been shown to be empirically relevant
and a contributor to wage inequality. This occurs because an increase in capital
stock and capital augmenting technology are skill biased (see e.g. Krusell et al.
(2000), Hornstein et al. (2005), Caselli and Coleman (2006), and Goldin and Katz
169
(2008)).
The firm hires l f ,it hours from the labour market, but not all are used for pro-
duction, as some of the workers’ time is used for training purposes. Denoting
the share of workers’ time in job-related training by t it implies that the net time
actually used for production is given by l f ,it
(
1 − t it
), whereas l f ,it t it is the time de-
voted to job-related training. Training increases next period’s labour productivity.
In particular, building on the human capital tradition since Ben Porath (1967),
and following e.g. Huggett et al. (2006), the stocks of skills, accumulated via
job-related training, evolve according to the following laws of motion:
hut+1 =
(
1 − δu − δuε
)
hut + δ
u
ε h¯
u
t + H
u
(
l
f ,u
t t
u
t h
u
t
)γu
, (3.19)
and
hst+1 =
(
1 − δs − δ sε
)
hst + δ
s
ε h¯
s
t + H
s
(
l
f ,s
t t
s
th
s
t
)γ s
, (3.20)
where 0 < δu , δ s < 1 is the depreciation rate for skills accumulated by unskilled
and skilled workers, respectively, which can be attributed to retirement of workers
and the technological change which depreciates outdated skills; 0 < δuε , δ sε < 1
measure the flows of human capital due to poaching and mobility of workers across
companies. The firm fails to internalise that the loss of skills due to poaching is
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compensated by hiring from a pool of workers with average human capital, h¯ut and
h¯st , equivalent to that of its own employees. For simplicity, I assume that, at each
time t , the net flow of workers is constant. In other words, the firm hires as many
workers as those poached away by competitors.
These assumptions help to include an externality widely recognised by the em-
pirical literature without introducing unemployment in the model. If unemploy-
ment were endogenous, it would be difficult to gauge the direct effect of training
subsidies on income and welfare. This alternative setup increases the model’s
degrees of freedom, and, as a consequence, it requires an even larger set of as-
sumptions and targets. Conversely, my approach allows to introduce the poach-
ing externality with a precise upper bound on the size of the inefficiency. In
particular, the human capital poaching must be a fraction of the average share
of workers who move from one employer to another within a quarter, i.e. the
job separation rate. As shown in Section 3.2, higher separation rates reduce the
training probability of workers. The model replicates the empirical evidence. If
the representative firm observes a decrease in the expected value of its training
investments due to poaching, it reacts by curtailing the provision of training.
Respecting the notation introduced in Chapter 2, H i
(
l
f ,i
t t
i
th
i
t
)γ i
are the new
skills created at time t ; H i > 0 is the productivity in new skill creation; and γ i < 1
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captures the elasticity of new skills with respect to existing skills and training time.
Note that both H i and γ i are related to workers’ learning ability (see Huggett et
al. (2006)), i.e. the ability of the workers to use existing skills with their time for
training to create new labour skills. This ability is fixed at the point of their entry
in the labour market. Since both sets of parameters relate to the same economic
concept, H i is normalised to unity while γ i is calibrated as to capture differences
in learning ability associated with University education.
The restriction γ i < 1 guarantees the existence of a well-defined (bounded)
steady-state value for hi , thus precluding long-run growth of the skills stock. At
the same time, γ i < 1 allows for increasing or decreasing returns to scale in creating
labour productivity. Following an assumption largely employed in the literature
since the seminal work of Mincer (1992), I let the learning ability to differ between
skilled and unskilled workers, reflecting their different education status prior to
entering the labour market.
The firm incurs in both an opportunity cost, in terms of foregone output, and
a monetary cost when training its employees. The benefit for the firm is that
the labour productivity generated by job-related training increases the effective
labour input. In particular, the latter, qit , is a function of workers’ time and of
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labour productivity:
qst =
[
l
f ,s
t
(
1 − tst
) ]ω [
hst
]1−ω , (3.21)
and
qut =
[
l
f ,u
t
(
1 − tut
) ]ω [
hut
]1−ω , (3.22)
where 0 < ω < 1 measures the elasticity of effective labour with respect to pro-
duction time.14 Note that the constant returns to scale restriction in (3.21)-(3.22)
implies that the production function (3.18) is also constant returns to scale in its
five inputs
[
l
f ,i
t
(
1 − t it
)
,hit
]
i=s ,u
, and k ft .
This setup implies that the firm pays for the training and it partly owns the
job-related skills associated with hit , thus capturing rents that are generated by
job-related training. I use the expression ”it partly owns” in that workers leaving
the company bring with them some of the skills they acquired through training.
To best understand the setup, suppose that training is indeed general, but firms
have a strong bargaining power against the workers in setting the wages, thus they
capture most of the training rents. The firm having the upper hand may be due to
information asymmetry, in the sense that the rival company is uncertain about the
quality of a poached worker and of the training he received. Kahn (2013) found
14It could be the case that ω is different between the skilled and the unskilled labour input.
However, there is no clear evidence in favour of either assumption. Thus, for simplicity the
parameter is assumed to be the same for both.
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empirical evidence confirming these asymmetries among US firms. This aspect
is captured by the model through the assumption that the representative firm is
hiring equally trained workers (as the ones who left) but it fails to internalise this
when it decides how much training to provide.
To summarise, the setup is consistent with the observation that (i) firms pay
for most of job-related training of their employees, (ii) firms’ productivity returns
from job-related training are estimated to be larger than the effect of job-related
training on workers’ wages, implying significant rents for the firms associated with
job-related training, and (iii) firms provide insufficient training to their workforce
because of the risk of losing the skill they invested in.
Thus, in this specification, and given that the production function in (3.18)
features constant returns to scale, the compensation to labour productivity in the
form of hit is captured by the firm as a rent associated with training its employees,
and takes the form of profits. Notwithstanding the poaching externality, the
relationship between ω and the firm’s profitability is the same as in Chapter
2. Therefore, lower values of the parameter imply a higher contribution of the
firm-owned factor hit to production, increasing the profitability of the training
investments.
The firm’s problem is formalised as follows. The representative firm aims to
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maximise the present discounted value of lifetime profits:
Π f =
∞∑
t=0
Qtpi
f
t , (3.23)
where:
Qt = β
t
λb,st+1
λb,s0
1 − τh,st+1
1 − τh,s0
, (3.24)
defines the discount factor (for the present value at t = 0), ∀t ≥ 1. The discount
factor entails that the firms maximises its stakeholders’ wealth, which is given by
the sum of current after-tax profits and the market price of the equity, the latter
being a function of discounted future after-tax dividends. The reason why tax
rates matter in this context is quite straightforward. The value of equity depends
on how high is the income tax on profits. This implies that firms may have an
incentive to shift temporally profits through human capital (dis-)investment. For
example, if the government commits to decreasing future skilled tax rates, the
company will retain profits by investing more in training and capitalise the higher
profits when those are taxed at the lower rate. The representative firm’s profits
are defined as:
pi
f
t = y˜
f
t − rtk ft −wut l f ,ut −wst l f ,st − φutut l f ,ut
(
1 − τuφ
)
− φstst l f ,st
(
1 − τ sφ
)
, (3.25)
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the revenue from selling the final good, minus the costs of capital, the costs of
unskilled and skilled labour, as well the training monetary costs. The parameter
0 < φi < 1 refers to the fixed monetary cost per training hour; and τ i
φ
is a subsidy
or tax on training activities. The intertemporal trade-off associated with training
time is evident in equations (3.18)-(3.22) and (3.25). All else constant, an increase
in training time raises new skills at time t and the stock of skills in t + 1. Hence,
in t + 1, both effective labour and output increases. However, training incurs a
resource outlay. In addition, at time t , by lowering the time available for work at
time t , effective labour and output fall.
The setup creates different incentives for the firm to train its skilled and un-
skilled employees which can be matched to the UK data. Since the employees have
different marginal products of effective labour, there is a higher marginal return
to increasing skilled, relative to unskilled, job-related skills and effective labour
input. Moreover, if the learning ability for skilled workers is higher, i.e. γ s > γu ,
then the increase in labour productivity is higher, for a given amount of training
time, for skilled versus unskilled workers (see e.g. the evidence in Almeida and
Faria (2014)).
On the other hand, if training unskilled workers implies a relatively higher
monetary cost, φu > φs , then the firm has more incentives to train skilled than
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to train unskilled workers. Finally, as skilled workers are more likely to change
job and be employed in a new company, i.e. δsε > δuε , the disincentives to invest
in training due to the poaching externality are (slightly) stronger in the case of
skilled workers, consistently with the results of Section 3.2.
In equilibrium, the relative training allocation between skilled and unskilled
workers depends on the quantitative evaluation of this trade-off, which, as ex-
plained above, depends on a multiplicity of concurring factors.
Given that several factors affects the provision of training, I could have envi-
sioned a range of policies alternative to subsidies to monetary training costs, such
as increasing the productivity of workers with extra education or off-the-job train-
ing. However, as discussed earlier, firm-provided training is the most effective
form of employees formation compared to training spells paid by the government
or by the household. Also, it is not clear how the new acquired skills will affect
the training provision of firms. They could be complementary or substitute to
the accumulation of firm-provided skills. Finally, the literature has shown that
training costs have a big impact on the decision of firms to provide training, e.g.
Muehlemann et al. (2007) and Blatter et al. (2012).15 As a consequence, it is
most natural to consider training subsidies as a tool for policy-makers to influence
15Furthermore, Muehlemann et al. (2010) shows that Swiss companies that do not provide
training are in average facing higher training costs than companies offering training to their
employees.
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the behaviour of firms.16
Taking the initial conditions,
{
k
f
0 ,h
s
0,h
u
0
}
, prices, {wst ,wut , rt }∞t=0, the fiscal stance{
τ st , τ
u
t
}∞
t=0, and the discount factor {Qt }∞t=0 as given, the firm chooses {k
f
t , l
f ,u
t , l
f ,s
t , t
u
t ,
tst ,h
u
t+1, h
s
t+1}∞t=0 to maximise (3.23), subject to (3.19) and (3.20). The Lagrangian
for the firm is given by:
Λf =
∑∞
t=0{Qt [y ft − rtk ft −wut l f ,ut −wst l f ,st −
−φutut l f ,ut
(
1 − τut
) − φstst l f ,st (1 − τ st )]−
−Qtλut [hut+1 −
(
1 − δu − δuε
)
hut − δuε h¯ut − Hu
(
l
f ,u
t t
u
t h
u
t
)γu ]−
−Qtλst [hst+1 −
(
1 − δs − δsε
)
hst − δ sε h¯st − H s
(
l
f ,s
t t
s
th
s
t
)γ s ]},
(3.26)
where λit , for i = s ,u, are the shadow prices associated the skill accumulation
constraints (3.19) and (3.20); and y ft is given by:
y
f
t = At
{
µ
( [
l
f ,u
t
(
1 − tut
) ]ω [
hut
]1−ω )α
+
+ (1 − µ)
[
ρ
(
k
f
t
)ν
+ (1 − ρ)
( [
l
f ,s
t
(
1 − tst
) ]ω [
hst
]1−ω )ν ] αν } 1α . (3.27)
The static FOCs with respect to capital, unskilled and skilled labour:
rt =
∂y
f
t
∂k
f
t
, (3.28)
16Remember that more coercive policies, such as the train-or-pay policy, have been dismissed
due to the protest of private sector. So, I exclude this type of intervention as well.
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wut + φ
utut
(
1 − τut
)
=
∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,u
t
+ λut
∂hut+1
∂l
f ,u
t
, (3.29)
and
wst + φ
stst
(
1 − τ st
)
=
∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,s
t
+ λst
∂hst+1
∂l
f ,s
t
, (3.30)
equate their respective marginal costs to their marginal products.17 In the pres-
ence of job-related training and skill accumulation, marginal costs are comprised
of the wage costs, wit , and the marginal increase in monetary costs of training, φit it ,
net of the tax or subsidy, τ i . The corresponding marginal products are comprised
of the marginal product of labour in output, ∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,i
t
, plus the marginal product of
labour in skill accumulation, ∂h
i
t+1
∂l
f ,i
t
, valued by its corresponding shadow price, λit .
Hence, the second term in the right hand side of these two FOCs captures the
benefit to the firm from increasing work time since this allows for more time to
train and thus for increased future labour labour productivity.
The intratemporal FOCs with respect to unskilled and skilled training time:
φul
f ,u
t
(
1 − τut
) − ∂y ft
∂tut
= λut
∂hut+1
∂tut
, (3.31)
17As in Chapter 2, some of the partial derivatives are not fully expressed to provide a more
intuitive understanding of the first order conditions. The formulas for these derivatives are
reported in Appendix D.
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φsl
f ,s
t
(
1 − τ st
) − ∂y ft
∂tst
= λst
∂hst+1
∂tst
, (3.32)
equate their respective marginal costs to their marginal products. Marginal costs
are equal to the opportunity cost of foregone output, ∂y
f
t
∂t it
, due to time being
diverted from work, plus as above, the marginal increase in monetary costs of
training time, net of the tax or subsidy. The corresponding marginal products are
the marginal product of training time in skill accumulation, ∂h
i
t+1
∂t it
, valued by its
corresponding shadow price, λit .
Finally, the Euler equations for unskilled and skilled skills acquisition:
λut =
Qt+1
Qt
(
∂y
f
t+1
∂hut+1
+ λut+1
∂hut+2
∂hut+1
)
, (3.33)
λst =
Qt+1
Qt
{
∂y
f
t+1
∂hst+1
+ λst+1
∂hst+2
∂hst+1
}
, (3.34)
state that the shadow price of skill acquisition at time t , λit is equal to the dis-
counted value of the net benefits of skill accumulation, i.e. ∂y
f
t+1
∂hit+1
+ λut+1
∂hit+2
∂hit+1
, where
∂y
f
t+1
∂hit+1
is the increase in output due to increased labour skills at t + 1 and ∂h
i
t+2
∂hit+1
is
the increased labour skills in t + 2 that result from increased skills in t + 1, valued
by its corresponding shadow price in t + 1, i.e. λit+1.
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3.4.3 Government budget
To focus on policies to reduce training inequality, the government’s balanced bud-
get constraint is assumed to be:
τut
(
φutut l
f ,u
t
)
+ τ st
(
φstst l
f ,s
t
)
= nu
[
Tut +
(
wut l
u
t + rtk
u
t
)
τh,ut
]
+
+ ns
[
T st +
(
wst l
s
t + rtk
s
t + z
s
tpit
)
τh,st
]
, (3.35)
where the sum of total-income taxes, net of lump-sum transfers, is equal to the
total expenditure for training subsidies. I assume that any lump-sum transfer is
equally divided between the two households according to their size, imposing that
nsT
s
t = nuT
u
t = Tt/2. To ensure that the government budget is always balanced, the
lump-sum transfers are the residual policy instrument, unless stated otherwise.
3.4.4 Market clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions for physical capital, unskilled and skilled labour,
dividends, equity, and goods markets are respectively:
k
f
t = k
u
t n
u + kstn
s , (3.36)
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l
f ,u
t = n
ulut , (3.37)
l
f ,s
t = n
slst , (3.38)
z
f
t = nsz
s
t = 1, (3.39)
pi
f
t = nsz
s
tpit = pit , (3.40)
and
y
f
t = nsc
s
t + nuc
u
t + ns
[
kst+1 − (1 − δk)kst
]
+ nu
[
kut+1 − (1 − δk)kut
]
+
+φut
u
t l
f ,u
t + φst
s
t l
f ,s
t + nsψ
z
s
(
zst
)2
+ nsψ
k
s
(
kst
)2
+ nuψ
k
u
(
kut
)2 . (3.41)
3.4.5 The decentralised equilibrium
Given initial conditions, the decentralised equilibrium is defined to be an allocation{
cst , c
u
t , l
u
t , l
s
t , l
f ,u
t , l
f ,s
t , pi
f
t , pit ,k
f
t ,k
s
t ,k
u
t , t
u
t , t
s
t ,h
u
t+1,h
s
t+1
}∞
t=0
, prices {rt ,wut ,wst , Pzt }∞t=0,
shadow prices
{
λb,st , λ
b,u
t , λ
s
t , λ
u
t
}∞
t=0
, and policy instruments
{
Tt , τ
s
t , τ
u
t , τ
h,s
t , τ
h,u
t
}∞
t=0
such that: (i) households and firms undertake their respective optimisation prob-
lems taking aggregate outcomes as given; (ii) all constraints are satisfied; and
(iii) all markets clear. At the aggregate level, the representative firm skill-stock
variables, hut and hst , are equal to the economy-wide variables h¯ut and h¯st .
Using Walras’ law I discard the skilled household’s budget constraint, thus
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the decentralised equilibrium consists of the following 27 equations: (i) the two
households’ FOCs, i.e. the 3-equations (3.15)-(3.17) and the 4-equations (3.7)-
(3.10); (ii) the firm’s 2-skill accumulation equations (3.19)-(3.20); (iii) the firm’s
7-FOCs, i.e. equations (3.28)-(3.34); (iv) the government’s budget constraint,
represented by equation (3.35); (v) the 6-market clearing conditions, i.e. equations
(3.36)-(3.41); and, finally, the unskilled household budget constraint (3.12). To
reduce the size of the model, I drop the equity stock, zst , which is constant by
assumption, and I use a single variable, Tt , to represent lump-sum transfers.
3.4.6 Calibration
I set the parameters appearing in the DE equations with the overall aim that the
model generates a steady-state solution which implies quantities similar to the
data for the UK. The parameters are summarised in Table 3.2. These are divided
in three groups: one for the households, the second for the firm, and the last for
physical and human capital.18
The productivity parameters which work as scaling factors {A,Hu ,H s} are all
normalised to unity and omitted from the table. Following many dynamic general
equilibrium studies, I set the coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 2.19 The
18Note that the first four parameters of the household, the first two parameters of the firm,
and the first three parameters of the capital are set. All the others parameters are calibrated,
as explained below.
19As mentioned in Chapter 2, Browning et al. (1999), Ionescu (2009) and Bakış et al. (2015)
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common discount factor β is set so that the interest rate on capital is equal to
about 2.9% at the steady state, which is equivalent to the average risk free interest
rate for UK over the last fifteen years before the great recession.20. The unskilled
and skilled population shares are the average shares from the last two decades of
data.
The coefficient for the capital holding cost for the skilled household, ψks , is nor-
malised to 1.3e−04 so that it has negligible effect on the resources allocation.21 By
setting ψku = 4.5e−04, I pin down the ratio of the stock of physical capital of skilled
workers over that of unskilled workers, which is 2.2. Also, I set equity holding
costs, ψ zs , equal to 2.7e−04 to target the ratio of physical capital to total wealth
for skilled households, that, at the time of the fourth Wealth and Assets Survey
(WAS), was about 92%. As a consequence, holding equity is more expensive than
holding physical capital.
The poaching coefficients for the skill capital are the most critical parameters.
To identify an upper bound, I estimate the job-to-job transition rates of skilled
and unskilled workers, respectively, from the longitudinal QLFS dataset. For
simplicity, I assume that a worker has been poached if she is employed for two
are some of the works which use a value of 2 for the households’ risk aversion coefficient.
20The data source is reported in Appendix A
21If ψ ks is any smaller than the specified value, MATLAB may fail to converge to the solution
for the steady state due to approximation. Larger values could be used, but that implies bringing
aggregate values, e.g. k¯y¯ , away from their empirical counterparts.
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Table 3.2: Calibration
symbol value definitions
Household
β 0.9985 quarterly time discount factor
δk 0.025 quarterly capital depreciation rate
σ 2 coefficient of relative risk aversion
nu 0.660 share of unskilled to total household members
ψu 0.385 leisure weight in utility (unskilled)
ψs 0.418 leisure weight in utility (skilled)
ψ ks 1.3e-04 capital holding costs (skilled)
ψ zs 2.7e-04 equity holding costs (skilled)
ψ ku 4.5e-04 capital holding costs (unskilled)
Firm
ν -0.495 effective skilled labour to capital substitution parameter
α 0.401 effective unskilled labour substitution parameter
ω 0.938 elasticity of effective labour with respect to time
µ 0.564 share of composite input to output
ρ 0.869 share of capital to the composite input
Capitals
δk 0.025 depreciation rate for physical capital
δu 0.025 depreciation rate for accumulated skills (unskilled)
δ s 0.025 depreciation rate for accumulated skills (skilled)
δ sε 5.39e-04 firm poaching (skilled)
δuε 4.91e-04 firm poaching (unskilled)
φu 4.469 fixed cost per training hour (unskilled)
φs 3.953 fixed cost per training hour (skilled)
γu 0.501 returns to scale for creating new skills (unskilled)
γ s 0.531 returns to scale for creating new skills (skilled)
consecutive quarters but her (self-reported) tenure in the subsequent quarter is less
than three months, in other words she is a new hire in the subsequent quarter.22
In the UK from 2005 to 2016 the average quarterly separation rate has been
22Potentially, this leads to overestimating job-to-job transitions, as a laid-off worker may find
job within the interview period and be confused for someone who was hired by competitors.
However, it can be noted that more than 50% of movers report that they resigned from their
previous job, while only about 15% report that they had a temporary job or they were made
redundant.
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2% and 1.6% for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. Setting δ iε to match
workers’ separation rate entails the additional assumption that all workers possess
the same average skill-stock, but it is well known that trained workers are less
likely to leave the company and that training tends to reduce the probability of
changing employer. For that reason, a realistic target for these parameters should
be a fraction of the observed job-to-job transition rate.
The parameters can be set in such a way that the model simulated moments
match the empirical data on the poaching externality. The larger δ iε is, the stronger
is the elasticity of training to a shock to δ iε . Thus, I set δ sε = 5.4e−4 and δuε =
4.9e−4, so that the model replicates the elasticities estimated in Section 3.2 with
a negligible margin of error.23
Table 3.3 reports the set of parameters related to the fiscal policy tools. The
total income tax rate for skilled and unskilled households is obtained by targeting
two observables. The analysis of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
data suggests that the ratio between the average skilled labour tax rate and the
average unskilled labour tax rate is about 1.17 (thus, on average, skilled workers
face a 17% higher tax rate). Furthermore, Piketty and Saez (2006) report that
the total effective income tax rate for UK in the reference year 2004 (which is in
the midst of the sample period) is 23.7%. Given the evidence, I set the tax rate
23These are -0.038 and -0.037 for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively.
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26.2% and 22.4% for skilled and unskilled household income, respectively.
As reported in Chapter 2, The UK training subsidies amount to 2.4% of the
monetary training costs. This sum is much less than the revenues from the income
tax. As a consequence, the residual is rebated to households in form of lump-sum
transfers.24
Table 3.3: Calibration of fiscal policy
policy
τu 0.024 public subsidy for training activities (unskilled)
τ s 0.024 public subsidy for training activities (skilled)
τh ,u 0.224 total income tax (unskilled)
τh ,s 0.262 total income tax (skilled)
T¯ -0.131 lump-sum transfers
Since the depreciation of job-related skills is hard to measure, I assume δ s = δu =
0.25. The literature on work-related human capital, e.g. Blundell et al. (1999),
suggests that this depreciates within a decade or so, which implies a yearly depre-
ciation rate of about 10%. Indeed, Mincer and Ofek (1982) estimated the annual
rates of individual-level depreciation to be between 3.3% and 7.6%, while Heckman
(1976) reports a confidence interval between 3.7% and 8.9%. To these figures, one
needs to add the value of human capital stock lost because of retirees, which, ac-
cording to Stokey and Rebelo (1995), amounts to 2.5% up to 4% of the total stock.
Based on this evidence, the quarterly depreciation rate should lie between 1.45%
24Unspent revenues could be considered as government spending with limited consequences
on the analysis that follows.
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and 3.26%. Thus, the value of 2.5% is in-between these estimates. The physical
capital depreciation is set to 2.5 (10% yearly), a rate that is frequently employed
in the literature (see e.g. Basu and Thoenissen (2007), Leeper et al. (2010), and
Andreasen (2012)) and matches the one set for the skill capital depreciation.
Next, I discuss the group of parameters relating to training and production
{ν ,α , µ, ρ,φu ,φs ,γu ,γ s ,ω}, starting with ω, which is linked to firms’ returns on
job-related training, i.e. the firms’ rent. As already discussed, estimates on the
profitability of job-related training do not exist for the UK. Blundell et al. (1999)
measure a 10% private return to participating to job-related training in the UK
and Dearden et al. (2006) estimate the partial effect of training time to firms’ prof-
its, alongside other factor inputs in a regression analysis. However, it is difficult to
express such partial effects in model-relevant quantities. Thus, ω is chosen by relat-
ing firm profitability to a valuation of the return to investment in job-related train-
ing, as measured by the ratio of firm’s profits over total monetary costs of training,
including both direct and indirect costs, i.e. pit
φutut l
f ,u
t (1−τu )+φs tst l f ,st (1−τ s )+wut tut l f ,ut +wst tst l f ,st
.
Almeida and Carneiro (2009) estimate the return to be between 8.6 and 13.8 per-
centage points for training firms in Portugal. Setting ω = 0.938 ensures that, in
conjunction with the remaining parameters, the rate of return of training invest-
ments is about 9 percentage points.
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Table 3.4: Steady-state
variable definition model data
(1−τ h ,s )ws
(1−τ h ,u)wu skill premium 1.578 1.589
ts skilled training to total time share 0.022 0.023
tu unskilled training to total time share 0.013 0.013
ts/tu training differential 1.726 1.746
t s l f ,s+tu l f ,u
(1−t s )l f ,s+(1−tu )l f ,u training to work time share 0.016 0.017
ls skilled labour to total hours 0.315 0.310
lu unskilled labour to total hours 0.292 0.290
k/y capital-to-output 8.20 10.30
φs t s l sns+φu tu lunu
y monetary training costs-to-output 0.027 0.026
τ sφs t s l sns+τuφu tu lunu
y public spending on training costs-to-output 0.0006 0.0006
rk/y capital income-to-output (model gross tax) 0.322 0.299
ns l sws+nu luwu
y labour income-to-output (model gross tax) 0.647 0.671
The remaining parameters in the production function are chosen so that the
model’s steady-state solution is consistent with factor income shares and inequality
indices. In particular, I choose {µ, ρ,φu ,φs ,γu ,γ s} so that the model’s steady-state
predictions regarding
{
ns lsws+nuluwu
y ,
k
y ,
ws
wu ,
φs t
s lsns+φut
ulunu
y , t
u , ts
}
are similar to the
data. Thus, for this set of parameters, the calibration approach follows closely the
one used in Chapter 2. The steady-state solution implied by the parameters in
Table 3.2 is summarised in Table 3.4. As can be seen, the model’s predictions for
the long-run quantities are close to the targets, except for the capital to output
ratio. However, the model generated quantity is consistent with the ratio obtained
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using a more restrictive definition of productive capital.25
3.5 Evaluation of fiscal policies
I use the framework developed above to evaluate a range of fiscal policies with
respect to training activities. The main policy intervention is a fiscal subsidy
to either skilled or unskilled training. To compensate the extra costs, I assume
that the government can finance its spending in different ways: (i) taxing both
skilled and unskilled workers (in which case the progressivity of the tax system is
preserved), or (ii) taxing only skilled workers. In Appendix G, I produce a coun-
terfactual experiment where the same fiscal subsidy is financed through lump-sum
transfers from both households to net out the effects of distortionary taxation on
income. Lastly, to complete the picture, I consider the optimal training subsidies
in the case they are financed by taxes on both households (first case).
In the next sections, I start presenting the impulse response functions obtained
from the model’s simulation to provide an intuitive interpretation of he fiscal
policy effects. Then, I report a more detailed analysis of each policy intervention
providing quantitative results.
25It is also possible to get closer to the 10:1 capital-output ratio by either increasing the
steady-state interest rate or decreasing the physical capital depreciation. This has not been
done to allow a closer comparison between the model in Chapter 3 and the one in Chapter 2.
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3.5.1 Impulse Response Functions
To perform a preliminary inspection of the economy’s reaction to training sub-
sidies, I assume that the economy is at steady state and I let the policy reform
occur after the first period. Then, I simulate the path of endogenous variables
from the initial steady state to the new equilibrium. The results are reported in
the following subsections. I consider the effects of unskilled and skilled training
subsidies, respectively. In each case, I show an arbitrarily large intervention, that
covers one fourth of monetary training costs. The intervention is financed accord-
ing to either one of the two scenarios mentioned above. In addition, I consider a
1% increase in progressivity of UK tax system as a measure to reduce inequality
alternative to the training subsidy policies.
3.5.1.1 Permanent increase in unskilled training subsidy
Figure 3.1 shows the dynamics of key endogenous variables after a permanent in-
crease in unskilled training subsidies from 0.024 to 0.25. The blue line represents
the impulse response functions (IRFs) when the subsidy is financed through in-
creasing both skilled and unskilled income tax rates equally, whereas the orange
line represents the dynamics of the model when the subsidy is financed by skilled
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workers only.26 The skilled and unskilled wages reported in the figure are before
tax so that I can compare the two scenarios. The wage inequality gives an idea of
the overall redistributive effect, since it is measured as the ratio between skilled
and unskilled after-tax wages.
It can be observed that, if government subsidises unskilled training (raising
taxes on both households), unskilled workers are offered higher wages as the de-
mand of unskilled labour input and unskilled training time increases (see sub-plots
(2,3) and (4,5), respectively).27 This reduces the wage premium and, even more so,
labour income inequality through its indirect effect on labour supply (see sub-plot
(3,3), (3,4), and (2,3), respectively).
The policy thus helps reduce the market failure caused by the training exter-
nality as it increases the provision of training for unskilled workers (see sub-plot
(4,5)). The effects of the policy on skilled training is less clear, as it depends on
the financing. In both cases, the policy has a very limited effect on skilled training,
as it deviates from steady state only marginally (see sub-plot (4,4)).
In the first scenario (both taxed), the skilled household is initially subjected to
a loss of utility due to the taxation, however in the long-run the loss is smaller (see
26In Appendix G, Figure G.1 compares the dynamics of the ”both taxed” case with the case
where the policy is financed through lump-sum taxes.
27Note that, if taxes are raised only on the skilled household, we observe a different short term
dynamics but over the long run the effects are qualitatively the same.
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Figure 3.1: Permanent increase of unskilled training subsidy to 0.25
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sub-plot(4,2), blue line). Also, this loss is largely compensated by the increase in
unskilled workers’ utility.
When the subsidy is financed entirely by the skilled household (second scenario),
the decrease of utility for this group is much larger and persistent. In this case, the
skilled household is worse off both in the long and in the short run (see sub-plot
(4,2), orange line).
As the subsidy helps the unskilled group, at impact, their utility increases above
the original steady state, it decreases below steady state in the short run, when
the costs of higher taxation are felt most, then it increases substantially in the
long run, as the benefits of higher human capital stock are accrued (see sub-plot
(4,3)). Thus, the benefits of the policy, in terms of utility, materialise only in
the long run, but the reduction of wage and income inequality is immediate (see
sub-plots (3,3) and (3,4)). This is true under both scenarios.
In the long run, in both cases, labour productivity is positively affected by
the policy due to the higher stock of physical and skill capital (see sub-plot (4,1)
compared to sub-plots (1,5), (2,5), (2,1), and (2,2)).28 The dynamics shows that
initially productivity falls due to: (i) more training time for unskilled workers to
accumulate skills; (ii) higher monetary investments on training; and, consequently,
28With respect to the latter, the average worker’s skills are increased since the decrease of
skilled human capital is more than compensated by the increase in unskilled human capital.
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(iii) higher tax rates causing a temporary contraction of consumption and output.
The pattern for unskilled training is almost identical across the two scenarios,
whereas skilled training follows different paths which eventually converge towards
similar steady-state values (see sub-plot (4,5)).29
With respect to the redistribution of consumption between households, the
policy has a much stronger effect when only skilled workers are paying for the
extra subsidy (see sub-plots (1,1) and (1,2), orange lines). The high tax rate leads
skilled workers to reduce the provision of labour (see sub-plot (2,4), orange line).
In the second scenario, the substitution effect should be stronger due to the tax
hike, yet the reduction of labour supply is quantitatively similar, suggesting that,
in this case, a stronger income effect induces the skilled household to supply more
labour.
3.5.1.2 Permanent increase in skilled training subsidy
Figure 3.2 shows the effects of a subsidy to skilled training that covers one quarter
of monetary training costs. The blue line represents the impulse response functions
(IRFs) when the subsidy is financed through increasing both skilled and unskilled
income tax rates equally, whereas the orange line represents the dynamics of the
29Remember that each scenario differs by the source of financing: the subsidy costs can be
paid by both skilled and unskilled households, only the skilled household, or through lump-sum
transfers – the last case being reported in Appendix G.
195
model when the subsidy is financed entirely by skilled workers.30
As can be noted, the economy reacts as it did for the unskilled subsidies. Yet,
this time, inequality measures move in the opposite direction, i.e. upwards in
favour to skilled workers (see sub-plots (2,5), (2,4), and (2,3)). With respect to
the short term dynamics, the main difference is that, after an increase in unskilled
training subsidies, the unskilled labour supply contracts under the first scenario
and expands under skilled-only financing, whereas, after the increase in skilled
training subsidies, skilled labour supply always fall below steady state (see sub-
plot (2,4)).31
This breaks the qualitative symmetry of the IRFs between unskilled and skilled
training subsidies. Also, in the case of shared financing, it helps explain why, after
the skilled subsidy policy, the wage premium does not increase monotonically
towards the new steady state but it jumps up at impact and it deflates in the
medium run before converging to its new long-run equilibrium (see sub-plot (3,4),
blue line).
Another difference is that the aggregate effects produced by the skilled subsidies
30Figure G.2 in Appendix G, shows the dynamics of the endogenous variables in the case the
policy is financed through lump-sum taxes, contrasting it with the first scenario.
31In the long term, it is the skilled labour supply that is always above the old steady state
after the increase in skilled training subsidy. Conversely, the unskilled labour supply is below
the old steady state if the unskilled training subsidy is financed by skilled workers and above in
the other case.
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Figure 3.2: Permanent increase of skilled training subsidy to 0.25
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are marginally larger than those caused by the unskilled subsidies, especially in
terms of labour productivity and capital stock accumulation (see sub-plot (4,1)
and sub-plots (1,5) and (2,5), respectively). This can be explained by a series
of factors: (i) the physical capital complementarity; (ii) the stronger poaching
externalities that characterise the skilled labour input; and (iii) the distortions
due to income tax. These differences are quantified and commented in Section
3.5.2.
3.5.1.3 Permanent increase in tax progressivity
I simulate an increase in the progressivity of the tax system to compare this al-
ternate policy with the training subsidy policies. To do so, I assume that the
additional revenues by taxing skilled workers must be equal to the revenues lost
by reducing the tax rate for unskilled workers. Under this condition, the progres-
sivity of the income tax can be amended without any direct change to lump-sum
transfers or training subsidy rates.
Figure 3.3 presents the IRFs to an increase of 5% in the tax progressivity, defined
as ratio between skilled and unskilled tax rate τh,s/τh,u . The increase is similar
in size to the change in tax rates that is necessary to compensate the training
subsidy expenditures in the sections above.
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Figure 3.3: Permanent increase of tax progressivity by 5%
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From Figure 3.3, it can be observed that, despite the government raises the
same revenues, the increase in progressivity reduces output in both the short and
the long run. The fall in labour productivity (sub-plot (4,1)) causes both unskilled
and skilled wages to decrease below the original steady state, even though the new
steady state labour supply is lower.32
Higher taxation of skilled workers’ income entails a fall in the physical capital
stock as well as in the skill capital stocks (in the long run only). Higher (lower)
tax rates on skilled (unskilled) income entails a downward (upward) shift of the
labour supply, which means higher (lower) costs that the firms has to pay for that
specific production factor.
The higher (lower) cost to use skilled (unskilled) labour for production entails
that there is a relocation towards the use of more unskilled labour input and
unskilled human capital stock. As a consequence, the long-run decline of the
latter is smaller than the decline observed for the skilled human capital stock. This
relocation translates into the observed fall of labour productivity since unskilled
workers are, by definition, less productive than skilled ones.
In terms of equality, the policy has positive effects as it produces a sizeable
32Remember that sub-plots (1,3) and (1,4) are before-tax wage rates. Hence, the peak of
skilled wage only proves that the tax burden is shared between employers and employees. In
particular, the former need to increase the bidding wage to incentive skilled workers to provide
labour (sub-plot(2,4)).
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reduction in both wage and labour income inequality. The after-tax incomes of
skilled and unskilled households are equalised after this intervention, as shown by
the inequality measures reported. Evaluated at the steady state, the after tax
reduction in inequality is 5.8%, with respect to wage, and 3.8% with respect to
labour income.
Conversely, the policy does not produce significant changes in the training in-
equality. In the short run, the policy incentives higher skilled and unskilled train-
ing as firms can use it as a buffer (human capital is the only production factor
not taxed). Since skilled labour is more expensive than unskilled one, skilled
human capital is most valuable. Thus, initially, the ratio of skilled training to un-
skilled training increases (sub-plot (3,5)). Later, at the steady-state, the training
premium is similar to its initial value.
To conclude, it appears that there is a relevant efficiency cost (from resource
mis-allocation) when the government exploits the progressivity of income tax rates
to reduce between-groups income inequality. Thus, the government may prefer
policies based on training subsidies to avoid this trade-off. After these preliminary
considerations, I look more in detail at the effects of the fiscal reforms under
scrutiny. The quantitative analysis of these policies is conduced in the next section.
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3.5.2 Quantitative evaluation of the policies
This section analyses in more detail the policies considered above (skilled or un-
skilled training subsidy, either financed by both households or only the skilled
one).33 In both cases, revenues are increased so that the government budget is
balanced after the increase in training subsidies.
To evaluate and compare the fiscal interventions, I report the percentage change
from the initial steady state (common to all the experiments) to the new steady
state to which the economy converges after the fiscal reform is implemented. This
provides a first rough measure of the overall effect of each policy on the economy.
Moreover, to take into account the dynamics, i.e. the transition from one steady
state to the other, I compute fiscal multipliers following the literature on fiscal pol-
icy evaluation (see e.g. Leeper et al. (2010)). Accordingly, the lifetime multiplier
of e.g. the variable x is defined as:
LMx =
S∑
t=0
Qit (xt − x)
S∑
t=0
Qit (Tt −T )
(3.42)
where Qit , for i = u, s, is the household discount factor as implicitly defined by the
33In Appendix G, I consider the case where the policies are financed by lump-sum transfers.
This allows to more closely compare the results here reported with those from Chapter 2.
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respective physical capital Euler equation, i.e. equation (3.17) for unskilled and
(3.9) for skilled workers. When the income measure of interest is an aggregate,
e.g. aggregate output yt , the average of the two discount factors, weighted by the
population share, is used.34
34Note that using a constant discount factor, i.e. the β , provides virtually the same results as
the ones reported here.
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3.5.2.1 Subsidies to unskilled training
Steady state comparative statics
I start with the case of training subsidies in favour of unskilled workers. Table 3.5
reports the percent changes from the old to the new steady state of key variables
such as training, inequality measures, and utility among the others. These quan-
tities are shown for different levels of the subsidies to the monetary training costs
for each scenario. With respect to utility, since its steady state value is negative,
I compute the percent change as the difference between new and old steady-state
divided by the absolute value of the latter. Following this definition, a positive
change implies welfare gain (as the utility gets closer to zero) whereas a negative
change implies welfare losses (as utility gets further away from zero).
Several observations are in order. In first instance, the effect of the policy on
training time is strong, subsidising 15% of monetary training costs implies an 11%
increase in the share of unskilled labour input dedicated to training activities (see
cell(1,3) in Table 3.5).
This is accompanied by a large decrease in training inequality which is also
substantial (see cell (3,3) in Table 3.5) and does not change significantly if I
change the source of financing. These results suggest that, at least for low level
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of subsidies, the effect on training is similar between the two scenarios.35
Table 3.5: Steady-state effects of increasing unskilled training subsidies
both tax rates skilled-only
τu = 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.15
%∆tu 2.14 6.51 11.27 2.14 6.51 11.25
%∆ts 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
%∆ t
s
tu -2.08 -6.09 -10.09 -2.09 -6.12 -10.14
%∆wu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 0.04 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.24 0.40
%∆ws
(
1 − τh ,s ) -0.03 -0.11 -0.20 -0.11 -0.36 -0.65
%∆ w
s (1−τ h ,s )
wu (1−τ h ,u ) -0.08 -0.23 -0.39 -0.19 -0.59 -1.04
%∆wulu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 0.05 0.16 0.25 0.08 0.23 0.38
%∆wsls
(
1 − τh ,s ) -0.04 -0.13 -0.25 -0.13 -0.40 -0.73
%∆ (1−τ
h ,s )l sws
(1−τ h ,u )luwu -0.10 -0.29 -0.50 -0.20 -0.63 -1.10
%∆ y(l sns+lunu ) 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.35 -0.63
%∆U u/|U u | 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.16
%∆U s/|U s | -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.13 -0.24
%∆(tslsφsτ s + tuluφuτu ) 0.51 1.54 2.67 0.61 1.89 3.30
In terms of after-tax wages and incomes, Table 3.5 shows that unskilled house-
holds benefit from the policy both when the tax burden is on skilled workers
and when this is shared – for reasonably low subsidy rates. Conversely, skilled
households are increasingly damaged by the policy as the subsidy rate gets larger.
Chapter 2 shows the presence of significant spillovers from unskilled workers to
skilled workers when looking at labour income outcomes. In this case, I do not
35Note that if the subsidy to unskilled training were very large, then the type of taxation will
have a large impact on the effects of the policy on unskilled training. In particular, distortions
on skilled labour market due to a very high skilled-only tax hike could reduce the incentives
to train unskilled workers. Such results are not presented here to focus on more ”reasonable”
subsidy rates.
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observe any manifest spillover effect.36
In terms of financial cost, it can be observed that the policies have a relatively
modest impact on public finances. A permanent increase in training subsidies
leads to an increase in public spending for training between 0.5 and 3.3% depend-
ing on the size of the intervention and the source of financing (see the last row of
Table 3.5). This corresponds to a GDP share between 0.01% and 0.07%.
Taxing skilled workers only allows the government to further reduce wage in-
equality, but this comes at the cost of lower efficiency. In fact, the change in
labour productivity (third row from the bottom, in Table 3.5) is shown to become
negative. After commenting on labour productivity, I look at welfare changes.
Unskilled utility improves in both scenarios, and, as it can be expected, the most
positive outcome is when the financial burden is on skilled workers only. Skilled
utility instead decreases under all interventions and financing options. Skilled
utility loss is larger the larger is the subsidy size, and largest under skilled-only
tax hike.
36To be more correct, spillovers would be seen under very small subsidy rate increases (e.g.
0.035 – a case that is not reported). For larger rates, like the one reported in Table 3.5, the
negative effects of distortionary taxation kicks in, affecting the skilled household’s market out-
comes.
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Transition comparative dynamics
So far, I considered the change from the old steady state to the new one after the
policy reform, thus neglecting the role played by the transition phase towards the
new equilibrium. To better evaluate the impact of the unskilled training subsidies,
Table 3.6 reports the present value of income multipliers as well as the present
value of the change in utility ∑∞t=0Qit (U it − U¯ i ).37
Table 3.6: Lifetime multipliers after increasing unskilled training subsidies
both tax rates skilled-only
τu = 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.15
wulu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 0.75 0.69 0.63 1.35 1.30 1.24
wsls
(
1 − τh ,s ) -1.79 -1.87 -1.96 -4.47 -4.63 -4.81
wulu (1 − τh ,u ) +wsls (1 − τh ,s ) -0.93 -1.00 -1.08 -2.49 -2.62 -2.76
(1 + r (1 − τh ,s ) − δk )ks -51 -53 -54 -322 -330 -339
(1 + r (1 − τh ,u ) − δk )ku 4.16 3.92 3.67 127 129 132
pi -0.66 -0.66 -0.67 -5.85 -6.00 -6.16
y -0.13 -0.23 -0.34 -6.19 -6.47 -6.78
U u − U¯ u 0.09 0.26 0.41 0.26 0.78 1.33
U s − U¯ s -0.12 -0.39 -0.71 -0.35 -1.10 -1.98
As Table 3.6 shows, the results are more nuanced when looking at the effects of
policies in terms of present value (taking into account the transition phase towards
the new steady state). From this perspective, it is also possible to evaluate wealth
redistribution. In particular, if the tax rate is increased only for skilled workers,
the model predicts a large shift of capital income from skilled to unskilled workers
37This is equivalent to taking only the numerator instead the full lifetime multiplier as defined
in equation (3.42). I show this value because it can be more easily interpreted.
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as the reduction in labour inequality leads to a reduction in wealth inequality.38
An important quantity is the aggregate output multiplier. According to the sim-
ulation, spending 1£ on unskilled training decrease the present value of aggregate
output by 0.23£ when increasing training subsidies up to 10% of monetary costs
(see cell (7,2) in Table 3.6). Thus, when I take into account the distortion caused
by higher income tax rates, the policy does not have an efficiency rationale but it
can be justified in terms of utility gains and because it alleviates inequality.39
Welfare evaluation
The welfare evaluation suggest that unskilled subsidies are beneficial to unskilled
households, but detrimental to skilled households. For low level of subsidies, I ex-
pect that the average welfare is increased by the reform because skilled households
are only about 34% of the total population. Yet, high level of subsidies have in-
creasingly larger skilled utility losses and those are unlikely to be compensated by
the gains of the unskilled households. It goes without saying that households have
contrasting views about the size of the optimal subsidy: unskilled workers bene-
fit more and desire higher subsidies than skilled workers. The latter are always
38I do not discuss further this aspect as the focus of the present work is on wage and labour
income.
39As already mentioned, the case of non-distortionary taxation is considered in Appendix G,
and it represents a main assumption in Chapter 2, where I focus on the ”pure” effects of training
subsidy reforms.
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penalised for any of the fiscal reform here contemplated.
To identify the optimal level of unskilled subsidies, I simulate the model for a
range of unskilled training subsidies, τu , and I plot the change in present value of
utility for skilled, unskilled, and average worker in Figure 3.4. They are reported
with blue dashed, red continuous, and yellow dotted lines, respectively. The figure
is composed of three sub-plots. The first one considers the case when the policy
is financed through lump-sum taxes. This case, unsurprisingly, is characterised
by larger utility gains. Sub-plot (b) shows the utility change when the policy
is financed through higher taxes for both skilled and unskilled workers. Lastly,
sub-plot (c) presents the case where the fiscal burden only on skilled workers.
Sub-plot (b) of Figure 3.4 suggests that the optimal subsidy for unskilled work-
ers is τu = 0.37, whereas skilled workers prefer the status quo if both households
bear the costs. The policy that maximises average utility under this scenario is
τu = 0.11, but this intervention will be opposed by skilled households.
If I assume that the costs are paid by the skilled household, there is no optimal
subsidy level for this group. Unskilled workers benefit more and inequality is
reduced. However, for skilled workers, the costs always outweigh the benefits
of the intervention. Thus, unskilled workers desire training subsidies as high as
possible under this scenario.
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According to the model, if the government implements a subsidy to unskilled
training equal to 15% of its monetary costs, financed through higher taxes on
both households, the overall reduction in after-tax wage inequality is about 0.4%
whereas, if the government finances an unskilled training subsidy of 15% by taxing
only skilled workers, the reduction in after-tax wage inequality is about 1%. Thus,
inequality reduction is more than two times larger, but distortions have very
negative effects on average welfare and aggregate productivity.
In conclusion, financing unskilled training finds the opposition of the skilled
group. However, I have also verified that if the fiscal burden were on unskilled
workers only, they would not be not willing to pay for their subsidies.40 In the case
of shared burden, the social conflict lies in the level of subsidisation. Unskilled
workers desire higher subsidies than skilled workers (who prefer the status quo),
and only a subsidy rate in-between these two values will not meet the opposition
of skilled workers.
40THe welfare evaluation for this additional financing option is reported further below, in
Table 3.9.
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Figure 3.4: Change in present value of utility by unskilled subsidy
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3.5.2.2 Subsidies to skilled training
Steady state comparative statics
I now move on to consider the effects of training subsidies in favour of skilled
workers. Table 3.7 reports the percent change from the old to the new steady
state of key variables such as training, inequality measures, and utility. These
values are shown for different levels of subsidies of the monetary training costs
under both the financing options. As in the previous section, the percent change
in utility is computed taking the absolute value of the steady-state utility (as
denominator) to have a more intuitive figure.
The effect of subsidies to skilled training is quantitatively similar to that of
unskilled training subsidies. In this case, training inequality rises and it exacer-
bates inequality of outcomes among workers. Yet, the effects are dampened by
the strong spillovers in favour of unskilled workers.41 In fact, unskilled wages are
higher than the old steady state for τ s values up to at least 0.10.
The benefits of skilled training subsidy are represented by higher productivity
(see row 10 in Table 3.8) and higher after-tax wage rates for both households (see
rows 4 and 5 in the same table). These benefits do not materialise if the policy is
financed by increasing only the skilled tax rate (last three columns of Table 3.8).
41Interestingly, there are stronger spillovers from skilled policies to unskilled workers than
from unskilled policies to skilled workers.
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In this case, though, the spillover effects are magnified.
With respect to the costs, this policy is more expensive than the policy based
on unskilled subsidies as evident by comparing the last row of Table 3.8 with the
last row of table 3.6. This is true for both scenarios and for any subsidy size. This
may seem unexpected since the monetary costs of unskilled training are higher
than those of skilled training (φu > φs). However, it must be noted that in the
case of skilled subsidies, extra resources are spent not only for skilled training but
also for unskilled training (whose steady state is higher than before the reform).
Table 3.7: Steady-state effects of increasing skilled training subsidies
both tax rates skilled-only
τ s = 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.15
%∆tu 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.09
%∆ts 1.75 5.29 9.07 1.74 5.26 9.03
%∆ t
s
tu 1.73 5.22 8.97 1.72 5.20 8.93
%∆wu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.12
%∆ws
(
1 − τh ,s ) 0.03 0.09 0.14 -0.02 -0.08 -0.16
%∆ w
s (1−τ h ,s )
wu (1−τ h ,u ) 0.03 0.09 0.15 -0.05 -0.15 -0.27
%∆wulu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05
%∆wsls
(
1 − τh ,s ) 0.04 0.12 0.18 -0.02 -0.06 -0.13
%∆ (1−τ
h ,s )l sws
(1−τ h ,u )luwu 0.04 0.13 0.22 -0.03 -0.10 -0.19
%∆ y(l sns+lunu ) 0.03 0.10 0.15 -0.05 -0.15 -0.28
%∆U u/|U u | 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.07
%∆U s/|U s | 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08
%∆(tslsφsτ s + tuluφuτu ) 1.31 3.95 6.78 1.38 4.19 7.21
In terms of after-tax wage, Table 3.7 shows that both households benefit from
the policy even when the fiscal burden is shared, up to the 10% subsidy rate (see
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rows 4 and 5). This is a stronger result compared to the case of unskilled training
subsidies. Even in this case though, the effect is stronger for moderate increases
of τ s and it weakens when the subsidy gets larger due to the adverse effect of
distortionary taxation. The spillovers from skilled workers to unskilled workers
are stronger than those from the opposite direction,42 but the policy-maker faces
the unpleasant drawback of exacerbating wage and labour inequality.
The skilled training subsidies favour the accumulation of skilled human capital
which is marginally more productive than unskilled one. This has direct and
indirect benefits for both households. As a consequence, most of the values in
Table 3.7 are positive, at least when the burden is shared. With respect to the
skilled-only tax burden, the benefits of the fiscal reform are outweighed by the
negative effects of higher tax rate on skilled workers income. The pattern is similar
to what observed for unskilled training subsidies for the same scenario. In this
case, the negative effects are so strong that even a 5% subsidy rate depresses
labour productivity.
With respect to welfare, unskilled workers have utility gains in both scenarios.
Sharing the burden seems to lead to lower unskilled utility benefits. The greater
the increase in skilled training subsidies, the greater are the benefits accrued by
42This can be concluded by comparing size of the unskilled utility losses after the change in
skilled training subsidies versus the size of skilled utility losses after the change in unskilled
training subsidies (in the shared tax burden case).
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the skilled household as measured by steady-state changes in lifetime utility when
the financing is shared.
Transition comparative dynamics
Once controlling for the transition path, results are more nuanced. Table 3.8
reports the present value of income multipliers and the present value of the change
in utility ∑∞t=0Qit (U it − U¯ i ) as computed in the previous section for the τu policy.
Table 3.8: Lifetime multipliers after increasing skilled training subsidies
both tax rates skilled-only
τs = 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.15
wulu
(
1 − τh ,u ) -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 0.05 0.04 0.04
wsls
(
1 − τh ,s ) 0.25 0.22 0.20 -0.34 -0.38 -0.43
wulu (1 − τh ,u ) +wsls (1 − τh ,s ) 0.14 0.12 0.10 -0.21 -0.24 -0.27
(1 + r (1 − τh ,s ) − δk )ks -2.77 -3.35 -3.93 -62 -64 -66
(1 + r (1 − τh ,u ) − δk )ku 4.30 4.16 4.02 31 32 32
pi -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -1.27 -1.30 -1.33
y 0.41 0.37 0.34 -0.93 -0.99 -1.07
U u − U¯ u -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 0.11 0.32 0.53
U s − U¯ s 0.03 0.08 0.11 -0.13 -0.42 -0.78
The multipliers of this exercise look similar to the ones in Table 3.8, however
there are important differences.
First, multipliers for the skilled training subsidy are smaller in absolute values
than those associated with unskilled training subsidies. Hence, the group favoured
by the policy gain less in terms of e.g. labour income, but at the same time the
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other group loses less. Moreover, the average labour income multiplier increases,
whereas it decreases with unskilled training subsidies.43
Capital income multipliers are different as well. In Table 3.8, columns 1 to 3,
skilled capital multipliers are negative whereas unskilled capital multipliers are
positive, despite the policy works in favour of skilled workers. This is due to
the fact that this policy favours physical capital accumulation and drives capi-
tal income up through its complementarity with skilled labour input (thus the
monetary spillover in favour to unskilled workers).
Table 3.8 also shows that skilled training policies have positive output multipli-
ers when the tax burden is shared. When only skilled households bear the cost,
the policies have less negative output multiplier than unskilled training subsidies.
Thus, the income tax related distortions are much larger if the policy is financed
by increasing only the skilled income tax rate as if it exacerbates the efficiency
costs linked to promoting inequality. The second scenario can thus be considered
as the combination of skilled training subsidies and an increase in tax progres-
sivity (studied alone in Section 3.5.1.3).44 The loss of efficiency (less output and
lower productivity) can be seen as the negative consequence of favouring unskilled
43This result holds also under skilled-only taxation, despite aggregate multipliers being nega-
tive. It’s still true that unskilled training subsidies have stronger negative effects under skilled-
only taxation compared to the skilled training subsidies (compare e.g. row 7 of Table 3.8 and
3.6).
44Skilled workers receive higher subsidies to train while facing higher income tax rates.
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labour input over skilled one.
Welfare evaluation
I now discuss about welfare. To identify the optimal level of subsidies, taking
τ s = 0.024 as starting point, I simulate the model economy for different levels of
(higher) skilled training subsidies and I plot in Figure 3.5 the change present value
of utility for skilled and unskilled workers, and for the average worker. Those are
represented by the blue, red, and yellow lines respectively.
From Figure 3.5, sub-plot (b), it can be inferred that the optimal subsidy for
skilled workers is τ s = 0.19, whereas unskilled workers prefer the status quo if both
households bear the financial costs of the intervention. The policy that maximises
average utility under this scenario is τ s = 0.04, and this project would be backed
by the skilled household only, as unskilled households pay part of the costs but
the policy’s spillovers are not large enough to compensate them.45
If the costs are paid by the skilled household, i.e. Figure 3.5, sub-plot (c),
the optimal subsidy levels are different. The optimal subsidy is τ s = 0.60 from
the perspective of unskilled workers, and it is τ s = 0.03 from the perspective of
skilled workers. Not surprisingly, in this case skilled workers desire a much smaller
45Simulating the model with larger values of the externality, i.e. δ sε , suggests that both
households would prefer the reform to the status quo, confirming the importance of a robust
calibration for this parameter.
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Figure 3.5: Change in present value of utility by skilled subsidy
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Table 3.9: Desired tax rate by worker type
τu policy τs policy
unskilled skilled average unskilled skilled average
Lump-sum 0.61 - 0.42 0.15 0.70 0.34
Both taxed 0.37 - 0.11 - 0.19 0.04
Skilled only 0.63 - 0.21 0.60 0.03 0.19
Unskilled only - 0.81 - - 1.00 -
subsidy, since they have to fully pay for it through higher total income taxes. The
unskilled workers’ support for large subsidies to skilled training is due to the
spillover effects that higher skilled workers productivity entails and the indirect
benefit of higher taxes on skilled income.
To summarise the results, Table 3.9 reports the optimal rates for both the
unskilled training subsidies (first three columns) and the skilled training subsidies
(last three columns). Each column indicates which worker’s utility is maximised
under a given policy. Hence, ceteris paribus, each policy rate is ”optimal” in that
it maximises the welfare gains of either: (i) the unskilled worker, (ii) the skilled
worker, or (iii) the average worker. The rows indicate which source of revenues
is used to finance the subsidy. I report the lump-sum case as a reference, and
the three cases where skilled, unskilled, or both households pay higher taxes to
finance the new training policy. For example, in the cell (2,1), τu = 0.37 is the
unskilled subsidy, financed by both households, that maximises the welfare of
unskilled workers. A missing value means that the worker is worse off for any
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Table 3.10: Change in inequality under the desired tax rate
τu policy τs policy
unskilled skilled average unskilled skilled average
Lump sum -1.70 - -0.97 0.24 1.90 0.69
Both taxed -1.14 - -0.22 - 0.25 0.02
Skilled only -4.55 - -0.68 0.39 0.01 0.17
Unskilled only - -3.39 - - 3.20 -
increment of the subsidy rate.46
The general conclusions that can be drawn from Table 3.9 are the following.
First, the subsidy rates, optimal for the average worker, are relatively low (mean-
ing lower than 22%). The beneficiary group desires much higher subsidy rates
(up to 60%) but the other group often desire no subsidy at all. Lastly, due to
population size, the unskilled welfare has a large impact on the average worker’s.
Table 3.10 shows the effects of every policy indicated in Table 3.9 on the steady-
state wage inequality (in percentage points). For example, looking at the cell (3,1)
of each table, it can be concluded that the policy τu = 0.63 financed by a higher
tax rate on skilled income lead to a reduction of 4.55% in the before-tax wage
inequality, i.e. ws/wu .
In conclusion, skilled training subsidies improve the welfare of both unskilled
and skilled households, but they exacerbate inequality and may not be seen
favourably by a policy-maker that is concerned about the latter. On the other side,
46This analysis assumes that the other subsidy rate is unchanged. I consider what happens
when both rates are reformed in the next section.
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unskilled subsidies have, in average, positive effects but they are more polarising
as they are liked by either skilled or unskilled workers, but not by both. Finally,
only unskilled subsidies can mitigate wage inequality and the achieved reduction
is relatively small.47
In the next section, I consider what happens when both τs and τu are optimised
over a specific target.
3.5.3 Optimal policy
In this context, the policy evaluation can be performed in different ways, depend-
ing on the preferences and the goals of the policy-maker. I consider three main
policy targets: (i) the average utility of workers; (ii) the steady state level of
output per worker, as a proxy for labour productivity; and (iii) the present value
of future aggregate output, as a proxy for the overall size of the economy. Since
unskilled workers represent the larger population share, the average present value
of utility favours more unskilled than skilled workers, yet the weights could be
changed in consideration of equity issues.
I focus on the case where the fiscal subsidy is financed by both households,
omitting the analysis of optimal policy under other scenarios as it would be either
47I have already discussed why wage (and income) inequality cannot be addressed through
unskilled training subsidies in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2.
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trivial or uninteresting.48
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Figure 3.6: Effects of training subsidies on aggregate utility
Since a priori, it is not possible to prove uniqueness of the optimal policy,
especially if the latter is defined according to the criterion (ii), I consider a closed-
subset of fiscal policies. In particular, I numerically evaluate the effects of combi-
nation of policies for τu ∈ [0.0241, 0.18] and τs ∈ [0.0241, 0.12]. Given the results
48In the previous section, I concluded that fiscal reforms that are subsidised by one single
household are never Pareto-improving, thus the payers do not approve the change in policy.
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of the previous section, this set of combinations includes any reasonable level of
tax subsidies.
If the policy-maker wishes to maximise the average present value of utility, the
optimal policy would be to set τu = 0.108 and τs = 0.037. This corresponds to an
increase in the average present value of utility by 0.038%. According to the results,
skilled training subsidies should be incremented marginally, whereas the govern-
ment should be much more active in favour of unskilled training subsidies. Figure
3.6 shows the welfare gain associated to different levels of skilled and unskilled
training subsidies. There is a clear decrease in welfare gain that is related to how
far subsidy rates are from their optimal level. So, it is unlikely that combinations
of subsidy rates outside the current range may produce higher welfare.
Compared to the partial analysis conducted before, here the mutual benefits
imply that the increase in welfare is larger than the sum of welfare gains due to
single policies (i.e. subsidising skilled training keeping constant unskilled training
subsidies and vice versa). In terms of optimal policy rates, these are the same as
the ones reported in Table 3.9 for the case of a single fiscal subsidy tool. Thus, it
appears that, at least for the welfare-based measure, the optimal training subsidy
for one group is independent from the level of subsidies set for the other group.
With respect to the increase in labour productivity, I consider changes from the
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Figure 3.7: Effects of training subsidies on productivity
original steady state to the new one where the policy has been implemented to
observe the long run gains from subsidising training activities. Figure 3.7 shows
that there is no maximum increase in steady-state labour productivity y¯/l¯ , at least
for the set of subsidy rates taken into account. According to this metric, large
training subsidies are desirable and can support productivity and wages.49
Despite the welfare evaluation favours unskilled training over skilled training
49Incidentally, the low performance of UK economy in terms of labour productivity has been
reported and largely discussed in the literature (see e.g. Barnett et al. (2014) and Blundell et
al. (2014)).
224
subsidies, here the conclusion is opposite. In fact, extrapolating iso-productivity
lines from Figure 3.7, it can be noted that an increase in skilled training subsidies
has a larger impact on labour productivity compared to an equally large increase
in unskilled training subsidies.50
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Figure 3.8: Effects of training subsidies on aggregate output
Lastly, maximising the present value of aggregate output with respect to the
50By this time, such a result should not be surprising. The crowding-out of the (more produc-
tive) skilled input caused by unskilled training subsidies has been already discussed above.
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training subsidy rates leads to totally different conclusions. The effect of each
policy combination is reported in Figure 3.8. It can be noted that the higher
percentage increase in discounted output is associated with the smallest increase
in training subsidies rates, i.e. τu = 0.0241 and τs = 0.0241. Also, the reduction in
the benefits of the policy reform is stronger for unskilled training subsidies than for
skilled ones (see the different slope of the two edges in the graph). The unskilled
subsidies have a weaker positive effect on aggregate output than skilled subsidies.
This is to be expected, given that in the production function the skilled input is
substitute to unskilled input. The subsidy hinders productivity as it incentivises
the unskilled input at the expenses of the other inputs.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter, building on the experience and knowledge gained from Chapter 2,
performs a thorough policy evaluation of the effects of fiscal subsidies on firm-
provided training activities for the UK economy.
I find evidence suggesting that firms provide less training opportunities than
optimal because competitors can free-ride on the skills of workers they invested
in (poaching externalities). In particular, I estimate that a 1% increase in the job-
to-job separation rate leads to a fall in the training participation rate by -0.038%
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and -0.037% for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. The fact that these
values are small can explain why the literature has not agreed on the existence of
training under-provision.
The evidence suggests that some (moderate) government intervention may be
desirable. According to the data of the Continuing Vocational Training Survey,
the UK government supports training activities paying 2.4% of their monetary
costs with resources from general taxation. To find out which level of training
subsidisation is desirable, I simulate a model that captures the salient features of
UK economy, investigating the effects of policy reforms.
First, I consider the effects of a partial intervention, which includes either un-
skilled or skilled training subsidies. This allows to evaluate the usefulness of un-
skilled training subsidies to reduce wage inequality and to evaluate the impact of
each policy separately. The results are consistent with the conclusions of Chapter
2. The lever offered by training subsidies to reduce wage and income inequality is
limited but not negligible. A trade-off arises, between the pursuit of lower inequal-
ity between skilled and unskilled workers and the larger efficiency gains produced
by subsidising skilled training.
All in all, I find that an increase of the subsidies to job-related training is
beneficial to the UK workforce. To maximise the present value of the average
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worker’s welfare, the policy-maker should subsidise 10.8% and 3.7% of the mon-
etary training costs of unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. This policy
increases welfare by about 3.4% and reduces wage inequality by 0.24%. Despite
the gains for the average worker, such a policy damages skilled workers who dis-
approve this level of subsidisation.51 Thus, the valuation of these policies cannot
be separated by a judgement of social justice (Rawls (1971)).52
The recent trends observed in the UK labour market are likely to affect this
evaluation. In particular, the increased supply of skilled workers is expected to
increase the desirable amount of training subsidies in their favour and to reduce
their opposition to subsidies in favour of unskilled workers. In any case, these find-
ings consolidate the role of training subsidies as part of a larger set of government
policies concerning education and labour market participation.
51A Pareto-improving policy, that makes both groups better off, would be subsidies corre-
sponding to 3.7% and 2.7% of the monetary training costs for skilled and unskilled workers,
respectively.
52This is true even when the policy-maker subsidises both unskilled and skilled training at
the same rate.
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Conclusions
The accumulation of human capital is a key research subject in economics. Re-
cently, post-education activities providing skills and competences have received
greater and greater attention, both by the academia and by institutions. This
Ph.D. dissertation focuses on firm-provided training and the pertaining fiscal poli-
cies.
In the first chapter, I bring forth evidence on the returns to training in terms of
higher wages and profits, for workers and firms, respectively. Taking as reference
the UK economy, I study the aggregate figures of training participation and the
determinants of training at the individual level.
Since it emerges that job-related training in the UK does not have a cyclical
component, I consider more in detail its trend in the last twenty years. In this
regard, the training participation rate has decreased since the peak observed in
the early 2000s. This fall has been only tentatively explained by the literature.
My data analysis excludes some of the proposed explanations (e.g. educational
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changes) and emphasises the importance of decomposing training participation
into sub-groups. In particular, the previous literature has neglected important
differences between University educated and non-University educated workers, and
between workers close to the retirement age and all the other workers. Future work
is needed to fully comprehend the driver of these trends.
Lastly, I observe a large and steady difference between training rates of Uni-
versity educated and non-University educated workers in favour to the former.
Exploiting this workers classification, I contribute to the literature showing a pos-
itive relationship between training inequality and wage inequality. This last result
brings up the research question for the second chapter.
The second chapter investigates whether subsides to job-related training could
improve earnings for the lower skilled workers and reduce wage inequality. To
this end, I use a general equilibrium (GE) model that incorporates skilled and
unskilled labour, capital-skill complementarity in production and an endogenous
training allocation.
The quantitative policy analysis suggests that training subsidies for the un-
skilled have a significant impact on their labour income. These subsidies also
increase earnings for skilled workers and raise aggregate income. Training subsi-
dies to skilled workers, while increasing skilled and unskilled earnings, raise the
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former by more, worsening wage inequality. Therefore, there is a trade-off associ-
ated with subsidies to skilled training.
Training subsidies to unskilled workers improve earnings for both skilled and
unskilled workers without a negative impact on inequality. However, the positive
spillover effects to skilled workers imply that the effects of training subsidies on
inequality are small. Hence, training subsidies are not a very effective in reducing
inequality, but this is not a negative result. The effectiveness of the policy to
propagate benefits throughout the labour force increases its social value.
To focus on the redistributive aspect of the fiscal policy, the second chapter
assumes that the market provision of training is efficient. Under such assumption,
I can also test the model’s consistency with UK empirical evidence, and I can
observe more easily the effect of training subsidies. Yet, to fully understand the
consequences of these policies, it is important to take into account externalities
and distortionary taxation.
The third chapter addresses these issues. I hypothesise that firms provide less
training opportunities than optimal because competitors can free-ride on the skills
of workers they invested in, the so-called poaching externality. My analysis sug-
gests that a 1% increase in the job-to-job separation rate leads to a fall in the
training participation rate by -0.038% and -0.037% for skilled and unskilled work-
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ers, respectively.
I amend the GE model to accommodate this evidence, and to allow for welfare
evaluation. Performing similar policy exercises, preliminary results confirm what
emerges from Chapter 2. The lever offered by training subsidies to reduce wage
and income inequality is limited but not negligible. A trade-off arises, between the
pursuit of lower inequality between skilled and unskilled workers and the larger
efficiency gains produced by subsidising skilled training.
The analysis concludes that a moderate increase of the subsidies to job-related
training is beneficial to the UK workforce. To maximise the average welfare, the
policy-maker should subsidise 10.8% and 3.7% of the monetary training costs of
unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. This policy increases welfare by about
3.4% and reduces wage inequality by 0.24%. Despite the average gains, such a
policy damages skilled workers who disapprove this level of subsidisation.
The Ph.D. thesis provides a comprehensive picture of firm-provided training
and it brings about new empirical evidences and theoretical insights. The work
validates the importance of government intervention in the training sector and it
aims to rekindle a fertile discussion around the issues of equity, productivity, and
skill accumulation in modern economies.
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A
Data description
This Appendix reports the list of data used to perform the analyses and to cal-
ibrate the model of Chapter 2 and 3. Additional information is available on re-
quest. Unless stated otherwise, data are pooled to compute aggregate quantities.
The samples include employed workers who are 25 to 65 years old. This restriction
is commonly used in the literature (e.g. Booth (1993) and Hara (2014)) and is
intended to exclude part-timers and apprentices.
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B
Derivatives firm’s FOCs
The derivatives used in Chapter 2 to simplify the representative firm’s FOCs are
defined as follows:
∂y
f
t
∂k
f
t
=
Aαρ(k ft )ν (y ft )1−α (1 − µ)
k
f
t [ρ(k ft )ν + ([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω) (1 − ρ)]1− αν , (B.1)
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∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,u
t
= µωA{µ([l f ,ut
(
1 − tut
)]ω [hut ]1−ω)α + (1 − µ) ×
×[ρ(k ft )ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α −1×
×([l f ,ut
(
1 − tut
)]ω [hut ]1−ω)α (l f ,ut )−1,
(B.2)
∂hut+1
∂l
f ,u
t
= γuHu
(
tut h
u
t
)γu (l f ,ut )γu−1, (B.3)
∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,s
t
= ω (1 − µ) (1 − ρ)A{µ([l f ,ut
(
1 − tut
)]ω [hut ]1−ω)α + (1 − µ) ×
×[ρ(k ft )ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α −1[ρ(k ft )ν + (1 − ρ) ×
×([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν −1([l f ,st (1 − tst )]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν (l f ,st )−1,
(B.4)
∂hst+1
∂l
f ,s
t
= γ sH s
(
tsth
s
t
)γ s (l f ,st )γ s−1, (B.5)
∂y
f
t
∂tut
= −ωµA{µ([l f ,ut
(
1 − tut
)]ω [hut ]1−ω)α + (1 − µ) ×
×[ρ (kt )ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α −1×
× ([l
f ,u
t (1−tut )]ω[hut ]1−ω )α
1−tut ,
(B.6)
∂hut+1
∂tut
= γuHu
(
Lut h
u
t
)γu (
tut
)γu−1 , (B.7)
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∂y
f
t
∂tst
= − (1 − ρ) (1 − µ)ωA{µ([l f ,ut
(
1 − tut
)]ω [hut ]1−ω)α + (1 − µ) ×
×[ρ (kt )ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α −1[ρ (kt )ν + (1 − ρ) ×
×([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν −1([l f ,st (1 − tst )]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν (l f ,st )−1,
(B.8)
∂hst+1
∂tst
= γ sH s(l f ,st hst )γ
s (
tst
)γ s−1 , (B.9)
∂y
f
t+1
∂hut+1
= Aµ (1 − ω) {µ([l f ,ut+1
(
1 − tut+1
)]ω [hut+1]1−ω)α + (1 − µ) ×
×[ρ(k ft+1)ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st+1
(
1 − tst+1
)]ω [hst+1]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α ×
×([l f ,ut+1
(
1 − tut+1
)]ω [hut+1]1−ω)α (hut+1)−1,
(B.10)
∂hut+2
∂hut+1
= 1 − δu + γuHu
(
tut+1l
f ,u
t+1
)γu (
hut+1
)γu−1 , (B.11)
∂y
f
t+1
∂hst+1
= A (1 − µ) (1 − ρ)ν (1 − ω) {µ([l f ,ut+1
(
1 − tut+1
)]ω [hut+1]1−ω)α+
+ (1 − µ) [ρ(k ft+1)ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st+1
(
1 − tst+1
)]ω [hst+1]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α ×
×[ρ
(
k
f
t+1
)ν
+ (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st+1
(
1 − tst+1
)]ω [hst+1]1−ω)ν ] αν −1×
×([l f ,st+1
(
1 − tst+1
)]ω [hst+1]1−ω) [hst+1]−1 ,
(B.12)
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∂hst+2
∂hst+1
= 1 − δ s + γ sH s
(
tst+1l
f ,s
t+1
)γ s (
hst+1
)γ s−1 . (B.13)
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C
The social planner solution
This appendix shows that the solution to the social planner problem is equivalent
to the solution to the decentralised economy. This proves that any government
intervention does not Pareto improve the market allocation described in Section
2.3.
The planner maximizes the welfare of households, by choosing consumption,
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investments and all inputs of production. Also, he decides how to divide working
time between production and skill-capital accumulation. The social planner guar-
antees the same level of consumption and welfare to all its members, irrespective
of individual labour market status, as the representative household does in the de-
centralized economy. He decides how much agents should work, and their savings.
He maximizes the lifetime utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c
ψ1
t
(
1 − nulut
)ψ2 (1 − nslst )ψ3 ] (1−σ )
1 − σ (C.1)
where instantaneous utility is a CRRA function. Keeping the same notation as
in the main text, ct ≡ (cst )n
s (cut )n
u is a weighted average of skilled and unskilled
members’ consumption; lit ∈ (0, 1), for i = u, s, is the household’s typical member’s
labour supply; ni , for i ∈ {u, s}, is the household’s share of the relevant type of
member, i.e. nst = (1 − nu); σ ∈ [0, 1) measures the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution; and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The first constraint for the
planner is the technology that translates factors into the undifferentiated final
good. This follows the CES production function:
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yt = At
{
µ
( [
nulut
(
1 − tut
) ]ω [
hut
]1−ω )α
+ (1 − µ)
[
ρ (kt )ν + (1 − ρ)
( [
nslst
(
1 − tst
) ]ω [
hst
]1−ω )ν ] αν } 1α (C.2)
where 1/(1 − ν ) and 1/(1 − α) are the elasticity of substitution between capital
and skilled labour input and between the latter and unskilled labour input, re-
spectively. Provided that µ, ρ ∈ (0, 1), the input shares of capital, skilled labour
and unskilled labour are (1 − µ) ρ, (1 − µ) (1 − ρ) and µ. Labour inputs are a Cobb-
Douglas combination of skill stock and labour units: hit represents the stock of
skills accumulated through on-the-job training, and nilit
(
1 − t it
) represents the
workers’ time that is devoted to production. In this regard, ω and 1 − ω are
respectively the weight of labour units and of skills in compounding the effective
labour input. Finally, At represents the exogenous dynamic process of total factor
productivity (TFP).
The planner is also constrained by the aggregate condition that consumption
plus investment must be equal to total output, net of monetary training costs:
ct +
kt+1
Pt
− (1 − δk) kt
Pt
= yt − φutut nulut − φststnslst (C.3)
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where Pt is the inverse of the relative price of capital, following an AR(1) pro-
cess. Finally, the law of accumulation for skilled and unskilled capital, which is
respectively:
hut+1 = (1 − δu)hut + Hu
(
nulut t
u
t h
u
t
)γu , (C.4)
and
hst+1 = (1 − δs)hst + H s
(
nslst t
s
th
s
t
)γ s . (C.5)
To sum up, the planner maximizes (C.1) subject to (C.2)-(C.5) with respect to
consumption, skilled and unskilled labour, next period physical capital, skilled
and unskilled training, and skilled and unskilled human capital. The first order
condition with respect to consumption is:
ψ1
ct
[
c
ψ1
t
(
1 − Lst
)ψ3 (1 − Lut )ψ2 ]1−σ = λht . (C.6)
where Lit has been used to replace nilit for i = s ,u. The FOCs with respect to
skilled and unskilled labour are:
ψ3
1−Lst
[
c
ψ1
t
(
1 − Lst
)ψ3 (1 − Lut )ψ2 ]1−σ =
H sγ sλst
(hst tst )γ s
(Lst )1−γ s + λ
h
t

(1−µ)(1−ρ)ωAαt y1−αt
([hst ]1−ω(Lst [1−tst ])ω )ν
Lst
(
ρkνt +
([hst ]1−ω(Lst (1−tst ))ω )ν (1−ρ))1− αν − φstst

(C.7)
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and
ψ2
1−Lut
(
c
ψ1
t
(
1 − Lst
)ψ3 (1 − Lut )ψ2)1−σ =
Huγuλut
(hut tut )γu
(Lut )1−γu + λ
h
t
[
µω
Lut
Aαt y
1−α
t
( [
hut
]1−ω [
Lut
(
1 − tut
) ]ω )α − φutut ] . (C.8)
Next, maximizing for the stock of next period’s physical capital entails the Euler
equation:
λht
Ptβ
= Etλ
h
t+1

Aαt+1ρk
ν−1
t+1y
1−α
t+1 (1 − µ)[
ρkνt+1 +
( [
hst+1
]1−ω [
Lst+1
(
1 − tst+1
) ]ω )ν (1 − ρ)]1− αν + 1Pt+1 (1 − δk)
 ,
(C.9)
whilst the optimal training choice requires that:
Hsγs
λst
λht
(
Lsth
s
t
)γs(
tst
)1−γs = φsLst + λht (1 − µ) (1 − ρ)ωAαt y1−αt
( [
hst
]1−ω [
Lst
(
1 − tst
) ]ω )ν
(
1 − tst
) [
ρkνt +
( [
hst
]1−ω [
Lst
(
1 − tst
) ]ω )ν (1 − ρ)]1− αν
(C.10)
for skilled training, and
Huγu
λut
λht
(
Lut h
u
t
)γu(
tut
)1−γu = φuLut + µωAαt y1−αt1 − tut ( [hut ]1−ω [Lut (1 − tut ) ]ω )α (C.11)
for unskilled training. The two FOCs with respect to the next period skill-capital
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stock are:
λst =βEtλ
h
t+1
(1−µ)(1−ω)(1−ρ)Aαt+1y1−αt+1
([hst+1]1−ω[Lst+1(1−tst+1)]ω )ν
hst+1
[
ρkνt+1+
([hst+1]1−ω[Lst+1(1−tst+1)]ω )ν (1−ρ)]1− αν
+βEtλ
s
t+1
(
H sγ s
(Lst+1tst+1)γ s
(hst+1)1−γ s
− δ s + 1
)
,
(C.12)
and
λut = βEtλ
h
t+1
[ (1−ω)µ
hut+1
Aαt+1y
1−α
t+1
( [
hut+1
]1−ω [
Lut+1
(
1 − tut+1
) ]ω )α ]
+βEtλ
u
t+1
[
Huγu
(Lut+1tut+1)γu
(hut+1)1−γu
− δu + 1
]
.
(C.13)
Initial and transversality conditions
The first order conditions are necessary condition for a solution of the planner’s
problem. To ensure the existence of a solution, I assume that:
k0 = k¯ > 0, (C.14)
hs0 = h¯
s > 0, (C.15)
and
hu0 = h¯
u > 0. (C.16)
244
Further, since agents are infinitely-living, to ensure a finite and unique solution to
the model exists (see e.g. Kamihigashi (2001)), I impose the following transver-
sality conditions:
lim
t→∞Etβ
tλht kt+1 = 0, (C.17)
lim
t→∞Etβ
tλht h
s
t+1 = 0, (C.18)
and
lim
t→∞Etβ
tλht h
u
t+1 = 0. (C.19)
Social Planner solution
Given initial conditions (C.14)-(C.16) and the path of exogenous innovations
{At , Pt }∞t=0, the social planner solution is defined to be an allocation
{
ct , l
s
t ,lut ,tst ,
tut ,kt+1,hst+1,hut+1, λht ,λst ,λut ,yt }∞t=0 such that (i) the planner’s budget is binding (C.3);
(ii) transversality conditions hold; (iii) all FOCs (C.6)-(C.12) hold; (iv) skill-
capital stocks evolve according to equations (C.5) and (C.4).
Equivalence of social planner and decentralised economy
The equivalence between the solution of the planner and the decentralised econ-
omy can be appreciated by observing that, once prices and wages are substituted
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out, the first order conditions (2.6)-(2.9) and (2.20)-(2.26) are equivalent to the
planner’s, so that the solution must also be the coincident.
As additional check, I solve numerically for the steady state the social planner
economy using the same calibration reported in Chapter 2 and I find that the
allocation, e.g. the level of consumption, physical capital and etcetera, is the
same as for the steady state of the competitive economy.
In conclusion, the decentralised equilibrium is a Pareto optimal allocation that
respects the first Welfare Theorem. Broadly speaking, this implies that the model
economy is characterised by: (i) absence of externalities, (ii) completeness of
markets, and (iii) absence of distorting taxes, such as income and sale taxes (see
e.g. Hammond (1998)).
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D
Derivatives firm’s FOCs with poaching
This Appendix reports the derivatives used in Chapter 3 to simplify the represen-
tative firm’s FOCs. As it can be noted, they are the same as those for Chapter
2 reported in Appendix B except the intertemporal derivatives of skilled and
unskilled human capital. This result follows intuitively from the fact that the
production function is the same and that poaching only affects the depreciation
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of skills (and not the marginal product of working or training time). Nonetheless,
I report all the derivatives utilised in Chapter 3. Those are defined as follows:
∂y
f
t
∂k
f
t
=
Aαρ(k ft )ν (y ft )1−α (1 − µ)
k
f
t [ρ(k ft )ν + ([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω) (1 − ρ)]1− αν , (D.1)
∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,u
t
= µωA{µ([l f ,ut
(
1 − tut
)]ω [hut ]1−ω)α + (1 − µ) ×
×[ρ(k ft )ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α −1×
×([l f ,ut
(
1 − tut
)]ω [hut ]1−ω)α (l f ,ut )−1,
(D.2)
∂hut+1
∂l
f ,u
t
= γuHu
(
tut h
u
t
)γu (l f ,ut )γu−1, (D.3)
∂y
f
t
∂l
f ,s
t
= ω (1 − µ) (1 − ρ)A{µ([l f ,ut
(
1 − tut
)]ω [hut ]1−ω)α + (1 − µ) ×
×[ρ(k ft )ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α −1[ρ(k ft )ν + (1 − ρ) ×
×([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν −1([l f ,st (1 − tst )]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν (l f ,st )−1,
(D.4)
∂hst+1
∂l
f ,s
t
= γ sH s
(
tsth
s
t
)γ s (l f ,st )γ s−1, (D.5)
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∂y
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∂tut
= −ωµA{µ([l f ,ut
(
1 − tut
)]ω [hut ]1−ω)α + (1 − µ) ×
×[ρ (kt )ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α −1×
× ([l
f ,u
t (1−tut )]ω[hut ]1−ω )α
1−tut ,
(D.6)
∂hut+1
∂tut
= γuHu
(
Lut h
u
t
)γu (
tut
)γu−1 , (D.7)
∂y
f
t
∂tst
= − (1 − ρ) (1 − µ)ωA{µ([l f ,ut
(
1 − tut
)]ω [hut ]1−ω)α + (1 − µ) ×
×[ρ (kt )ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α −1[ρ (kt )ν + (1 − ρ) ×
×([l f ,st
(
1 − tst
)]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν ] αν −1([l f ,st (1 − tst )]ω [hst ]1−ω)ν (l f ,st )−1,
(D.8)
∂hst+1
∂tst
= γ sH s(l f ,st hst )γ
s (
tst
)γ s−1 , (D.9)
∂y
f
t+1
∂hut+1
= Aµ (1 − ω) {µ([l f ,ut+1
(
1 − tut+1
)]ω [hut+1]1−ω)α + (1 − µ) ×
×[ρ(k ft+1)ν + (1 − ρ) ([l f ,st+1
(
1 − tst+1
)]ω [hst+1]1−ω)ν ] αν } 1α ×
×([l f ,ut+1
(
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)]ω [hut+1]1−ω)α (hut+1)−1,
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∂hut+1
= 1 − δu − δuε + γuHu
(
tut+1l
f ,u
t+1
)γu (
hut+1
)γu−1 , (D.11)
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∂y
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∂hst+1
= A (1 − µ) (1 − ρ)ν (1 − ω) {µ([l f ,ut+1
(
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)]ω [hut+1]1−ω)α+
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(
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(
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= 1 − δs − δsε + γ sH s
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f ,s
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)γ s (
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E
Total factor productivity in Chapter 3
As discussed in Section 2.4, after a total factor productivity (TFP) shock, the
model of chapter 2 generates dynamics that are in line with the real business
cycle (RBC) literature. This appendix assesses the role of training during business
cycles fluctuations by comparing a simulation to a temporary TFP shock with the
model of Chapter 3 with the simulation run on the same model but where training
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does not exists.
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Figure E.1: Comparison of a 1% temporary increase in total factor productivity
To exclude the training channel, it is sufficient to assume that: the human
capital stocks, hst and hut are fixed and equal to their respective steady state;1
training time is zero, i.e. tst , tut = 0; and the monetary resources spent for training
1This way the stocks could be interpreted as a fixed production input, such as land, owned
by firms.
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subsidies are (unproductive) public spending.
Figure E.1 reports the impulse response functions of both models. Qualitatively,
the dynamics after a temporary TFP shock is the same whether training is part
of the model or not. The only major difference is that, with endogenous training,
wages jumps up at the arrival of the shock. Conversely, without training, wages
rise less and more slowly (sub-plots (2,2) and (2,3)).
This difference can be attributed to the effects of higher TFP on the demand of
training time. As companies seek to accumulate human capital skills, they need
to occupy workers both in training and production activities. Thus, firms offer
higher wages to bid workers’ labour input.2
Lastly, it can be noted that endogenous training reduces the wage inequality
that is generated, in the medium run, by the temporary positive TFP innovation
(sub-plot (4,1)). Possibly, this is related to the lower stock of physical capital
accumulated in the presence of the training sector.
In conclusion, these results suggest that the inclusion of the channel for human
capital accumulation through training does not alter the basic properties of the
model.
2This explanations seems at odds with the higher labour supply I observe in the model
without training (sub-plots (3,2) and (3,3)). However, it is important to remember that also the
marginal utility of consumption matters for the labour market equilibrium.
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F
Simulation of the poaching externality
shock
This appendix reports the simulation exercise which I use to compute the elasticity
of training with respect to the job-to-job separation rate. The experiment shows
the effects of an increase in the poaching externality δ sε and δuε on the endogenous
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variables of the model employed in Chapter 3.
Experimenting with the model proves that the elasticity of training to an ex-
ogenous shock to these parameters and their values are proportionally related. As
explained in Section 3.4, this paves the way to the calibration of the poaching
externality.
Figure F.1 reports the dynamics of endogenous variables to a 1% permanent
increase in both skilled and unskilled firm poaching externality. As expected, the
reaction of the economy to this shock is very small. Most variables deviate from
their steady state by less than one basis point.
The shock has the greatest impact on the skill capital stocks which is depleted
because firms are less willingly to train workers. In fact, both skilled and unskilled
training decreases (sub-plots (4,5) and (5,1)). The increase in the separation
rate has overall negative consequences. In particular, total output declines and
households have lower labour income. The skill premium increases (sub-plot (3,5)),
as skilled wage initially rises, but this change is more than compensated by the
changes in labour supply, as indicated by the steady fall of income inequality
(sub-plot (3,4)).
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Figure F.1: Permanent increase in δ sε and δuε by 1%
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G
Further fiscal policies for Chapter 3
As explained in the main text, increasing the training subsidy rate requires ad-
ditional fiscal resources to be collected by the government. In order to ensure a
balanced budget, in Chapter 3 I have assumed that either both households get
taxed at a higher rate or only the skilled tax rate is increased. Here I report the
dynamics and the quantitative impact of skilled and unskilled training subsidies
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under the assumption that the government can collect lump-sum transfers to cover
for the extra expenditures (the rest is still collected through income taxation).
Unskilled subsidies
Figure G.1 allows a comparison of the unskilled training when those are financed
through distortionary taxed on both households and when those are financed
through lump-sum transfers. Clearly, non-distortionary taxes entail a much more
beneficial effect of training subsidies than otherwise.
When considering the steady state effects of the policies, under lump-sum trans-
fers, it not surprising that those are generally larger than the effects when distor-
tionary taxation is taken into account. Most remarkably, the path of physical
capital is much higher whenever taxes are non-distortionary, and both skilled
and unskilled consumption is much higher than it would be under distortionary
taxation.
Table G.1 compares the effects of unskilled training subsidies under lump-sum
and both household taxed assumptions in terms of percent changes from the orig-
inal steady state (i.e. comparative statics).
It can be observed that financing the intervention through distortionary tax-
ation causes a stronger reduction of inequality compared to lump-sum transfers,
even if the burden is equally shared across households. After accounting for the
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Figure G.1: Permanent increase of unskilled training subsidy to 0.25, lump-sum financing
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Table G.1: Steady-state effects of increasing unskilled training subsidies under lump-sum financing
lump-sum both tax rates
τu = 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.20 0.30
%∆tu 6.5 17 29 6.5 17 28
%∆ts 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1
%∆ t
s
tu -6.1 -14 -22 -6.1 -14 -22
%∆wu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 0.3 0.7 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.4
%∆ws
(
1 − τh ,s ) 0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6
%∆ w
s (1−τ h ,s )
wu (1−τ h ,u ) -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2 -0.6 -1.0
%∆wulu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 0.4 1.0 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.5
%∆wsls
(
1 − τh ,s ) 0.2 0.6 0.9 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7
%∆ (1−τ
h ,s )l sws
(1−τ h ,u )luwu -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.3 -0.7 -1.2
%∆ y(l sns+lunu ) 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
%∆U u/|U u | 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.03 0.07 0.10
%∆U s/|U s | 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.03 -0.09 -0.18
%∆(tslsφsτ s + tuluφuτu ) 1.5 3.8 6.5 1.5 3.9 6.8
distortionary taxation and the poaching externality, the effects of training subsi-
dies are larger in term of inequality but smaller in terms of aggregate outcomes.
Comparing the lump-sum transfer case to the other scenario, it can be observed
that distortionary taxation produces non-linear utility gains. The gains, in terms
of unskilled utility, diminish as the subsidy rate increases. Valued at the steady
state, unskilled utility improves by 0.03% when subsidies are 10%, by 0.07% when
subsidies are 20%, but only by 0.1% when subsidies are 30%.
To complete the picture, Table G.2 reports the multipliers for unskilled subsidies
under the two financing assumptions.
All fiscal multipliers are larger under the lump-sum transfers as the behaviour
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Table G.2: Lifetime multipliers after increasing unskilled training subsidies under lump-sum financ-
ing
lump-sum both tax rates
τu = 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.20 0.30
wulu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 2.45 2.37 2.29 0.69 0.57 0.44
wsls
(
1 − τh ,s ) 2.13 2.06 1.99 -1.87 -2.04 -2.23
wulu (1 − τh ,u ) +wsls (1 − τh ,s ) 2.24 2.16 2.09 -1.00 -1.16 -1.32
(1 + r (1 − τh ,s ) − δk )ks 33 32 31 -53 -56 -59
(1 + r (1 − τh ,u ) − δk )ku 12 12 12 3.92 3.42 2.90
pi -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.66 -0.67 -0.68
y 3.64 3.53 3.41 -0.23 -0.45 -0.68
U u − U¯ u 0.39 0.90 1.37 0.26 0.54 0.73
U s − U¯ s -0.09 -0.29 -0.61 -0.39 -1.08 -2.01
of the households is not influenced by the latter.
Skilled subsidies
Figure G.1 allows a comparison of the skilled training when those are financed
through distortionary taxed on both households and when those are financed
through lump-sum transfers. Again, I observe that, most of the time, the IRFs
under lump-sum transfers are above the IRFs with distortionary taxation for both
income flow or stock variables.
The same analysis is re-proposed for the case of skilled training subsidies. Thus,
Table G.3 reports the percent change from the original steady state of key variables,
and Table G.4 contains the present value multipliers.
The welfare evaluation provides the same insights. Lump-sum transfers would
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Figure G.2: Permanent increase of skilled training subsidy to 0.25, lump-sum financing
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imply large utility gains. When accounting for distortionary taxation, although
benefits are still significant, the size of the subsidy plays a key role.
Table G.3: Steady-state effects of increasing skilled training subsidies under lump-sum financing
lump-sum both tax rates
τ s = 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.20 0.30
%∆tu 0.08 0.18 0.29 0.1 0.1 0.2
%∆ts 5.3 13.2 22.4 5.3 13 22
%∆ t
s
tu 5.2 13.0 22.0 5.2 13 22
%∆wu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 0.10 0.24 0.38 0.0 0.0 -0.1
%∆ws
(
1 − τh ,s ) 0.24 0.59 0.97 0.1 0.2 0.2
%∆ w
s (1−τ h ,s )
wu (1−τ h ,u ) 0.14 0.35 0.58 0.1 0.2 0.3
%∆wulu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 0.17 0.41 0.67 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
%∆wsls
(
1 − τh ,s ) 0.36 0.88 1.46 0.1 0.2 0.3
%∆ (1−τ
h ,s )l sws
(1−τ h ,u )luwu 0.19 0.47 0.78 0.1 0.3 0.5
%∆ y(l sns+lunu ) 0.16 0.38 0.60 0.1 0.2 0.3
%∆U u/|U u | 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
%∆U s/|U s | 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.02 0.05 0.06
%∆(tslsφsτ s + tuluφuτu ) 3.9 9.7 16.4 3.9 9.8 16.6
Table G.4 contains the fiscal multipliers for the skilled subsidy. As expected,
the table shows that financing the subsidies with lump-sum transfers would be
more effective than financing them through distortionary taxation.
With respect to the fiscal multiplier of output, unskilled subsidies have larger
multipliers than skilled subsidies when these interventions are financed through
lump-sum transfers. Conversely, skilled subsidies have larger output multipli-
ers than unskilled subsidies when financed by distortionary taxes. For example,
spending 1£ on skilled training can increase total output by 0.37£ when increasing
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Table G.4: Lifetime multipliers after increasing skilled training subsidies under lump-sum financing
lump-sum both tax rates
τs = 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.20 0.30
wulu
(
1 − τh ,u ) 0.30 0.29 0.28 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13
wsls
(
1 − τh ,s ) 1.12 1.09 1.07 0.22 0.17 0.11
wulu (1 − τh ,u ) +wsls (1 − τh ,s ) 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.12 0.07 0.03
(1 + r (1 − τh ,s ) − δk )ks 16 15 14 -3.3 -4.5 -5.8
(1 + r (1 − τh ,u ) − δk )ku 6.1 5.8 5.6 4.2 3.9 3.6
pi -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
y 1.24 1.19 1.15 0.37 0.30 0.23
U u − U¯ u 0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.20 -0.46
U s − U¯ s 0.29 0.66 1.02 0.08 0.11 0.05
training subsidies to 10% of monetary costs whereas unskilled training depresses
output (negative multiplier).
In conclusion, it appears that the combination of training subsidies and taxes
affect the allocation of labour input with overall effects that depend the interplay
of the different policy tools employed. I leave to the reader any further consider-
ation.
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